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Background
Since the 1970s, Islam has become an increasingly important political
factor. The various manifestations of this phenomenon of ‘Islamic
activism’ have led to considerable tensions and violent conflicts, not only
within the Muslim world itself, but also in (relations with) the West and
the Netherlands. The interrelatedness of what occurs outside and inside
national borders means that what takes place elsewhere may also have
consequences for the internal relationship between segments of the popu-
lation. A climate of distrust and fear has arisen between Muslims and non-
Muslims, and also within the Muslim community itself. Communication
about ‘Islam’ now only takes place through intemperate images and
inflated words, such as a ‘clash of civilizations’ or an ‘irreconcilability of
Islam with democracy and human rights.’
Research question
This report investigates the characteristics and dynamics of Islamic activism.
It poses the question of whether, and in what respect, the manifestations 
of this activism since the 1970s offer reference points for democratization
and the improvement of human rights. It also investigates which policy
perspectives for the Netherlands and Europe can contribute to a reduction
of tensions surrounding Islamic activism in the longer term and can sup-
port processes of democratization and the improvement of human rights.
Goal
With this report, the Council intends to formulate a policy perspective
that will contribute to reducing the tensions with and within the Muslim
world on issues of Islamic activism. The Council considers it essential that
this perspective be based on factual knowledge of the developments and
characteristics of this activism. At the same time, this report does not
intend to be a description and analysis of all facets of Islamic activism,
including its well-known negative manifestations. The research concen-
trates on positive reference points for policy directed towards democrati-
zation and human rights in Muslim countries.
This report is directed towards the Dutch government. However, by their
nature, the international developments discussed, demand efforts of inter-
national policy. For this reason, the report primarily explores the policy
options available to the eu. It is precisely within this larger context that the
Netherlands can exert influence. However, reference points for the eu’s
external policy also have implications for approaching Islamic activism
within the Netherlands.
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Approach
The relationship between Islamic activism and democracy and human
rights is examined along three dimensions, namely:
• Islamic political thought,
• Islamic political movements, and
• Islamic law.
Reference points
The report concludes that Islamic activism does indeed offer reference
points for democratization and human rights. Each of the three investi-
gated dimensions shows, in this respect, great diversity and promising
dynamism. Even though these are only tentative reference points and much
uncertainty still exists, it is inaccurate to assume that ‘Islam’ in a general
sense is at odds with the acceptance of democracy and human rights.
On the level of Islamic political thought there are indeed many thinkers
who reject important principles for the polity of the state, such as the sepa-
ration of church and state, democracy, constitutional government, and
human rights, as incompatible with Islamic principles and the supremacy
of Islamic law. Yet, alongside these opinions, which shape much of the
image of Islam, there are increasingly more thinkers who strive for these
same principles precisely on Islamic grounds. They turn away from
dogmatic approaches that claim that the precepts of the sacred sources
should be followed to the letter. Rather, they are more concerned with the
spirit and expressive power of these sources in relation to current circum-
stances. Thinkers holding such views can now be found in many Muslim
countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Egypt, for example. This modernizing
mode of thought can even be found in Iran, a country that has now had a
quarter century of experience with Islamic theocracy.
The recent history of Islamic political movements in the Muslim world also
reveals a large degree of diversity and dynamism. Such movements do not
form a homogenous, unalterably radical, and always violent threat.
Transnational terrorism that concentrates on jihadist actions is, of course,
threatening. Alongside this, however, there are a number of Islamic move-
ments with very diverse aspirations, including groups seeking reforms
within the existing political systems. Moreover, Islamic political move-
ments in many Muslim countries have abandoned their initially radical
attitude in favor of a pragmatic political standpoint. The movements most
strongly oriented towards the political arena, such as the Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt, have shifted the most in the direction of accepting demo-
cratic principles and norms. In doing so, they distance themselves from
absolute truths and become familiar with the positive workings of demo-
cratic principles and human rights.
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
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In the last few decades many Muslim countries have been exposed to the
pressure of introducing elements of Islamic law in national legislation.
The views on what Sharia contains, however, are quite divergent, ranging
from very general guidelines to concrete codes of behavior. Thus there are
large differences not only in the laws based on Sharia, but also in how these
laws should be put into practice. The Islamization of law since the 1970s has 
had limited scope in most countries; exceptions are countries like Iran, 
Pakistan, and Sudan. Additionally, the first wave of Islamization has not
been not followed by a second; rather, there has been a decline in the 
influence of strict interpretations of Sharia on national law in the last fifteen
years. Even when Sharia plays a formal role, it seems that this does not 
exclude gradual modernization of law. Thus the reform of marriage laws has 
gone forward in most countries despite activism. In reaction to universal 
human rights, ideas about Islamic human rights have been developed in the
Islamic world. In addition to sharing similarities, these two concepts also
demonstrate important fundamental differences. Nevertheless, here, too,
there appears unmistakably a tendency towards gradual rapprochement. 
Policy perspective
The member states of the eu cannot permit themselves to stand aloof. An
inwardly focused Union which renounces external ambitions only creates
an illusion of security that does not remove the existing vulnerability.
Furthermore, aloofness means that Europe fails to make use of its oppor-
tunities for supporting promising developments in the Muslim world. 
For this reason, the wrr argues for an active and, wherever possible,
constructive attitude on the part of eu member states. This policy encom-
passes the following points:
• taking into account the diversity of Islamic activism;
• recognizing Islamic activism as a potentially constructive political and
legal factor in the development of Muslim countries;
• engaging with endogenous development processes and trajectories that
promote democracy and human rights;
• investing in an informed public opinion in Europe on Islamic activism
and on the main European and Dutch policies in this area.
Diversity
Between and within Muslim countries there are many different interpreta-
tions of the way in which Islam relates to politics, democracy, and human
rights. Whether Islam and democracy can coexist, and whether Islamic
legislation is at odds with human rights, cannot be established in any
general sense but differs according to particular views and/or practices of
Islam or Sharia, and may also change over time. The Netherlands and the
eu will have to invest in knowledge of these different views and practices
as a foundation for a policy towards Muslim countries.
9
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Constructive or not
In the past, the eu, in its advocacy of democratization and the improve-
ment of human rights in neighboring Muslim countries, primarily put its
hopes on non-religious movements and parties, even if these groups had
little political support within the local population. It becomes increasingly
apparent, however, that ignoring the political and legal agendas of religious
activism offers no solution and may even be counterproductive. Not only
does such a stance discourage Islamic groups with substantial followings
who are prepared to pursue gradual political liberalization from within the
existing system, but it also fuels the widely-held view amongst ordinary
citizens in the Muslim world that secularism and (Western) democracy, by
definition, serve anti-religious interests. This will only fan the demand for
Islamization, either because radicals will receive more support from the
population for their religious views, or because political rulers themselves
will play the conservative ‘Islamization card’ in order to maintain political
legitimacy.
The eu and the Netherlands should no longer rule out in advance Islamic
movements as potential interlocutors, but should be guided by the
concrete political actions of these groups. They should strongly support
groups moving towards the acceptance of democracy and human rights and
condemn groups which move away from this goal. In addition, they must
develop more positive incentives to be able to encourage and reward
reforms. Furthermore, they must be prepared to levy sanctions in the case
of serious violations of human rights. In the case of Euro-Mediterranean
policy, this may amount to the (temporary) suspension of a partnership
agreement. In this way, the Union allows space for different courses of
democratization and the progressive realization of human rights, while at
the same time maintaining its own values in this area. 
Endogenous dynamism
Democracy and human rights cannot be permanently imposed from
outside. The Netherlands and the eu should influence without lecturing
and accept the fact that within an Islamic frame of reference democracy and
human rights may sometimes (temporarily) be worked out in a manner
different from that which is customary in Western countries. In many
respects, Muslim countries do not satisfy contemporary international stan-
dards regarding democracy and human rights. In this, for that matter, they
do not differ from many (other) developing countries. Precisely because of
this, the question of whether and how they wish to aim for improvement is
crucial. Serious reforms in the direction of international standards deserve
support, including those which proceed from an Islamic discourse.
Progressive improvements of human rights in many Muslim countries are
simply easier to accept if they can be imbedded in the local tradition and
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
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culture. This is illustrated by the new family legislation in Morocco;
considerable improvement in women’s rights has taken place under the
banner of Sharia.
Implications for the Netherlands
Internal European and Dutch relations also demand attention to diversity
and dynamism. This, however, will require a cultural shift. To date, politi-
cal and public debate in the Netherlands lacks sufficient knowledge of
Islam and the many Islamic political movements and schools of thought.
Governments should support active and especially structural initiatives
which broaden the supply of information about these themes among
Muslims and non-Muslims. Structural contributions may serve as an 
excellent counterbalance to the one-sided information and influence
mechanisms, such as that of ‘web Islam’ practiced by radical factions.
In the Dutch situation, the formation of parties (partially) based on Islam
or Muslim identity can offer a constructive contribution to political debate.
Political parties inspired by Islam can give voice to those who do not feel
themselves to be represented in the Muslim representative bodies. Such
parties attest to the aspiration for participation in the existing institutions
and according to the pertaining democratic rules.
Conclusion
A climate of confrontation and stereotypical thinking does not create stable
conditions for security, democratization, and increasing respect for human
rights. The only advisable alternative is to engage the reference points for
democracy and human rights in Islamic activism itself. The analyses
presented in this report demonstrate that these reference points, indeed,
exist.
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1 introduction
1.1 background      
Over the last few decades, Islam has become an increasingly important polit-
ical factor. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran marked the sensational start 
of a period in which Islamic activists gained increasing currency as political
players (see box 1.1). Initially their influence appeared to be mostly limited 
to countries with a Muslim majority (‘Muslim countries’).1 Terrorist attacks
such as those in New York, Madrid, and London, however, have made it 
unambiguously clear that non-Muslim countries in the West also are a part 
of the image of the enemy for some Islamic groups. Indications of this have
been around for much longer; the Iranian revolution, for instance, had a
strong anti-Western motivation at its core. This understanding led writer
Samuel Huntington to predict in 1993 that after the disappearance of the 
opposition between East and West, new conflicts would take place more 
often between ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ civilizations (Huntington 1993). 
The last two decades of the twentieth century are the pre-eminent years of
the third wave of democratization and an increased focus on human rights
(Diamond 2003; undp 2002:14-16).2 This trend, however, appears to have
left major parts of the Muslim world almost untouched (Fish 2002). Only
four of the seventeen Arab countries have an electoral system which allows
competition among multiple parties through regularly recurring elections
(undp 2002: 15). Additionally, in a number of Muslim states in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and in Central and South Asia, political liberalization seems to
have stagnated since the middle of the 1990s. Insufficient civil and political
liberties, bad government (which continues to exist in the Arab region
thanks in part to oil income), lack of a proper constitutional state, and great
economic and social inequalities contribute to the increasing unrest and
hopelessness which help create a breeding ground for violent Islamic radi-
calism (undp 2005; Rabasa 2005). The violence is, in part, directed at the
people of the region. It is also partially directed at the West, which in the
Arab world is seen as another force maintaining the status quo for its own
(energy) interests, despite all the Western rhetoric about human rights and
democracy. 
There are also other factors which contribute to tensions around Islam and
the Muslim world. The practices of ‘Islam in power’ in countries where the
pursuit of Islamization results in the reintroduction of Islamic law (Sharia),
or in theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, are at odds with universal
human rights. The sometimes far-reaching segregation and inequality of
men and women, cruel punishments, animosity towards homosexuality,
introduction 
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and limitations on the freedom of expression in these countries are far
removed from what many in Europe and other parts of the West consider
important (though in some cases fairly recent) achievements. The same
holds for phenomena such as the practice of honor killings and female
circumcision which are likewise often associated with Islam. These
phenomena manifest themselves increasingly closer to home due to the
large number of Muslims currently living in Europe. Tensions surrounding
Islam have thus also become European and national political issues, which
often generate fierce debate and conflict within society.
Box 1.1 Political mobilization under the banner of Islam
There is already substantial literature available regarding the characteristics and back-
grounds of the recent revival of Islamic activism.3 This literature emphasizes a complex of
underlying factors and catalysts, a few of which we list below:
• the protracted decline of the great Islamic civilization and the rise of the Western
powers, resulting in the fall of Islamic empires and colonial domination;
• parallel to this, aroused feelings of humiliation, powerlessness, and lost identity, which
prevailed also after independence;
• the policy carried out by postcolonial governments directed towards the consolidation
of the (mostly secular) state, economic planning, and modernization. Through this
policy, large segments of the population for whom Islam was an important reference
point were, at the same time, placed culturally outside the system;
• international political events, such as the Six-Day War, the Arab oil boycott, the long,
drawn-out confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, and, recently, the war
against Iraq, which functioned as catalysts of discontent with the failed domestic poli-
cies and Western presence in the Middle East;
• the mobilizing effect of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the jihadist struggle of the
Taliban in Afghanistan;
• Saudi Arabian attempts to spread the doctrine of conservative Islamic Wahhabism
through the rest of the world with the help of ‘petrodollars’. This doctrine should serve
as a Sunni counterweight to Shiite revolutionary zeal;
• the increasingly manifest political failures of postcolonial governments in many
Muslim countries against a background of growing international economic competi-
tion, rapid population growth, substantial migration to large cities, and rising expecta-
tions of the population as a consequence of higher levels of education;
• the emergence of political movements which – after the relaxation of tensions 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’, the decline of communism, and the worldwide pressure 
for political liberalization since the start of the 1990s – treat Islam as a frame of reference
for political legitimization; many strive toward the ‘Islamization’ of politics, the state
and law;
• the use of terrorism by radical, often transnationally operative, activist groups and
networks who charge geopolitical conflicts (such as the Gulf War, the Balkan War, the 
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
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conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya, the Palestinian conflict, and the war in Iraq) with
‘Islamic’ and primarily anti-Western overtones;
• Muslims’ experience of exclusion and discrimination in the economic, cultural, and
political arenas in Western countries. 
The connection between what happens outside and inside our borders
involves not only concrete facts, but also images. Terrorist actions carried
out by Muslims elsewhere in the world may suddenly cause Muslims in the
Netherlands to be seen as potential terrorists and their religion as intrinsi-
cally antidemocratic and violent. The reverse also holds true: Muslims
living in Europe and the us may interpret the wartime actions of Western
countries against Muslim countries as new ‘evidence’ that the West is
targeting Islam. International tensions and conflicts thus no longer affect
only the international and foreign political relations between countries, but
also greatly influence internal relationships between population groups via
events and images. Even if our relationships with the governments of the
Muslim world are stable, tensions and violent conflicts within and between
Muslim countries can have significant consequences in Europe and the
Netherlands, both for Muslims and non-Muslims. This accentuates the
importance of more relaxed relationships between and within Muslim
countries.
1.2 goal, key questions, and definitions
Goal and key questions
The report aims to provide insight into the dynamics of Islamic activism in
the Muslim world, and to formulate a policy perspective for reducing
tensions surrounding Islamic activism and supporting processes of democ-
ratization and the improvement of human rights in Muslim countries. The
central questions are outlined below:
• What insights can be derived from the development of Islamic activism
since the 1970s in relation to democratization and the advancement of
human rights?
• What reference points does Islamic activism offer for rapprochement with
the concepts of democracy and human rights?
• What policy perspectives for the Netherlands and Europe can, in the long
run, reduce the tensions related to Islamic activism within the Muslim
world and also support the processes of democratization and the advance-
ment of human rights?
These questions are naturally based on the assumption that democracy and
human rights represent universal values, and that the active support of
introduction 
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these values should not be limited to certain regions or (religious) popula-
tion groups. Put undiplomatically: even if the Arab region is rich in oil and
terrorist Islamic activism, that is no reason to view the systematic viola-
tions of human rights by repressive Arab regimes as an acceptable ‘price’
for political stability in the region. Even if many authoritarian regimes
inside and outside the region are only too grateful to use the American
‘war’ on terror to label their Islamic activist opponents as terrorists, West-
ern democracies should not ignore the justified democratic wish of Islamic
political parties to take part in the normal political process of their country.
The questions asked in this report are expressly focused on reference points
within Islamic activism for democratization and the advancement of human
rights. This report is thus not concerned with providing a representative
image of all facets of this activism, including all its aberrations. This selec-
tive approach has been chosen consciously. The primary assumption of this
report is that precisely because of the mutually interrelatedness of foreign
and domestic politics, the West has an enlightened, long-term self-interest in
helping countries in parts of the Muslim world to break out of the political
and economic stagnation. Lack of opportunities for development, bad
government, lack of regular institutional channels for expressing political
discontent, and repression form a dangerous mix which can easily encour-
age (violent) radicalism within the Muslim world. Violent radicalism is also
increasingly easily directed towards population groups outside the Muslim
world, certainly in relatively open societies. However, policies directed
towards the structural support of democratization and human rights in 
the long term can counteract radicalism. Democratization and respect for
basic human rights enable people to mandate political parties that are
responsive to the voter’s interests and respect democratic procedures and
institutions. They also offer people opportunities to send away political
leaders who neglect the agenda of development for their country. Without
these opportunities present, radical groups will maintain their appeal since
they are the only ones in the position to challenge the established order, 
yet without having to account to the population for their actions. In these
circumstances, radical Islamic groups can easily obtain the lead over other
competing political groups since they primarily spread their message
through mosques, religious welfare organizations, and other religious
networks which, thanks to the protection of the banner of Islam, are less
quickly exposed to direct government repression (Gambill 2004). 
Breaking through the cycle of repression and extremism in parts of the
Muslim world and allowing real political competition in elections can
contribute to the moderation of Islamic extremism in the long run, but
there are, of course, no certainties. In the short term, processes of democra-
tization may even be destabilizing, because in new democracies with a long
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
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history of authoritarian control, for instance, democratic institutions are
still weak, the people have little trust in democratic procedures, and the
newly chosen political elite plays on nationalist or populist sentiments to
overcome domestic political differences. The critics of policies for democ-
ratization even believe that the short term risks of a take-over by Islamic
extremists with the attendant chaos and instability are not compensated
for by the possible chance of successful democratization in the long run.
The Council, however, emphasizes the importance for the Netherlands and
Europe of developing a strategic policy that will take into account not only
such short-term dilemmas and risks, but will also be equipped in the long
run to exploit opportunities whenever and wherever these arise. 
Definitions
How the processes of democratization will take place and what form
democracy will finally take may vary from country to country and also
over time.4 It is clear, however, that the concept of democracy assumes
more than periodic (free) elections alone. Democracy must ultimately also
be based on the rule of law, respect for basic individual human rights, such
as human dignity, freedom of expression, association, assembly, and 
religion, the right to education, constitutionally guaranteed oversight of
government decisions by chosen representatives of the people and civilian
control of the army and police. 
The Council will use the term Islamic activism to refer to the revival of
‘Islam’ as a political factor in the Muslim world. This refers to the endeav-
ors of people for whom Islam is an important source of inspiration in the
organizing of contemporary politics and society (Fuller 2003: xi). Here
Islamic activism is an umbrella term for various possible objectives and
demands, from the pursuit of a (worldwide) Islamic state to its antithesis –
namely the separation of mosque and state based on Islamic principles. 
The word ‘Islamic’ emphasizes that Islam functions as a common vehicle
and idiom for raising the political and social consciousness of large groups
of Muslims. ‘Activism’ indicates that many different kinds of efforts may
be included and that these may be highly susceptible to change. Under-
standing this requires interpreting the symbols, rhetoric, and idiom of Islam
as well as the actions and behavior of the Muslims concerned.
Along with other concepts such as Islamism, fundamentalism, extremism,
and political Islam, the term ‘Islamic activism’ in the current context some-
times evokes associations with violent, extremist action in the name of
Islam. This is not surprising; it is always the extreme and violent manifes-
tations which attract attention these days. Much of the turbulence which
manifests itself under the name of Islam, both within and outside the
Muslim world, is concerned with expressions of self-awareness raising and
introduction 
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militancy. This is something which should not be ignored, of course. This
militancy, however, is not solely expressed in violent forms; it covers the
whole spectrum from peaceful, playful, and provocative actions to those
that are violent, terrorist, and intimidating. It is also expressed in various
political, social, and cultural arenas and through various forms such as
political movements and parties, non-governmental organizations (ngos)
and individual, and collective scholarly research into Islamic political
thought. 
The concept of Islamization refers to the founding of politics, the state, law,
and society on Islamic principles. This concept is not entirely unambiguous
since these principles and their meanings can be interpreted in very 
different ways. Thus the view that Islam cannot relate positively with
democracy, the constitutional state, and human rights has come to be 
held not only by many in the West, but also by many in the Muslim world
(Huntington 1993 and 1996). Don’t the experiences in Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan teach us that the relationship is more likely to be a negative
one? This relationship, however, can also vary according to time and place.
By focusing on developments that have taken place since the 1970s we 
can see what implications Islamic activism has had for politics and law 
and whether any changes have arisen with regard to the Islamization 
advocated. Have Islamic movements and groups maintained their original
goals and instruments or have these changed over time? It is plausible 
that Islamic-political groups that originally presented themselves as violent
or anti-system forces may, in the end, play a constructive role within the
existing political system and increasingly orient themselves toward
democratization and the advancement of human rights (Fuller 2003).
Conversely, one can also imagine that movements and groups that first
aimed to function within the existing systems could later formulate
increasingly extreme demands in terms of the Islamization of the state 
and law. 
This report uses the term fundamentalism to mean the pursuit of political
reforms based on guidelines set down in the sacred sources (the Quran and
the Sunna, the acts of the Prophet Mohammed). Radicalism is defined here
as the pursuit of sweeping changes in the political and social order. The
terms radicalism and extremism are used synonymously in this report.
1.3 limitations
To be clear, the Council stresses that this report will not conduct a discus-
sion about ‘the (in)compatibility of Islam with democracy and human
rights’ in a general sense. While this question has occupied many (Muslims
and non-Muslims) in the West for the last few years in particular, this dis-
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cussion is seldom fruitful. Seeking an answer by relying solely on the sacred
texts does not help. In the end it is not so much the texts, but primarily their
interpretation and the concrete actions of the adherents which determine
whether or not their religion is compatible with democracy and human
rights. The many diverse interpretations and forms of conduct are, in turn,
dependent on a range of different factors such as the cultural norms of the
religious population in question and economic and political development
trajectories – factors which are strongly linked to time and place. Therefore
the proposition that Islam, democracy, and human rights are (in)compatible
as such can neither be confirmed nor denied. The Council deems it more
productive to investigate under which circumstances and in which places 
in the Muslim world Islamic activism creates opportunities for, or impedi-
ments to democratization and the advancement of human rights. 
Likewise, the theme of this report is not ‘development’ (of democracy,
human rights, etc.) in Muslim countries in a general sense. The focus is on
Islamic activism in relation to (further) democratization and advancement
of human rights in these countries. By limiting itself to this religious polit-
ical factor, we aim to shed light on an extremely relevant line of approach.
We do recognize, however, the risk of over-emphasizing this factor and
ascribing more importance to it than is justified. With the focus explicitly
on Islamic activism, the impression may easily arise that all the behavior of
individual Muslims, Islamic movements, and governments is motivated by
their religion, while in actual fact other factors might be more important.
Yet also in cases where Islam as a religion does play an explicit role, it may
serve as a vehicle for completely different goals, such as the underlining of
identity, resistance against corrupt regimes or foreign domination, nation-
alistic aspirations, or ethnic dominance. This report will attempt to do
justice to these nuances. 
The analyses of this report do not refer all the time to all Muslim countries.
That would require a much larger research project than the present one.
Some information here does indeed concern all Muslim countries – as far 
as it is available – but for more ‘in-depth’ information, a selection has to
suffice. This primarily concerns Chapter 4, which draws on the research
into comparative law in twelve Muslim countries commissioned by the
wrr and conducted by J.M. Otto, professor and director at the Van Vollen-
hoven Institute for Law and Administration in Non-Western Countries at
the University of Leiden. For Chapter 2, which deals with developments 
in modern Islamic political thought within the mainstreams of Sunni and
Shiite Islam, the wrr similarly commissioned research by Nasr Abu Zayd,
Ibn Rushd Professor at the University for Humanistics and professor at 
the University of Leiden. Both studies have been published simultaneously
with the Dutch version of this report (Otto 2006; Abu Zayd 2006).
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1.4 elabor ation of the research question and 
structure of the report
The development of Islamic activism in the Muslim world in relation to
democratization and human rights is studied in terms of three dimensions:
• Islamic political thought within the Sunni and Shiite mainstreams,
• Islamic political movements, and
• Islamic law.
These dimensions are dealt with in Chapters 2 through 4 in the order indi-
cated above. This order, however, does not suggest any causal progression
or sequential connection in the sense that renewal starts on the intellectual
level, is subsequently translated into political activism, and then finally
settles into law. Changes can take place in this order, but different
sequences are also conceivable, while, at the same time, renewal may also
finds its origin outside these areas. Furthermore, other approaches may
plausibly be used to view the development of activism, such as that of
Islam as ‘lived’ in practice. Because of this report’s focus on the relation-
ship between Islamic activism and democracy and human rights, the public
dimensions noted above have been chosen.
The development of Islamic-political thought is the focus of Chapter 2.
There is a broad spectrum of views with regard to the organization of the
state and society, and the relationship of Islam with democracy, the consti-
tutional state, and human rights. The schools of thought researched here
can be found within the Sunni and Shiite mainstreams. First we will exam-
ine the authors who are considered the intellectual fathers of the move-
ments that have dedicated themselves since the 1970s to the establishment
of an Islamic state and the introduction of Islamic law (sec. 2.2). They are
also designated as fundamentalists since they pursue political reform on
the basis of the original sources of Islam: the Quran and the Sunna. Many
look to the early days of Islam for inspiration to break out of the stagnation
in the Muslim world. Next to be considered are thinkers who distance
themselves from following these sacred sources literally. These thinkers are
inspired by the intention and expressive power of these sources when
applied to modern questions (sec. 2.3). Subsequently, the chapter addresses
the question of dynamism within viewpoints and a possible rapproche-
ment with concepts of democratization and universal human rights (sec.
2.4). Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 2.5.
Chapter 3 deals with the development of Islamic political movements.
Section 3.2 describes the most prominent characteristics of activist political
movements that sprung up in the 1970s. In some countries they have
succeeded in taking power (sec. 3.3). In most other countries they have not
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been successful, or, if so, only temporarily. These groups are, however,
emphatically present in the political and social arenas in these countries
(sec. 3.4). Interaction with the state greatly influences the dynamism and
radicalism of this activism. Section 3.5 outlines this dynamism and assesses
the opportunities for (further) democratization and advancement of
human rights.
The development of Islamic law in Muslim countries is the subject of 
Chapter 4. This chapter investigates the scope of the Islamization of
national law (sec. 4.2) and the relationship between universal and Islamic
human rights (sec. 4.3). An important question here is whether these legal
structures are at odds or if they permit rapprochement. Section 4.4 inter-
prets the legal dynamics, after which conclusions are drawn (sec. 4.5).
This report is primarily directed toward the Dutch government. However,
several of the proposed policy guidelines demand cooperation at the Euro-
pean level; it is precisely within this larger context that the Netherlands
can exert influence. Chapter 5 investigates which policy options the
Netherlands (working in conjunction with the eu) has at its disposal for
reducing potential tensions within the Muslim world around the issue of
Islamic activism and for supporting processes of democratization and the
advancement of human rights. It begins by characterizing the context of
contemporary world politics in which this policy must be carried out (sec.
5.2). Next it briefly sketches the findings of the previous chapters on the
reference points within Islamic activism for rapprochement with the
concepts of democracy and human rights (sec. 5.3). These sections offer a
prelude to the policy perspective: a guiding framework with general 
starting points for constructively dealing with Islamic activism and, where
possible, supporting democratization and human rights in the Muslim
world (sec. 5.4). Section 5.5 throws light on the relevance of these general
points of departure by exploring concrete options for the Dutch govern-
ment to shape its constructive involvement with Muslim countries on
European and bilateral levels. Finally the wrr briefly discusses the impli-
cations of this policy perspective for dealing with Islamic activism within
the Netherlands itself, also given the increasing interrelatedness between
external and internal developments (sec. 5.6). The last section will be used
to formulate final conclusions (sec. 5.7).
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notes
1 This report uses the term ‘Muslim countries’ to denote countries where
over fifty percent of the population is Muslim. There are 48 such countries
(see the appendices at the end of this report). An overview of countries
with a Muslim majority can be found in Karatnycky 2002, amongst others.
In this report the adjective ‘Islamic’ is used to refer to the religion of Islam.
2 The worldwide increase in the number of democracies has been relatively
recent. Circa 1900, there was no nation that could be designated an ‘elec-
toral democracy’ – what would today be considered a very minimalist and
inadequate interpretation of democracy based on universal suffrage and
competitive multi-party elections. Only a handful of nations (about 19
percent of all countries and 12.4 percent of the world’s population) had
democratic characteristics, but even the most democratic of these had no
female suffrage and, in the case of many states in the us, blacks were
prevented from voting. The overwhelming majority of countries in this
group had political systems in which a dominant party controlled political
power and could exert a disproportionately large influence on the media
and the course of elections. Of the 130 states, no fewer than 55 were
colonies and another 20 were protectorates. Most of these would only
obtain independence during the process of decolonization which took
place in the two decades after World War II. Illustrative of this is the fact
that in 1950, 33 of the current 57 member states of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (oic) still had the status of colony or protectorate. The
number of electoral democracies in the world increased rapidly only from
1974 onwards; there was a jump from 27 to 43 percent in 1987, and by the
end of the twentieth century this finally reached about 62 percent (Free-
dom House 1999). 
3 For more recent analyses, see, amongst others, the rand report (Rabasa et
al. 2005), the Arab Human Development Reports of the undp (undp 2003,
2004, and 2005), Roy 2004, as well as publications by the International
Crisis Group (icg), such as icg 2005a.
4 There is substantial literature regarding the characteristics and qualities of
democracies and processes of democratization. For recent investigations
and discussions see, for instance, the many contributions in the Journal of
Democracy, such as Diamond and Morlino 2004. For a debate on democra-
tization and democratic deficiencies in Muslim countries see, amongst
others, Karatnycky 2002; Stepan and Robertson 2003 and 2004; Fish 2002;
Lakoff 2004, and Nasr 2005.
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2 the development of isl amic political
thought
2.1 introduction
This chapter investigates which insights can be gained from the develop-
ment of Islamic political thought since the 1970s and its relations with
democracy and human rights. Are there reference points which could in
the longer term reduce tensions regarding Islamic activism, and which
could reinforce processes of democratization and the improvement of
human rights within Muslim countries? 
It will be evident that Islamic thought on the design of the state, politics,
and law offers a varied image. The thinkers presented here have sought, or
continue to seek, new powers of expression for Islam within public life.
They take part in Islamic activism and can all be seen as reform-minded.
Nevertheless, there are great differences in the directions of the reforms
they champion. To make these differences more apparent, the thinkers will
be divided into two categories. The first group includes thinkers who look
for inspiration in the utopia of the foundation period of Islam, and who
follow the letter of the Quran and the Sunna as guidelines. This group will
be discussed in section 2.2. These thinkers exert great influence; many
Islamic movements – including militant ones – that have made themselves
felt strongly since the 1970s were established or influenced by them. It is
primarily their views which feed the fear that Islam is at odds with democ-
racy and human rights. 
There are, however, also thinkers who emphasize a positive connection
between Islam, democracy, and human rights; given the research question
of this report, attention will be paid primarily to their views (section 2.3).
Unlike the former group, they employ a modern epistemology and
emphasize the inherent relativity of human interpretations of the sacred
sources (Filali-Ansary 2003). They distance themselves from the literal
texts through their emphasis on the spirit of the Quran and the Sunna and
in this way create space for the appreciation of democracy and human
rights. The choice of which thinkers to present here is not based on their
influence or following, but on their substantive contribution to the freeing
of Islam from a traditionalist and legalistic interpretation. The selection is
limited to thinkers within the two mainstreams of Islam, namely Sunni
and Shiite. That is not to say, however, that there are no relevant views 
on democracy and human rights within other groups such as the Alewite,
Ahmadi, and Sufi movements. The selection is further concentrated on
thinkers from a limited number of countries. In this way it is possible to
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take into account the context of those countries along with the ideas and
their dynamics.
Section 2.4 deals with the issue of the dynamism of opinions and potential
rapprochement with concepts of democratization and the strengthening 
of human rights, while section 2.5 draws conclusions from the insights that
have been presented. This chapter is based to a significant extent (particu-
larly section 2.3) on a study conducted for the wrr by Nasr Abu Zayd,
professor at the University of Leiden and the University for Humanistics 
in Utrecht. This study, titled Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical
Historical Analysis, has been published simultaneously with this report
(Abu Zayd 2006). Abu Zayd’s publication will be referred to for literature
on the thinkers discussed below.
2.2 reform by returning to the sources
Current thinking about reform is strongly inspired by views which were
developed at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century. The context of intensive confrontation with the West and with
Western thought at that time led to a great need for reform within the
Muslim world. Whether caused directly by colonization or indirectly
through the influence of Western thought on the indigenous regimes, the
West strongly left its mark on states and nations. This usually meant that
Islam was relegated to the private sphere. Western dominance led to a
profound crisis of identity within the Muslim world. The dominant ques-
tion throughout the Muslim world was: why is the West so powerful and
the Muslim world – once a great power – so weak? The abolition in 1924 
of the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire – the former Muslim empire that
appointed itself as ruler of the whole Muslim community (Ummah) – was 
a traumatic event which many in the Muslim world viewed as yet another
defeat for ‘Islam’ by the dominant West. This led to an intensive debate on
the caliphate. At the same time, the debate on ‘Islam and politics’ was born,
a debate in which the two categories of reform thinkers take such very
different positions (Abu Zayd 2006).
Muhammid Rashid Rida (1865-1935) defended the caliphate as an authentic
Islamic political system. While it was not explicitly stated as such in the
sacred sources of the Quran and Sunna, the caliphate was viewed by Rida
as necessary to prevent Muslims from reverting to a state of heathenism,
jahiliyya. For this reason he saw the reinstatement of the caliphate as an
essential strengthening of Islamic law and order that could counter the
existing decadence brought about by Western influence. This view was
shared by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). He blamed the decline of the
Muslim world on the loss of the religious fervor so characteristic of its
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foundation era – the time of the Prophet and the so-called ‘rightly guided
caliphs’, the first four caliphs who ruled after the Prophet’s death. 
Al-Banna was strongly opposed to the practices of faith of his time, which
were traditionalist and unconcerned with worldly affairs, as well as to the
ulama who supported these practices. His ideological message was that
Islam, which was based on divine revelation, is an unequaled system that
should permeate all aspects of human life. Muslims should return to the
pure faith of the devout forefathers of the Ummah, a faith that had not yet
been ‘contaminated’ by foreign influences. The faithful will only be able to
know Allah through the description that He personally and via His Prophet
has given. Everything else is heathenism. For this reason, all Western
influences, such as codes of law, social customs (clothing, greetings, work-
ing hours, languages), ideas and institutions should be removed, and Sharia
(Islamic law) should be instituted across the board (Abu Zayd 2006).
In 1928, al-Banna set up the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to implement
his ideas. His strategy was to use the Brotherhood to first Islamize Egypt-
ian society. This example was meant to be followed elsewhere in the
Muslim world as a necessary step towards ultimately achieving a caliphate.
Because of these concepts, al-Banna is viewed as the father of the idea of
‘the Islamic state’ (Fuller 2003: 9), which was to be gradually built from the
bottom up and ultimately result in a caliphate. He viewed Islam as the
universal solution for all the major issues and as the ideological alternative
to capitalism and communism (Buijs 2002: 68). From the very start, the
movement was directed under his leadership towards – what would be
considered in modern terminology – humanitarian goals and social work
amongst the poorer layers of the population, and employed peaceful means
of Islamization. In this way the Brotherhood created an extensive network
of Islamic schools, professional associations, youth associations, and so on.
Al-Banna, who was assassinated in 1949, also argued for participation in
the political process; after all, the Islamization of the state was an impor-
tant intermediate step towards the ultimate goal of recreating the caliphate. 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is seen as the mother of the many
movements that have appeared up to the present time with the demand for
the Islamization of the state and society. This role certainly concerns the
Sunni world, although it extends even beyond. Hasan al-Banna was
strongly influenced by both Salafism and Wahhabism. Salafism is derived
from the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammed Abdu, thinkers
known as important reformers. This movement initially directed its efforts
chiefly towards modernization. The objective was to overcome the large
gulf between the Sunni and Shiite sects as well as between the four Sunni
schools of law. By calling for ‘the utopia of the early days’ and for following
the example of the early Ummah, it appealed to the authentically Islamic in
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reaction to Western political and cultural domination, as well as to
activism in reaction to tradition and quietism. In this way the existing
discord and rigidity could be overcome. Al-Banna’s pursuit of the restora-
tion of the caliphate, however, gradually led him and the Brotherhood in
the direction of the very conservative and intolerant Wahhabism (Abu
Zayd 2006). This doctrine, which is also the faith of present-day Saudi
Arabia, is based on the views of Muhammed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1792). He preached absolute theocracy and an extremely puritanical, ‘true’
Islam based on a literal interpretation of the Quran and imitating the life 
of the Prophet as faithfully as possible. Backed by petrodollars, this belief
system, which also preaches a very strict separation of the sexes, has gained
great influence throughout the Muslim world as well as in the West,
including the Netherlands (aivd 2004). It should be noted that external
influencing is primarily occurring under the banner of Salafism, the
contemporary mainstream of which is now linked to Wahhabism. This
puritanical movement emphasizes transnational Islamic identity and
community (Ummah) and is strongly opposed to Western influence (icg
2004a).
In the course of its history, the Brotherhood has had periods of radicaliza-
tion, and more radical splinter groups have emerged in reaction to oppres-
sion by the Egyptian government. These groups include, for instance,
explicitly revolutionary movements, such as Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which flourished primarily in the 1980s in Egypt
and, like the Brotherhood, have been imitated elsewhere in the Muslim
world. The inspiration with respect to content for this radicalization was
primarily supplied by Sayyd Qutb (1906-1966), who led the Muslim Broth-
erhood in the early 1950s. 
Qutb is known as the theoretician of militant Islamic activism. He mainly
developed his ideas while imprisoned. Like al-Banna, he described Egypt
as being in a state of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic heathendom). This diagnosis
was not only directed towards the majority of the population, but, more
particularly, towards the established political order and the religious estab-
lishment. According to Qutb, since the Quran is the source of all true
knowledge and thus also the absolute standard for judging knowledge,
philosophy, social science, and political systems must therefore be seen
without exception as manifestations of heathenism. Using the concept of
the absolute and exclusive sovereignty of God (hakimiyya: all power
belongs to God and only God should be obeyed), he divided society into
two camps: those who obey God and those who do not. This Manichaean
view of the absolute opposition between good and evil served as an impor-
tant justification of rebellion and struggle. While al-Banna placed his
emphasis on (peaceful) Islamization from the bottom up, Qutb focused his
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attention specifically on the Islamization of the state. In his view, anti-
Islamic governments and neocolonialism had led to a corrupt and unreli-
gious society; Islam stood on the edge of the abyss. For him, all secular
governments were godless and had to be overturned so that a true Islamic
regime could be established (ultimately throughout the world). He called
for the formation of a vanguard organization which would engage in this
struggle. He viewed this ‘jihad’ against the existing powers as an urgent
and legitimate duty. According to Buijs (2002) – whose work forms the
basis of this description – this does not necessarily entail armed struggle.
Qutb saw the choice of means as dependent on the concrete situation and
goal in question. With this vision of jihad-as-liberation-struggle, he broke
out of the traditional Islamic juridical belief that favored stability over the
justice and legitimacy of the state. At the same time, he argued for the
reopening of ‘the gates of ijtihad’ (the right to a legal interpretation of the
concrete implications of religious doctrine) which had been declared closed
by the religious scholars since the tenth century. 
The Indian – and later Pakistani – al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) also contributed
significantly to the shape and content of what would eventually come to be
known as political Islam. He greatly influenced Qutb, but lacked the latter’s
militant radicalism. Instead he took part in the political institutions of
Pakistan. Unlike al-Banna he was an outspoken advocate of Islamization
from the top down (Kepel 2002: 34). But like al-Banna and Qutb, he
emphasized Islamic identity (in terms of religion, philosophy, culture, the
political and economic systems, and education). Much more than the other
two thinkers, however, al-Mawdudi strongly emphasized the superiority
of Islamic civilization over what the (materialistic) West had to offer. In his
view, there was no need to ‘borrow’ anything from the West. The earthly
representation of the all-encompassing universe, in which all power
belongs to Allah, is found in ‘the state of Islam’. Only two authoritative
sources exist for the necessary Islamization, namely the Quran and the
Sunna, and, according to Mawdudi, these should be taken literally. They
are, after all, sacred texts: the Quran is the ‘uncreated’ – and therefore eter-
nal – revelation of the word of God, and the Sunna contains Mohammed’s
God-inspired utterances that have been passed down (Arkoun 1992). 
Al-Mawdudi played an important role in the Jamaat-i-Islami movement
(organization for Islamic revival) he set up in 1941 in what was to become
Pakistan. He was an outspoken pan-Islamic thinker and was opposed to
nationalism. Indeed, he saw Muslim identity as universal and the national
state as antithetical to this universality. In this sense, the concept of the
nation-state is dangerous, both in terms of theology and in practice: theo-
logically, because it can never be an authoritative object of identification
between God and man, and practically because it threatens the unity of the
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Muslim community (Ummah). For this reason, he rejected the idea of
Pakistan as a Muslim state; Pakistan must instead become an Islamic state.
For him, the return to Islam derived from hakimiyya; Islam is thus an all-
encompassing ideology for the individual and the community, for the state
and society. The faithful, and not the religious scholars (ulama), are the
guardians of God’s legacy. Strict and thorough submission to God’s word
and following the example of the Prophet are what makes a good Muslim;
everything else is an expression of unbelief. It is precisely the subordina-
tion to God’s authority that gives people freedom. The establishment of
one’s own laws is an expression of arrogance since the Sharia contains all
the necessary precepts. Rulers must not only be competent but pious, and
they must refrain from pursuing their own self-interests. They are obli-
gated to consult with the faithful (the Quranic principle of shura) to recon-
cile interests and bring about a state of universal harmony amongst the
faithful (Buijs 2002: 68-70). 
Al-Banna, Qutb, and al-Mawdudi had great influence in the Sunni world,
in particular, but they also served as an important source of inspiration for
the leaders of the Islamic revolution in Shiite Iran (Abu Zayd 2004: 60).
The offspring of their views make themselves felt today, including in the
particularly fierce forms so well known in the West after 9/11. The Pales-
tinian Abdullah Azzam is a major source of inspiration for extremist
groups that support armed jihad. He is also the teacher of Osama bin
Laden, the pre-eminent symbol of armed conflict. Azzam was deeply influ-
enced by Qutb and the Salafiyya jihadiyya, the extremely conservative and
violent movement that arose in the context of the war against the Soviet-
backed regime in Afghanistan (icg 2004a). While Qutb can be seen as the
father of Islam as ideological resistance to repressive regimes at home,
Azzam extended this to jihad against external enemies of Islam, which he
viewed as besieging the Muslim world and wished to tackle one by one. 
He opposed the nationalist orientation of many movements and viewed
the nation state as a product of colonialism and imperialism. Following the
Muslim theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), he claimed that
“the Muslim countries are equal to a single country”. Osama bin Laden 
has extended Azzam’s armed conflict over the entire world (Buijs 2002: 
76-80). His views are precisely in keeping with Huntington’s concept of a
‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1996). 
As will become evident in the next chapter, many of the movements that
have arisen from the ideas of the authors discussed have only partially
succeeded in the Islamization of state and society. This is due to the fact
that they not only found the government against them, but often the reli-
gious establishment as well, which, according to the authors – incidentally,
all laymen – formed a part of the problem by selling out to the regime
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
30
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 30
(Kepel 2002). Islamic activism achieved great political success in Shiite
Iran, however. The intellectual inspiration was provided by Ali Shariati
(1933-1977), who would greatly influence Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Shariati was primarily influential among students; Khomeini had substan-
tial authority in the religious world and amongst loyal segments of the 
religious population. It was precisely this collaboration that allowed the
Islamic revolution to succeed in Iran. 
Shariati was strongly influenced by leftist intellectuals such as Jean-Paul
Sartre and revolutionaries such as Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara and also found
inspiration in the Algerian fight for independence. In addition, he rejected
the idea that the third world could benefit from a Western ideology such 
as Marxism in the struggle to free itself from corruption, stagnation, and
economic and cultural domination. Liberation would only be possible if
countries rediscovered their indigenous identity. Islam contained all the
theoretical qualifications for a radical doctrine and at the same time
provided spiritual sustenance which modern materialistic ideologies were
incapable of providing. For this Third Way, Islam had to recover its original
revolutionary zeal. He accused the mullahs (clerics) of turning Shiism into
an ‘old women’s’ religion. This Shiism ascribed significance to the martyr-
dom of Imam Hussein, the son of the fourth caliph Ali (son-in-law of the
Prophet), who was defeated and killed in 680 by the Sunni caliph of
Damascus. This event, which Shiites commemorate annually, had for long
been interpreted as an encouragement to turn away from the world of poli-
tics and power. Shariati attacked this political quietism; in his view, the
events of 680 should be seen as encouragement to resume the struggle Ali
engaged in against the injustices of the state of his day. The fundamental
message of Islam must be resumed and the established political order be
challenged. With his emphasis on ‘the underprivileged’, Shariati added
Marxist connotations to his interpretation of Islam.
Ayatollah Khomeini adopted this revolutionary activism, both in terms of
the idea of revolution in the name of the underprivileged and Shariati’s
ideas regarding the taking over of state power. The difference was that
while Shariati envisioned the revolution being led by a vanguard of
enlightened intellectuals, Khomeini saw this as the role of the clerics.
Khomeini also elaborated on how an Islamic state should be formed. Influ-
enced by French constitutional thought, he envisioned a ‘theo-democracy’
(Mawdudi’s term for the system he strove for in Pakistan): a combination
of theocracy and democracy. The Quranic principle of shura (consultation
between the ruler and an assembly; sometimes seen as the equivalent of a
parliament) would be retained, but the president and members of parlia-
ment were to be chosen by general suffrage. Both organs were nevertheless
subordinate to a Council of Guardians and the Supreme Leader who would
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inspect the Islamic caliber of the candidates of these organs as well as the
decisions made. The important role Khomeini assigned the clerics ensured
that in Iran a literal interpretation of the Quran and Sharia would, at least
formally, set the tone.
The thinkers discussed here have all had great influence on the politiciza-
tion of Islam. Their efforts at reform were primarily directed towards rais-
ing Islamic awareness and no longer accepting a priori the authority of the
state and traditional religion. Together they supplied the components of an
activism that has manifested itself in a number of movements, especially
from the 1970s onwards. These components include: the literal interpreta-
tion of the Quran, using Sharia as the only valid legal source (particularly
in the Sunni world), turning against the religious establishment, theocracy,
rejecting worldly authority, anti-secularism, Jihad (in the sense of ‘holy
war’), authenticity, and a strongly anti-Western disposition. This activism
is at odds with democracy and universal human rights. Against the concept
of popular sovereignty, these thinkers posited the sovereignty of God in
such a way as to exclude inalienable human rights. 
2.3 reform by reinterpretation of the sacred sources 
2.3.1 the pioneer s
The authors discussed in the previous section sought a revival of Islam by
returning to the letter of the Quran and the Sunna. They set themselves
against the human traditions (with a small t) by returning to what they
considered the holy Tradition (with a capital T) laid out in these sources:
the foundation era of Islam. At present, however, many authors are also
concerned with seeking the spirit of these sources, using this as inspiration
to answer questions about the organization of society. These authors are 
of great interest for this report. For the most part, they have developed
their political thought in the twentieth century, but the groundwork was
laid out in the nineteenth century. At that time, a number of significant
dogmatic obstacles that were blocking the development of this political
mode of thought were removed. For this reason, we will address the
pioneers of this mode of thought first.
These pioneers’ ideas of reform were also developed in reaction to the
identity crisis which stemmed from Western dominance in the Muslim
world. Like the first category of reform thinkers, they focused on the idea
of the decline of the Muslim world. Their reaction, however, was not a call
for a renewed Islamization of society and state following the example of
the foundation era, but for modernization of Islam itself. The causes of the
decline were sought in the traditionalism which in the Muslim world had
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reached an almost dogmatic character. They were thus opposed to the
‘deterioration’ of Islam into a religion solely concerned with what was
compulsory and not allowed. 
Classical Islam’s fixation on rules is based on four sources of knowledge
(listed in decreasing order of importance): 
1 The Quran as the literal word of God, whose message applies to all of
humankind and is thus independent of place and time.
2 The prophetic Tradition (Sunna): the pronouncements and actions of
the Prophet, based on revelation. For the jurists, this source of knowl-
edge gradually became as important as, or perhaps even more important
than the Quran.
3 The doctrine of the ‘consensus of the ulama’ (religious scholars) for
cases that were not settled by the first two sources.
4 Syllogism (via analogy) for all other cases.
The last two sources mentioned do not serve as autonomous sources of
legal interpretation , but are methods of interpreting the first two textual
sources. There existed a right to interpretation (ijtihad) since not all the
rules in the Quran and the Sunna were clear and therefore had to be
worked out with the help of human intellect. This theory of judicial
construction was developed in the first centuries of Islam. The law was
considered completed by the tenth century. After this, the ulama closed
‘the gates of ijtihad’ again. From this century on, all the rules had been
established and the period of ‘imitation’ began (Berger 2006).
To release Islam from the straitjacket of such a dogmatically grounded
status of the traditions, and even from the Tradition, some very basic steps
had to be taken. It is thus not surprising that reformist thinking started
with an attack on one of the least sacred foundations, the denial of the right
to new interpretations, and ended by discussing the most sacred, the
Quran itself. The different layers of dogmatic traditionalism thus had to be
peeled away like the layers of an onion in order to reach the core: the inten-
tions of the Quran and the Sunna. Only then would there fully be a basic
appreciation of democracy and human rights. The authors discussed in
section 2.2, who were similarly opposed to traditionalism, sometimes
argued for a renewed right to ijtihad, but never went so far as to question
the status of the Quran and the Sunna. On the contrary, the thinkers and
movements that followed them wanted only to remove the historically
grown misfits (human traditions) to re-establish the original prescribed
codes of behavior – the Tradition. 
Discussions of whether the classical ulama had a monopoly on the inter-
pretation of the Quran and the Sunna (the consensus) took place early on,
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in the eighteenth century. The Indian Sufi, Shah Wali Allah (1702-1762),
defended the right to ijtihad as the outcome of personal effort also under-
taken by those other than the ulama. He emphasized the spirit of the law.
Since this is always applicable, the form of the law can be adjusted to the
circumstances of time and place. In this way he distanced himself from the
indiscriminant use of the old codes of behavior. According to the Egyptian
Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), the religious scholars were more than just the
guardians of an established and fixed tradition. Like Wali Allah, he argued
for a re-opening of the gates of ijtihad. Through a renewed use of reason-
ing, the principle of consensus could be opened up and Sharia could be
adapted to new circumstances. He even suggested that there was little
difference between the principles of Sharia and the natural law which
forms the basis of European law. This also legitimized the idea that under
certain circumstances the faithful could accept laws from sources other
than Islamic law books. Thus Al-Tahtawi paved the way for introducing
Western legal codes into Egyptian law. Likewise, attacks began on the
principle of consensus and on the related hegemonic authority of the tradi-
tional ulama throughout the Muslim world – a process which has contin-
ued and intensified to the present. Thanks to rising levels of education and
modern means of communication, this traditional authority has sharply
diminished and many, even those outside the circle of ulama and intellec-
tuals are now involved in the interpretation of the precepts. 
Thus after the dogma forbidding human interpretation of the sacred
sources was breached, there emerged intellectual room for new reflection
on the two sacred sources themselves. Important pioneers in the reinter-
pretation of the Sunna and the Quran include Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani
(1838-1897), Sayyed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and Muhammed Abdu
(1845-1905). The position that they took regarding these two sacred
sources has remained controversial in the Muslim world up until today.
Al-Afghani sounded the clarion call for this renewal. Like the later Rashid
Rida, discussed in the previous section, he was an outspoken supporter of
the pan-Islamic idea. He also supported the caliphate as a counterbalance to
European domination with the caveat, however, that Islam – the unifying
factor – modernize. In his view, the backward situation Muslims found
themselves in was due not to Islam as such, but to an incorrect understand-
ing of Islam by Muslims. Al-Afghani saw Islam as a religion more in
harmony with the principles of scientific reason than was Christianity.
Islam could even serve as an engine for science and progress. He did not
use the foundation era of Islam as his source of inspiration, as Rida did, but
was inspired by the tenth to fourteenth centuries when philosophy,
sciences, and free-thinking flourished. This period provided evidence for
the compatibility of Islam with rational science. Radical social, political,
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and intellectual changes were necessary for a revival of this kind of Islam;
only then could it rediscover its role as moral compass. 
Building upon this, the Indian Sayyed Ahmed Khan and the Egyptian
Muhammed Abdu wished to free Islam from the dogma of the Tradition, as
embodied in the Sunna. In the classical teachings, the prophetic Traditions
had the same authority as the Quran itself, despite their difference in form.
The Traditions did not deal with the word of God, but with the utterances,
actions, and revelations of the Prophet passed down orally and recorded by
people much later. Over time, however, the Sunna increasingly came to be
accepted as the correct explanation of the Quran, which could not be prop-
erly understood without the Sunna. It was even held that the Quran could
not exist without the Sunna, but that the Sunna could exist without the
Quran. Khan contested this by emphasizing the universality of the Quran
as opposed to the historicity, and thus the accidental nature and fallibility,
of the Sunna. Using the analogy of Western biblical criticism to show how
much the Sunna was influenced by prevailing views, he also attempted to
free exegesis of the Quran from the Tradition; the Quran was, after all,
interpreted through the Sunna. He claimed that the Quran was completely
self-sufficient and that it could be understood by enlightened minds using
the principles of ‘reason’ and ‘nature’. It is precisely this universality that
makes it possible for each generation to derive relevant significance from
the Quran for the prevailing situation. Unlike Khan, Abdu did not dismiss
virtually every hadith as unreliable, but he did want to place the Quran in
the center of Muslims’ attention once again. In the early twentieth century,
these views led to fierce polemics in India and Egypt between movements
that rallied around the competing slogans ‘Ahl-i-Quran’ (‘follow the
Quran’) and ‘Ahl-i-Hadith’ (‘follow the hadith’).
With the exegesis of the Quran freed from the heavy burden of the Tradi-
tion, the Quran found itself in a central position. Thus the way was paved
for a more modern interpretation of the Quran itself. In the Muslim world,
(Western) modernity was mainly identified with scientific discoveries 
and rationalism. Khan proposed the task of reconciling the Quran with 
the spectacular discoveries of Western science. His position was that these
manifestations relate to God’s promises in reality, while the Quran pres-
ents God’s promises in words. Thus the wonders and supernatural
phenomena mentioned in the Quran should not be understood literally,
but should be taken as metaphors, allegories, or other indirect forms of
expression. Based on the thesis of harmony between ‘promises in words’
and ‘promises in reality’, his central point was that the Quran and modern
science were not in conflict. In this Khan prepared the groundwork for
authors and movements that are also influential now, such as those who
attempt to demonstrate the scientific inimitability of the Quran (all knowl-
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edge is already present in the Quran), as well as the current trend towards
the ‘Islamization of knowledge and science’. Unlike the thinkers discussed
in section 2.2, he did not simply dismiss knowledge as a product of moder-
nity, but attempted to see it in an Islamic light. 
Muhammed Abdu was similarly concerned with the relationship between
Islam, modern knowledge, and rationality. Unlike Khan, however, he did
not attempt to achieve reconciliation by regarding all modern knowledge as
principally ‘Islamic’, filtered through Islam and the Quran, but by employ-
ing modern sources to fundamentally research the Islamic heritage, includ-
ing the Quran itself. This was the first attempt made to contextualize the
Quran, in this case by projecting it against the historical and cultural back-
ground of the seventh century. In this way he freed the Quran from claims
of being without historical and scientific equal. The Quran, he argued,
should not be understood literally, but rather as a literary text whose
message is conveyed in a language which reflects the Arab worldview and
intellectual climate of the time in which it was written. Thus the stories
need not be taken literally; they are meant to serve ethical, spiritual, and
religious purposes and, as such, may also serve an important function for
other times and places. With his contextualizing, Abdu came close to
demythologizing the Quranic story as well as the sanctity of the text itself.
However, he believed this did not detract from the importance of religion.
Religion would remain an essential part of human existence; precisely for
this reason, real societal reform would only be possible through a reforma-
tion of Islamic thought. 
These views made Abdu the leading pioneer, paving the way for later
reform thinkers. He and his predecessors had freed Islam from its identifi-
cation with traditions and Tradition and from the sacred power of the letter
and a resulting dogmatic obsession with what is commanded and forbid-
den. Thus the mental space was created for challenging the identification of
Islam with power and the state, and for coming to appreciate democracy
and human rights.
Reform thinkers in many Muslim countries have continued to build upon
this foundation. The next section will concentrate on a selected number of
these. After all, while it is the intention of this report to research whether
there are conceptual reference points in the Muslim world for the develop-
ment of a democratic constitutional state, it is not necessary to review 
all the thinkers associated with this reform movement. The elaboration of
their concepts is influenced by the specific political contexts of the coun-
tries within which the thinkers concerned operate. Taking this into
account, the focus will primarily be on thinkers from two important Sunni
countries, namely Egypt (the intellectual core of the Arab world) and
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Indonesia (the country with the greatest number of Muslims), as well as
thinkers in Shiite Iran, a country with 25 years experience with theocracy,
including a classical Islamic legal system. Finally, a few prominent thinkers
from outside these three countries will be discussed. Some attention will
also be paid to the very active school of feminist hermeneutics, which is
rethinking the position of women in Islam. 
2.3.2 contempor ary reformer s
Egypt
The contextualization of the Quran – initiated by Abdu, amongst others,
using the right for renewed interpretation which had earlier been fought
for – has been carried on by many thinkers in the twentieth century. In 
the early twentieth century, Abdu’s pupil ‘Ali’ Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966)
defended the abolition of the caliphate with the argument that there is no
such thing as one specific Islamic political system. Based on research, he
concluded that a system such as the caliphate cannot be deduced from 
the Quran, the Tradition, or the consensus of the ulama, whether from the
foundation period of Islam or since. If Islam is without a political theory,
Muslims have freedom of choice. Using argumentation from within Islam
he showed himself to be a great advocate of the separation of mosque and
state. 
The idea – supported by many Muslims – of the Quran as the literal word of
God had been challenged by Taha Husayn, Amin al-Khuli, and Ahmad
Khalafalla using methods of literary and historical research. They focused
on the Quran as a – human – ‘text’, a text that should primarily be seen as a
literary product. Taha Husayn (1889-1973) saw the Quran as an independ-
ent literary category. He demonstrated that the stories told within it
existed long before the Quran; they were used in the Quran to situate
Islam vis-à-vis the Judeo-Christian tradition and to confirm its monotheis-
tic character. Amin al-Khuli (1895-1966) elaborated on this by proposing
that the Arabs accepted Islam precisely because of the literary qualities of
the Quran. According to the modern theory of rhetoric, the emotional
impact is not unrelated to the esthetic qualities of the text and the esthetic
awareness of the reader. Only through methods of modern literary theory
can the meaning of the Quran be (re)discovered. Khalafalla (1916-1998)
collected Quranic stories, reordered them chronologically, and analyzed
them by relating them to their original contexts. He viewed all the stories
as self-contained, even if they were concerned with the same event, in
order to discover their meanings and intentions. He thus concluded that
the Quranic texts should be seen as allegories and not as historically
authentic descriptions. The writers of the many stories used these to clarify
ethical and spiritual questions. Through this literary and contextualizing
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approach, Khalafalla intended to free the Quran of the burden of being seen
as the ultimate book on history, science, political theory, or law. 
These authors’ opinions have remained controversial up until today
because they take away from the uniqueness and sacredness of the Quranic
stories and therefore also drastically relativize the Quranic commandments
and prohibitions. They have thus been met with fierce opposition. This
holds true for the views of Nasr Abu Zayd (born 1943) as well. Using the
idea of the Quran-as-text, he tries to show its human dimensions. In his
view, this applies foremost to the completion of the final text itself. While
the revelations themselves took over twenty years to be completed, it took
the Prophet’s companions until after his death to record them all on paper.
It actually took several centuries for the vocalized version to reach comple-
tion. All the phases of this realization involved human contributions, such
as the determining of the recitation order of the verses that sharply depart
from the revelations themselves. Furthermore, Abu Zayd demonstrates
that, from the beginning, all the methods used by religious scholars to
determine codes of behavior from Quranic texts have been based on often
controversial choices, made by the scholars themselves. The final result, the
Sharia, including the differences set down in the schools of law, does not,
then, rest on ‘objective’ interpretation, but is completely man-made; there
is nothing sacred about it. It is also evident that the punishments for
offences mentioned in the Quran itself or by the jurists are not authenti-
cally Islamic, but date from earlier or later times. It is thus very presumptu-
ous, Abu Zayd argues, to consider these man-made and historically deter-
mined codes sacred and therefore compulsory for every place and time. 
Similarly, he dismisses as mistaken or apologetic attempts to model
contemporary desirable concepts, such as democracy, on the Quran. The
current appeal to democracy, which is also heard in the Muslim world, has
been parried by both incumbent regimes and Islamic movements by refer-
ences to ‘Islamic’ democracy, namely the Quranic concept of shura (the
obligation of the ruler to consult his subjects). This, however, was a pre-
Islamic practice, according to Abu Zayd, used in the earlier autocratic tribal
societies. The concept of shura naturally also suits today’s autocratic rulers
well, yet, despite the claims of the rulers, it has nothing to do with Islam.
Neither can it be contended that this concept forms the embryo of the
current understanding of democracy. Thus the conclusion must be that
contemporary Muslims are not relegated to shura, even if this is mentioned
in the Quran. Islam in no way whatsoever limits the freedom of Muslims
to choose their political or legal systems. 
Abu Zayd does not limit himself to the conclusion that the Quran is a
cultural product which gives a new articulation to pre-Islamic culture and
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concepts and must be analyzed in order for its intentions to be revealed. In
his view, it is not enough to show that, on closer inspection, historical and
literary contextualizing often reveals many ‘sacred’ dogma to be the work
of humans. Every form of hermeneutics creates its own central point from
which an interpretation can be developed; just as history can be read in
‘any’ way, so can the Quran when it is seen as simply a text. What one
reads in the Quran thus depends on one’s ideological stance; both the
fundamentalist and the liberal can find justification within it. 
Abu Zayd argues that within the structure of the Quran there is not only 
a vertical dimension, but also an implicit horizontal, communicative, 
and humanistic dimension which can be revealed through ‘humanistic’
hermeneutics. Conceptually, the Quran should be seen not only as a text,
but also as a collection of discourses; it is a polyphonic rather than a mono-
phonic (God is the only voice) text. According to Zayd, it is precisely this
dialogue between different voices full of argumentation, role reversal,
rejection and acceptance of earlier assumptions and assertions that makes
the Quran relevant for current questions about meaning on all levels of life.
The internal discrepancies which are found regarding many points in the
Quran should not be explained away through all sorts of rules, then, but
should be seen as positive qualities since they allow for a diversity of
options. Thus the Quran invites active interpretation and the further
development of the spiritual and ethical dimensions of our existence (Abu
Zayd 2004).
Indonesia 
The plea by thinkers such as al-Afghani and Abdu for a new interpretation
of the Quran has also been echoed in Indonesia. Just like these thinkers,
Nurcholis Madjid (1939-2005) attributes the stagnation of religious
thought not to Islam itself but to Muslims’ inaccurate understanding of
Islam. The masses do not make a distinction between transcendent and
worldly values. All values derived from the traditions are seen as transcen-
dent and therefore as sacred, without exception. As a consequence of this,
Islam becomes identical with tradition. Breaking through this traditional-
ism demands secularization first and foremost. This should not be seen as
an ideology, but as a process in which practices and articles of faith may go
in two ways. In the downward trajectory, to which secularization is
usually limited, an article of faith is stripped of its former sacredness. There
is also an upward trajectory, however, in which something that is actually
transcendent and holy is made sacred. In Madjid’s view, many codes of
behavior should take the first path, and therefore should be recognized as
merely traditions. The second path, however, should also be traveled. This
may be applied to ‘plurality’ for instance, a concept that many Muslims
have difficulty with. The positive regard for difference is firmly established
in the Quran. In order to differentiate between these two paths, a reopen-
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ing of the right to ijtihad is essential, and, accordingly, so is intellectual
freedom without any restrictions. Madjid developed these views during
the Suharto era. Thus he placed emphasis on a renewal of Islamic thought
through culture, strongly focusing on education. Under Suharto’s New
Order, room for political Islam to deliver actual renewal would remain
limited.
Abdurrahman Wahid (born 1949), president of Indonesia from 1999 to
2001, similarly propagated ‘cultural’ Islam. Specifically through the
pesantrens, the Indonesian system of Islamic boarding schools, he hoped to
stimulate Islam by emphasizing positive values and replacing negative
ones. Dynamism can arise by giving priority to the spirit of the law, the
inner truth. Through rational efforts, it is possible for Islam to take up the
challenge of modernity. By rediscovering the humanitarian message of
Islam, which is expressed in tolerance and concern for social harmony,
Muslims have no need to fear the plural nature of modern society and can,
in fact, view this positively. The same holds for democracy, for which he
also led a fervent campaign throughout Suharto’s rule. There is no distance
between Islam and democracy; when democracy is a process focused on
realizing a better society, both are in harmony. Respect for human rights is
thus inherent in this process, since this is precisely what democratization is
about. The texts of the Quran deal with human dignity, which contains
three aspects: individual, social, and political dignity. 
In Indonesia, not only is democracy a sensitive issue, but so is religious
plurality. Religion – the belief in one, almighty God – is part of the
Pancasila, the five pillars of the state defined in the constitution of 1945.
Formulated in this way, this pillar formally accommodates religious diver-
sity. However, since independence a segment of the large Muslim majority
has sought the introduction of an Islamic state. For this reason, Wahid has
put great emphasis on the positive significance of democracy and plurality
drawn from a specifically Islamic perspective. This focus can also be found
in the work of other contemporary reformers. Syafii Maarif, for example,
argues that important components of democracy can be found explicitly in
the Quran, including justice, equality, the recognition of different views,
and plurality. 
What these thinkers have in common is that they do not wish to remodel
contemporary actuality based on the letter of the Quran and Sunna, but,
conversely, wish to accept contemporary actuality and seek inspiration
from the Quran for its improvement. They hope to reinvigorate the signifi-
cance of Islam within a modernity that is, in principle, accepted and
valued. Thus Ahmad Wahib (1942-1974) sees freedom of thought as neces-
sary for renewal; free-thinking is not only a right, but a religious obliga-
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tion. In his view, modernity cannot be avoided and demands a positive
response. Religious renewal is therefore a conditio sine qua non. Moham-
med is the preeminent role model as an innovator; he altered the social and
intellectual world of his time. This example calls for imitation, naturally in
a different context than in Mohammed’s day. The obligation of ijtihad is
not reserved for the elite, but applies to everyone. Munawir Sadzali (born
1925) also calls on ijtihad to make Islam more responsive to the needs and
requirements of the contemporary Indonesian situation. Thus he argues for
a change to the law of inheritance; the Quranic rule that male heirs receive
twice the share of female heirs is at odds with current notions of justice.
The argument is that justice in contemporary relationships between men
and women demands another form of expression than it did at the time in
which the Quran came into existence. Here, too, the religious text is
contextualized and the pressure for a literal interpretation is removed; the
intention is privileged. Likewise, Sadzali – whose approach is analogous to
that of al-Raziq discussed earlier – dismisses the idea, popular in radical
circles in Indonesia, of an Islamic state. He does this not merely because
none of the sources command this, but also because Indonesia’s pluriform
reality benefits by maintaining the Pancasila principle. 
Iran
The 1979 revolution in Iran is without a doubt the most spectacular exam-
ple of the Islamization of the state and the political and social establish-
ments in the last few decades. While elsewhere Islamization was the result
of civil war (Afghanistan) or coups (Sudan and Pakistan), the Islamic revo-
lution in Iran took place with comparatively little bloodshed and was
broadly supported. The great majority voted in a referendum for the estab-
lishment of the Islamic Republic. The constitution was unambiguous: the
aim was to create a model society based on Islamic norms. All elements of
the movements arguing for a ‘return to the sources’ discussed in section 2.2
were synthesized in the new ideology: totalitarian theocracy, Sharia, anti-
Westernization (in response to the so-called westoxication), anti-Western
and armed struggle for ideological jihad (aimed towards the worldwide
establishment of the sovereignty of God).
It is precisely this widely supported Islamic revolution as well as the chance
Iran then had to realize this model society in relative freedom over a period
of more than 25 years that make this ‘experiment’ exceptionally interesting.
This holds for Muslims and Muslim movements elsewhere pursuing a
similar form of theocracy as well as for those who believe that democrati-
zation and respect for human rights, rather than Islam, offer the solution
for the large problems with which many Muslim countries wrestle. Thus
the developments in Iran have been followed everywhere with great inter-
est.
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In 1979 the Iranian state quite explicitly defined itself as anti-Western. The
constitution states that the revolution purged the country of its heathen
past and of foreign ideological influences, through the return to the
authentic intellectual standpoints and philosophy of Islam. From this 
basis, it is implied that values commonly associated with the West, such 
as democracy and human rights, would have to be vehemently rejected 
at first. Khomeini himself was very clear about this: in the relationship
between man and God, only the latter has rights. People have no rights and
certainly none which are inalienable, as is implied in the concept of human
rights. Humans merely have obligations to God. God can grant rights to
human beings, but can also take them away. Additionally, the rights and
interests of the Islamic community have priority over those of the individ-
ual. Khomeini viewed human rights as the work of the devil; there was 
no such thing as the rights of the individual as distinct from the – Islamic –
state. He thus also accused the West of having developed an anthropocen-
tric system. 
This anti-Western attitude affected not only politics, but certainly also the
cultural sphere. It is interesting to note that this continual harping on ‘the
decadent West’ is something Islamic thinkers shared with Western
cultural critics. Thus Heidegger’s critique of modernism is popular with
many Iranian writers. The crisis in the West is so large, Reza Davari claims,
that decline and fall are inevitable; Islam shall then triumph (Davari 1980,
in Abu Zayd 2006). In the black-and-white mentality after the revolution,
every attempt at making subtle distinctions was a priori suspect, and a call
for more freedom and democracy could easily be suppressed with the argu-
ment that these represent ‘Westernization’ or ‘Western decadence’. For
this reason it is all the more striking that a large and very active reform
movement emerged in Iran. Many Islamic thinkers now reject both the
theocratic principles and the fervent anti-Western stance. This even
includes thinkers who contributed to the conceptual foundations of the
Islamization of the Iranian state and society. In the Iranian theocratic
context, where every debate must be framed in terms of Islam, the views of
the so-called ‘new theology’ movement are especially radical. Important
proponents include Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohammed Mojtahed
Shabestari. 
After more than 25 years experience with the daily practices of Islamism
and the apparent inability of this dominant interpretation of Islam to solve
societal problems, Soroush (born 1942) – originally an enthusiastic partici-
pant in the revolution – argues for a constructive involvement with the
West and its values. The West’s scientific progress – rather than its politi-
cal-imperialist behavior – offers much inspiration, also in the areas of
philosophy and social sciences. Learning is not the property of the West;
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there are no property rights to ideas. Philosophical concepts can be adopted
without having to share the corresponding intellectual and historical
context. Similarly, Soroush is not convinced by Shariati’s plea (see section
2.2) to return to indigenous sources: “what our heart and mind is willing to
accept, belongs to us” (Soroush 1993: 121, in Abu Zayd 2006). After all, in
Iran returning to the sources could also mean abandoning Islam. He argues
that a culture is always heterogeneous, and so why shouldn’t people
borrow each others best ideas?
Soroush, who studied in England and was influenced by Popper’s ‘open
society’, views the Quran as an ‘open’ text inviting interpretation. Since
human understanding is always dependent on the time period and state 
of knowledge, religious understanding may also be changeable. He thus
makes a distinction between first- and second-order values. Second-order
values concern the details religions use to distinguish themselves from one
another (dress codes, punishments), but they do not form the essence of
religion; they may change under the influence of new perceptions. Values
of the first order, such as justice, however, are constant; their importance is
common to all religions and to human reason. A value such as justice is a
religious value, but at the same time, a universal value. 
In Soroush’s opinion, Islam, human rights, and democracy may be very
compatible. His argument, however, is not historical (‘look at the tolerance
Islam had for Jews’) or hermeneutic (‘if you contextualize and interpret a
text from the Quran in a specific manner, a respect for human rights is
evident’). According to Soroush, human rights are a requirement of human
reason in our contemporary world, and they do not contradict values of 
the first order; the rights of God remain fully intact. The fact that they have
been developed outside the religious domain is no reason to exclude them
from an Islamic form of government. He thus argues that people have
inalienable natural rights, even if this is not actually stated as such in reli-
gion. 
What is the use of religion, however, if not for serving as the exclusive
basis for importance values? Here Soroush adopts a pragmatic position:
human rights may be inherently independent of religion, but religion is
important for passing these values on to the masses. Soroush views the
democratic state as the best system for realizing both human rights and
religion. Totalitarian states destroy both humanity and sanctity. In these
systems, religion is damaged by the abuse of power by ‘men of God’.
Through respecting human rights, including the freedom of religion,
democracy protects religion against the abuse of power. The ideal govern-
ment is not only democratic but also religious when it creates the condi-
tions under which people can live their faith. Such a system is more reli-
gious than a system in which ‘only’ the Sharia is carried out. Freedom of
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religion, including the freedom to choose against religion, is a necessary
condition for a truly religious society. Forced faith is no faith at all. Based
on this reasoning, Soroush argues for a separation of mosque and state 
in order to restore religion as individual belief, rather than a collection of
dogma’s. 
The Islamic revolution was inspired by the desire to give the Quran a
central position in daily life once again, rather than being collected just on
holidays from the tachtsche (the place where the Quran is kept: the highest
place in the house). Soroush has experienced the implications of this; it did
not lead to improvements compared to the previous regime. In theocratic
Iran, thousands have been killed in the name of Allah, and the country is
marked by large-scale corruption, mismanagement, and nepotism.
Soroush wishes to clear Islam of all blame for this. For precisely this reason,
the Quran should return to the tachtsche, where it can again serve as an
inspiration for arts and science and for the personal relationship between
man and God. 
Unlike the philosopher Soroush, the reformer and theologian Shabestari
(born 1939) is difficult for the clerical elite to ignore. Like Soroush he is
schooled in both Western philosophy and Christian theology. His
approach is a hermeneutic one, in which he is inspired by Gadamer,
Dilthey, and, most of all, Habermas. How does one achieve the most objec-
tive knowledge possible, especially when interpreted through the ‘episte-
mological interest’ (Habermas) that the interpreter has in any given expla-
nation? Any text, including the Quran, only answers the questions posed;
anyone may find the answer he or she is looking for. When a text cannot be
fully understood, however, a democratic explanation is possible. Analo-
gous to modern Christian theology, Shabestari seeks an answer to the
question of what role faith can play in the modern world. This demands
actual modernization of Islamic theology – something far different from
simply putting the Quran onto a cd-rom. The modern condition is one of
uncertainty in human thought. The traditional security of religion no
longer offers a solution for this condition. A new role for faith can only be
found through exchanging new experiences of faith. All the great Christian
reformers, such as Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and Friedrich Schleier-
macher have formulated new definitions of and functions for religion and
theology. Essential in determining this new role is not only the enriching
of theology with insights from, for instance, philosophy, methodology,
and sociology, but also the search for a connection with the practice of
faith. The convictions and emotions in the practices of faith form a differ-
ent, yet no less important, category than the revelations to the Prophet. A
new understanding of religion can thus only come about in an open climate
in which criticism of and competition between ideas are encouraged.
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Shabestari sees such initiatives for renewal; the politicization that Islam is
undergoing everywhere demonstrates that it is reaching out to the world
and to daily life. He finds it desirable, however, that the experimentation
and struggle that takes place in practice be translated into a theology that
will exchange dogma for faith and will start from religious experience. 
Shabestari’s views are also fueled by negative experiences with theocracy;
to prevent Islam from falling into discredit, he argues for the necessity of a
democracy. The Quran demands only a just political system without
tyranny and oppression – nothing more than that. Contrary to what the
leading clerics claim, a statist philosophy cannot be derived from this ethi-
cal imperative. This being the case, people have freedom in the arrange-
ment of the political system. Like Soroush, Shabestari believes this should
be a democratic system since this is best equipped to secure the principle 
of religious freedom. Only a faith based on free choice is a true faith. 
Soroush and Shabestari are not the only thinkers advocating democracy
and human rights, and many of the other critics of theocratic theory and
practice are, like Shabestari, Islamic clerics. It is precisely for this reason
that the Iranian discussion is equally important for other Muslim countries
with movements pursuing theocracy based on the Quran. In Iran, more
than anywhere else, a theological discussion is being conducted about what
Islam or the Quran does and does not dictate. In the meantime, large
segments of the population have come to the conclusion that there is no
one single explanation based on Quranic imperative (i.e. Bayat and Baktiari
2002, and Bayat forthcoming). The posture toward the West is directly at
issue here. This is due not only to the scientific input – people in Iran are
extremely well informed about scientific progress in the West – but also
because of Iranian reformers’ obvious affinity with Western political ‘soft-
ware’. The enormous religious pressure of the theocratic system leads these
reformers to emphasize religious freedom. Abdallah Nuri (born 1949),
who is also a cleric, claims that if people are forced into religion, it is no
longer religion. For this reason he is a great proponent of religious and
political pluralism. He sees Europe as a political example for Iran to imitate.
The European democracies of today carry on the tradition of pluralism 
and democracy found in the Islam of the Middle Ages. This re-assessment
of Western thought finds even more far-reaching expression in Mohsen 
Kadiwar (born 1959). Based on extensive analysis, he concludes that
Islamic law is incompatible on a number of important points with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since modern humanity wants to
live according to humanistic principles, however, it is not the concept of
human rights, but Islam that should adapt. Traditional, legalistic Islam
should give way to the development of a spiritual Islam that can be used to
address modern questions. 
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With these views, reformers have distanced themselves from the theo-
cratic ideology and the anti-Western attitude still cultivated by the regime.
They demonstrate that there are many ways in which to interpret Islam in
a modern way. The religious thought of the reformers goes much further
than rethinking the tradition and the Quran. The humanistic interpreta-
tion of the Quran and Islam has led to a complete acceptance of the princi-
ples of human rights, democracy, freedom of religion, separation of
mosque and state, and individuality.
Elsewhere in the Muslim world
The list of thinkers who use hermeneutic freedom to liberate Islam from
the dogmatic straitjacket of traditions is extensive, both in terms of people
and countries (of origin). They do not represent a specific school; what
they share, however, is that their thinking is based on modern epistemo-
logical premises and is set in opposition to the ahistorical essentialism of
the thinkers described in section 2.2 (Filali-Ansary 2003). To illustrate this,
two authoritative writers, namely Abdullah An-Na’im and Mohammed
Arkoun, will be discussed below along with a field of application that is of
particular interest to the Western image of Islam, namely feminist
hermeneutics. 
Abdullah An-Na’im, from Sudan, aims at achieving an integration of
Islamic heritage and Western thought. Against the background of internal
decline, disorder, political powerlessness, economic frustration, and West-
ern dominance, he finds it unsurprising that the Muslim world seeks an
answer by drawing on the power of its own, authentic sources. Muslim
peoples have a legitimate right to self-determination in terms of an Islamic
identity, including Islamic law. At the same time he emphasizes the failure
of Islamization in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan, where
attempts have been made to use pre-modern Islamic law in the modern
context. That theme serves as the basis for the search for an alternative. In
An-Na’im’s view, the question of whether Islam is compatible with politi-
cal development in the Muslim world is an erroneous one. The question is
not about ‘Islam’, but about which form of Islam. The concept of the nation
state is not a product of the indigenous history of the Muslim world. At the
same time the nation state is a fact and therefore demands legitimacy in
Islamic terms and reconciliation with the principles of Islamic law.
However, precisely because public law has not been strongly developed in
Islamic theories of law, the advent of the nation state also brought with it
secular public law.
The task, therefore, is to Islamize public law without losing the benefits of
secularism. These benefits include constitutionalism, with its principles of
the rule of law, representation, separation of powers and human rights.
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That this constitutionalism has best been articulated and applied in the
West is no reason to forgo it, but rather it should be regarded as a valuable
contribution to the total of human experiences available to everyone. The
necessary Islamization of these achievements cannot happen by using 
classical Sharia, which is hopelessly obsolete, for instance, in regard to the
position and rights of women and non-believers. Since historical research
shows that the Sharia deals for the most part with the work of humankind
and rules that are determined by historical context, re-interpretation is
possible and necessary. This should be based on the fundamental sources
and thus be consistent with the essential moral and religious precepts.
Following his teacher Mahmud Taha (executed for dissidence in Sudan 
in 1984), An-Na’im makes a distinction between the ‘first’ and ‘second’
messages of the Quran. The first message concerns the revelation
Mohammed received in Mecca and the second that of Medina. The first
concerns spiritual values, such as justice, freedom, and equality and is
gradually surpassed or replaced by the Medina message which emphasizes
law, order, and obedience. Because they were meant for Medina, the
precepts are context-specific and must be re-interpreted according to the
contemporary context. The first message is the most fundamental one; 
due to the emphasis on inherent human dignity, the equality of man and
woman, and freedom of religion, it contains the basis for a revision of the
Sharia that is compatible with international law and the concept of human
rights. An-Na’im further elaborated this basic assumption for important
areas of law. 
Mohammed Arkoun (born 1928), originally from Algeria but a long-time
resident of France, is much less programmatically inclined than An-Na’im.
His interest is more methodological and epistemological and is primarily
aimed towards including Islam in a general development of knowledge. 
It is precisely the strangling of this development by both the orthodoxy 
as well as the state authorities, who in alliance with it, placed (orthodox)
Islam and the ulama under state authority, that has made any form of criti-
cal thought impossible. Because of this, Islam has remained purely an
object of theology and Islamic legal scholarship, rather than of the human
and social sciences. This ‘dogmatic closedness’ of Islam can only be opened
up by confrontation with scientific thought. It is all the more necessary
because Islam has never gone through the learning process (of seculariza-
tion, erosion of the mythic world view, the rise of the bourgeoisie) that the
West, including Christianity, went through in the eighteenth century. 
By denouncing dogmatic closedness, Arkoun goes much further than re-
applying ijtihad according to the classic juridical-epistemological model.
He is not concerned with a new exegesis of the Quranic statements, but
with a reinterpretation of the Quran as such and the implications of this for
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‘Islamic reason’. In this reinterpretation, the mechanisms of the conferral
of meaning are central, starting with the ‘Quranic fact’, namely the Revela-
tion itself: the spoken words that Mohammed attributed to God. This fact
must be distinguished from the ‘closed official corpus’, namely the final
version of the written text. The phenomenon of ‘Revelation’, its language,
the historical context, and the mythic and symbolic forms of expression
cannot escape research. The same applies to what took place between that
Quranic fact, the final book, and the processes of selection, interpretation,
and ‘canonization’. The dynamic mechanisms of the production of mean-
ing through classical Islamic reason, which ultimately led to orthodoxy and
dogmatic closedness, contrast greatly with the openness and unending
possibilities for interpretation of the original text. These processes and
selection mechanisms, looked at through a number of disciplines (semi-
otics, linguistics, history, sociology, anthropology, hermeneutics, the
comparative study of religions), throw light on both the ‘unthought’ and
the ‘unthinkable’, namely that which is excluded from Islamic thought due
to dogmatic closedness. Arkoun’s aim is to make these excluded concepts
and issues, such as rule of law, civil society, and the equal status of men and
women, visible so that they can be included in a radical reconstruction of
Islamic reason and Muslim societies. 
While dedicated to another idea himself, Arkoun does not dismiss the
apologetic reasoning which attempts to demonstrate the compatibility of
Islam with modernity. In the 1981 Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,
for instance, it is stated that Islam as a religion not only accepts and wishes
to defend human rights, but that these rights are described in the Quran
itself, thus long before the revolutions in the West led to the codification 
of human rights. Aside from the historical accuracy of this proposition,
Arkoun considers this effort to lay claim to human rights as beneficial,
because the cause of human rights can use the support from religious
authorities to its advantage. According to Arkoun, similar reasoning is used
in Judaism and Christianity. At the same time, however, a critical historical
study of the content of the sacred texts of all monotheistic religions in rela-
tion to the development of modern human rights is urgently needed. Such
a study can help these religions recognize that even the most developed
religious teachings, as well as the Revelation itself, cannot escape their
historicity and thus the inadequacy of traditional religious representation
(Arkoun 1992: 142-144).
Like most of the thinkers cited earlier, Arkoun wants to make it possible 
for Muslims to discover the spiritual side of Islam. More than the cited
authors, however, he does this by deconstructing the hallmarks and foun-
dations of the orthodox ‘episteme’ – in Foucault’s terms – rather than by
offering alternative readings or interpretations. 
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Feminist hermeneutics
All of the authors discussed are relevant for the renewal of Muslim views
on the organization of the state and the relationship between Quranic
principles and democracy and human rights. Their ideas are therefore also
relevant for the position and rights of women. In addition, however, an
active school of (mostly women) thinkers has emerged explicitly oriented
towards the theme of Islam and women: feminist hermeneutics, a term
which certainly does not imply that these thinkers would embrace a West-
ern form of feminism. As in other religions, the position of women in
Islam is problematic, certainly if the interpretation follows the letter of the
sacred sources and wishes to restore relationships to the patriarchal model
of the past, as in the case of the salafiyya movement. According to Khaled
Abou El Fadl, it even seems as if some movements, such as those discussed
in section 2.2, translate all of their theology into the restriction of women’s
freedom of movement (El Fadl 2003).
As in the West, reformers in the Muslim world initially placed emphasis
on emancipation and equal rights, both at the conceptual level and at the
level of social action. In his investigation for the wrr (2006), Abu Zayd
reported that as early as 1909 a feminist women’s union was established in
Egypt that fought for equal rights both in the public sphere (primarily
education) as well as in the realm of the family (polygamy, marriage,
divorce). According to Abu Zayd, the Tunisian Tahir Haddad was the first,
in 1930, to point out the historicity of the Quranic provisions regarding
women’s rights. In respect to the pre-Islamic situation, these provisions
formed a huge step towards granting equal rights, according to Haddad.
The Quranic strategy was precisely to use values such as justice and equal-
ity to bring about improvements in this situation by subjecting polygamy
to limitations, by including women in the law of inheritance, and so on.
These new rights must not be made sacrosanct; in the contemporary situa-
tion the principles deserve a different interpretation. 
Emancipation in the sense of granting equal rights is still a very topical and
controversial issue in the Muslim world, evident in the laws pertaining to
the family in most Muslim countries and the granting of the vote to
women in Kuwait only in May 2005. Contemporary Islamic feminist
hermeneutics goes beyond equal rights, however, and additionally concen-
trates on the broader gender problematics of power inequalities between
men and women and social injustice. The basic assumption is, of course,
the rejection of the exclusive right that men have appropriated to define
Islam, and therefore to legitimize and perpetuate patriarchal relationships.
Gender distinctions must be exposed and fought. 
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Feminist hermeneutics assumes that the fundamental ideas of the Quran
cannot be negated by its parts. For this end, three steps are taken: firstly
reinterpreting all those verses in the Quran which have been seen by men
as the basis for inequality, secondly, pointing out the verses that indicate
equality, and, thirdly, deconstructing verses that indicate differences
between men and women (Abu Zayd 2006).
To illustrate the first step: Riffat Hassan, amongst others, points out that
no indication can be found in the Quran that Eve should be held responsi-
ble for Adam’s sin; both ate the forbidden apple. Therefore no difference
between the rights of men and women can be derived from this incident;
the only norm for the difference between people is the awe before God.
Hassan subsequently shows – the second step – that, alongside the verses
that emphasize the equality of men and women, significant verses of the
Quran focus on people, which men are often inclined to read as ‘men’. In
the same spirit, Aziza al-Hibri analyzes the Quranic concept of tawhid,
which she interprets not only as monotheism, as is customary, but as a
principle of unity and equality. Men have unjustly appropriated the
doctrine of khilafa: God’s deputy. Where the Quran does differentiate
between men and women, as in regard to polygamy, marriage, divorce,
obedience, and rebellion, the proponents of feminist hermeneutics point
out – the third step – the historical context (Abu Zayd 2006). The concern
is with the intentions behind the concrete codes of behavior; the current
situation demands other codes of behavior based on the same intentions. In
the seventh century, when women were completely without rights, the
Quran implied a great leap forward. Thus the intention of the Quran is the
improvement of the position of women. The current context once again
calls for great steps forward based on the principle of equality (Kugle 2003).
2.4 interpretation of the dynamism in isl amic
thought
The ideas examined in this chapter reveal an extremely varied picture of
the relationship between Islam and the organization of the state and soci-
ety. This is evident not only in the two successively discussed categories of
thinkers; a broad spectrum of views also exists within both categories.
Within the first category, for instance, opinions vary regarding the role of
violence, the question of whether the called-for Islamization should be
brought about from above or below, and whether this can be achieved
through participation in political institutions. The thinkers in the second
category reveal important differences regarding the way in which Islam,
democracy and human rights are linked. Some appropriate the concepts of
democracy and human rights by grafting them to their own intellectual
heritage, in other words, by arguing that these are Islamic values. In addi-
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tion to this ‘Islamization of modernity’, there are other thinkers such as
Soroush, Abu Zayd, and Wahid who instead support a ‘modernization of
Islam’. In this way of thinking, democracy and human rights are accepted
as products of human reason and the expressive power of the Quran is
proven in answering questions arising from these issues. Between these
two extremes are attempts, such as that of An Na’im, to encourage
Muslims to accept secular values such as democracy and human rights
through a revised view of the Quran, or of feminist hermeneutics to revise
the relationships between men and women using new interpretations of
the Quran. These cases involve new interpretations of the sacred scriptures
as well as a selective approach to modern existence.
Given this plurality of views, it is unfair to view ‘Islam’ as one undivided
quantity. That is to say, Islam should not be identified with qualities about
which Islamic thinkers now have such widely varying views. This insight
about internal plurality is relevant not only for non-Muslims, but also for
Muslims themselves. As Safi notes, the market in the West is being flooded
with brochures and Internet postings with titles like ‘the status of women
in Islam’, ‘the concept of God in Islam’, and so on. He calls this ‘pamphlet
Islam’ and ‘web Islam’. These information streams give Muslims looking
for something to hold on to in their religion the idea that there is only one
true explanation and that complexity is excluded: ‘Islam is the answer’
(Safi 2003: 22). The preceding sections show, however, that there are many
authors who have reservations about this idea and who contest the
absolute claim of one, ‘true’ Islam. 
From the foregoing findings it also appears that the view that ‘Islam’ is in
principle irreconcilable with democracy and human rights is not tenable;
both concepts are part of the Islamic discourse, not only as negative points
of disconnect but as goals worth striving toward. Nevertheless, the idea 
of irreconcilability has gained great currency due to the influence of ‘clash
thinkers’ in both the West and the Muslim world. Governments in the
Muslim world also use this argument to discourage democratic experi-
ments, in which Islamic-inspired formations could gain more political
influence. This fear is fed, to a large extent, by the image-defining move-
ments that make absolute claims and are based on the thinkers discussed 
in section 2.2. Indeed, these interpretations of Islam do not conceptually
tolerate democracy and human rights. The presence of thinkers who posi-
tively emphasize the relationship between Islam, democracy and human
rights, however, refutes this supposedly fundamental irreconcilability. 
At the same time, it should be recognized that the mere existence of this
type of thought provides no prognosis for compatibility in political and
legal practice. The authors discussed in section 2.3 are treated in coordina-
tion with those in section 2.2; their possible societal or political influence
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or support was not a criterion of selection. Thus their views may only
(continue to) occupy a marginal or isolated position. The perspectives of
political movements and law, discussed in the following chapters, may also
supply important supplementary indications for judging the actual rela-
tionship between Islam, democracy and human rights. 
There is, however, no reason to trivialize the importance of new modes of
reform thought due to limited, or limitedly visible, support at this time.
Renewed thinking must start somewhere and can gradually gain depth and
influence, for instance, when changed political circumstances or develop-
ments in the individual behavior of Muslims bring about a need for views
that can support and theoretically build on these changed conditions.
Section 2.3 makes it clear that during the evolution of reform thought,
important dogmatic obstacles to the acceptance of democracy and human
rights were gradually overcome. The fact that positive views about democ-
racy and human rights now shelter under the banner of Islam means that,
in principle, there is more support conceivable for these ideas. The obsta-
cles to the dissemination of these ideas, however, should not be underesti-
mated either. In many Muslim countries, free thinking and debate are seen
as dangerous by the orthodoxy, radical Islamic movements, and govern-
ments; it is in the interest of all these groups to disqualify these ideas as
apostate. That these views are often so vehemently opposed and lead to
‘clashes within’ indicates their potential attraction. 
In Iran in particular, intellectual thought and debate about Islam, democ-
racy, and human rights has grown exponentially. This not only concerns
views directed towards Islamic democracy and Islamic human rights; a
category of intellectuals who argue the desirability of democracy and
human rights on purely humanistic grounds has emerged (Jahanbegloo
2005). The identification of Islamic thought with anti-democratic ideas and
antagonism to human rights by writers like Samuel Huntington (1996) and
Bernard Lewis (1990), the fathers of ‘clash thinking’, seems to have been
sharply influenced by the ideas behind the militant activism of the 1970s
and 1980s. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, in particular, and the
original response to this throughout the Muslim world, have made a strong
impression. It is precisely this experience with over 25 years of theocracy,
however, that has brought many intellectuals in Iran to the view that reli-
gion and power should be separated, that power should be controlled by
democracy and that human rights should aim at offering protection from
the state. This also applies to authors like Soroush who contributed to the
theoretical foundations of the Islamic republic. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
‘Islamic utopia’ was seen by many Muslims as a beckoning perspective. As
long as it remained a dream, the negative sides remained in shadow. The
best way to become aware of the downsides was through the actual realiza-
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
52
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 52
tion of this ‘ideal state’. Recent research shows that the ‘lessons’ have not
been limited to intellectuals. While in 1974 a large majority of the popula-
tion wished for religion to play a larger role in public life, in 2004 a large
majority, including youth, wished for a decrease of religious influence
(Asadi et al. 1976; Goedarzi et al. 2004). On these grounds it is likely that
the outcome of the presidential elections of 2005 was not determined by
religious considerations. Additionally, the lessons of Iran have not
remained limited to that country; the experiment has been followed with
great interest across the Muslim world. According to Bayat and Baktiari, 
the influence of proponents of theocracy has not disappeared, but has
decreased, and the Iranian experience has contributed to a gradual modifi-
cation in the doctrine employed by Islamic movements, namely from a
revolutionary to a more democratic persuasion (Bayat and Baktiari 2002:
322-323). This offers an important reference point for democratization. 
It is after all a known fact that democracy cannot be imposed but can only
succeed when it stems from endogenous dynamics (wrr 2001). 
Thus we have arrived at the possible future dynamism in the support of
democratic ideas. Is a further shift from revolutionary to democratic views
indeed a possibility? Just as previously the revolutionary ideas spread
quickly, this could also be the case for the ideas discussed in section 2.3.
Through the current means of communication, thinkers can be expelled
from their country, but their ideas cannot be easily expelled. In addition,
the dynamics of situations may increase the need for a different ‘reading’ 
of religion, as seems to be the case with Iranian thinkers. The problem is
that the people’s appreciation of this dynamics is difficult to determine.
Thus far in most Muslim countries the existing democratic mechanisms 
for measuring preferences have not been strongly developed. Elections are
held sparsely, and when they are held, participating parties are often bound
by all kinds of limiting provisions. Nevertheless, in many cases (Indonesia,
Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) such elections demonstrate a preference for moder-
ate Islamic parties and/or illustrate an aversion to mismanagement, lack of
security, corruption, and so on. Findings by the World Values Survey indi-
cate that in a number of Muslim countries democracy is valued highly and
there is a rejection of autocratic government (Inglehart and Norris 2004).
These findings were confirmed by The Pew Global Attitudes Project,
whose research revealed a wish for more political freedom and openness
but also for Islam to play a major role in politics. At the same time, there
was a general preference for the separation of mosque and state (Pew
Global Attitudes Project 2003). Recent actions by the populations of coun-
tries such as Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia also
point in the direction of a desire for more democracy. This could mean that
the ideological grip of radical Islamic movements on the populations is
limited or is becoming more limited, or that these movements themselves
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have given up their anti-democratic inclinations in order to attain political
power. It is likely, however, that, in the current state of Islamic awareness,
the rapprochement with concepts of democracy and human rights is more
likely to take place in an Islamic rather than a humanitarian framework. 
The next chapter will take a more in-depth look at the question of whether
a dynamism in this direction is actually operating in Islamic movements
and which factors play a role in this development. In anticipation of this
discussion, we have indicated here that the schools of thought discussed in
sections 2.2 and 2.3 do indeed differ greatly but also share significant simi-
larities. Both are part of Islamic activism: schools of thought and move-
ments directed towards raising the political and social consciousness of
Muslims using Islam as a common vehicle (see Chapter 1). The schools of
thought distinguished here are both directed towards activism and thus
against religiously motivated traditionalism and an inwardly directed
experiencing of the faith. They also set themselves in opposition to the
self-evident authority of the state: the one strand of thought by restricting
the role of the state by using Islamic norms, the other by arguing for
democracy and human rights. What is held in common, then, is the pursuit
of change and breaking out of the stagnation in the Muslim world. All the
authors discussed also seek this revitalization in a rehabilitation of Islamic
culture. This holds true for authors like Arkoun, Soroush, and Abu Zayd,
as well, who are interested in the openness of cultures and seek the revital-
ization of Islam through modernization of the faith. The call for restoring
the relationship with the ‘authentic’ culture should be placed against the
backdrop of the long periods – both in the colonial and postcolonial eras –
in which Islam was banished to the private sphere and seen as an obstacle
to progress. This marginalization gave many groups the feeling that they
stood ‘outside history’ (Göle 1996). By emphasizing the importance of the
expressive power of Islam for society, and by showing that one can be
proud of an authentic Islamic culture, those who were previously margin-
alized are once again placed ‘within history’.
In this view, Islamic activism is comparable to some other emancipation
movements, both in terms of internal variation and composition and
violent outgrowths of its radical wings. That the need for recognition is
sometimes expressed in radical phrases, is not unfamiliar to emancipation
movements; the accompanying use of violence, however, is less common.
In the black movement one heard the phrase ‘black is beautiful, and white
is pig’. Scott points out that subordinate parties protesting their position
often make use of a symbolic reversal of their qualities and those of the
dominant group (Scott 1990). Such a rhetorical reversal of values is also a
functional tool for mobilizing followers. It has been used in the communist
revolution, for instance, as seen in the aiming for a ‘dictatorship of the
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proletariat’. That the ends justify the means for these movements is well
known. The fervor of the ‘front mentality’ in the mobilizing phase and the
accompanying use of violence, however, are not immanent or permanent
qualities. They are a function of the indignity experienced and of the obsta-
cles that are seen to stand in the way of recognition. 
Radical rhetoric and means in the battle for recognition need not rule out a
later democratic inclination. The liberal Muslim thinker Muqtedar Khan
sees a marked connection between the call for Islam as a resistance ideol-
ogy by the radical thinker Qutb, discussed in section 2.2, and the pursuit of
a government that respects freedom. Qutb’s views represented a revolu-
tionary message for the Muslim world because they included an attack on
the legitimacy of tyrannical regimes. Khan sees Qutb’s call for armed rebel-
lion, if necessary, against these regimes, as similar – even in terminology –
to the rhetoric of John Locke in the seventeenth century. According to
Khan, Qutb’s wish to make God’s sovereignty absolute should also be seen
as primarily turned against the absolute power of the ruler. As one of God’s
creations, the individual human is free and owes obedience to only one
authority: God. Based on this thought, the individual can position him- or
herself against the ruler. In Khan’s opinion, this vision of human freedom
is comparable to Locke’s inalienable natural freedom. Thus, in the end,
authority is only legitimate if it is built on the values of the governed (Khan
2003).
If the element that links the authors discussed in this chapter is that the
‘own’ values of the governed need also be given their due in the political
sphere and that the power of the ruled must be a limited power, it is not
inconceivable that in the course of time even more radical movements
might recognize that this is precisely what democracy and human rights
are about. Other movements have shown us that the radical, maximizing
first phases may be followed by less radical ones concerned with optimiz-
ing. We can point to an example from the Netherlands: the pre-war sdap
(Social Democratic Workers’ Party) slogan ‘the state is a lie’ evolved into
the strongly pro-state stance of the post-war pvda (Labor Party); the
experience that the state may be influenced in favor of the party’s own
desiderata formed the basis of this transformation. Muslims’ experience
with democracy is still very limited, but it has been hopeful. The Indian
Muslim party Jamaat-i-Islami, for example, evolved from an originally
anti-democratic party directed towards the establishment of an Islamic
state, to a fully democratically-oriented party. After experiencing the
advantages of participating in the Indian democracy, the party gradually
renounced all its originally radical Islamic doctrines (Ahmad 2005). 
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2.5 conclusion
This chapter shows that Islamic political thought exhibits great diversity.
On the intellectual level, rapprochement with concepts of democracy and
human rights can certainly be observed. The thinkers discussed in section
2.3 have gradually demolished the dogmatic obstacles, making acceptance
of these concepts possible. The actual political effect of these concepts in
Muslim countries is unclear and often takes place underground. Neverthe-
less, representatives of this way of thinking, such as Seyyed Muhammed
Khatami in Iran and Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia, have held high
positions in their countries. This plurality makes it clear that the sacred
sources of Islam can be read and interpreted in many different ways. The
battle for the proper interpretation has strongly intensified with the emer-
gence of Islamic activism in the Muslim world. The influence of views
which allow no deviation from the literal text of the sources is probably
considerable, in part because in many Muslim countries militant means are
employed to enforce these views. 
This diversity in itself forms a reference point for a policy that pursues
processes of democratization and the strengthening of human rights in the
Muslim world. The argument that Islam is principally incompatible with
these ideas is simply untrue. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that such a policy will achieve great success in the short term. Not only 
are power relations stubborn, but views do not change overnight. All kinds
of developments may be of influence, such as higher education, women
participating in the workforce, migration, and media consumption. For 
this reason, the present limited influence of positive views of democracy
and human rights does not mean that their potential influence will be as
limited. Changes in individual behavior as well as changes in the political
make-up can increase the need for interpretations of Islam which support
democracy and human rights. 
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3 the development of isl amic political
movements
3.1 introduction
Islamic political movements have been in the spotlight for some time. Far-
reaching political events such as the Iranian revolution (1979), the struggle
of the Taliban in Afghanistan since the 1980s, the assassination of President
Sadat (1981), and the bloody civil war in Algeria after the election victory of
the Islamic fis party and the cancellation of the election results (1992)
focused worldwide attention on militant Islamic groups. They gave violent
expression to the Islamization effort: the establishment of politics, the
state, society, and law on Islamic principles (Piscatori 1984: 1). That these
are not isolated events is evident from the armed struggle of Islamic groups
elsewhere since the 1980s, from Chechnya, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan,
to Yemen and Sudan. Since the terrorist attacks in, among other places, the
us, Indonesia, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, and England, these Islamic political
movements have been followed with more than passing interest also 
by non-experts in the West. Even if they are not reputed to be violent, they
are at least considered radical, in the sense that they aim to bring about a
thorough change in the political and social order. They are also usually
considered to be fundamentalist, ultraconservative, and anti-democratic,
given that many call for the Islamization of society based on the example 
of the founding era of Islam (Noyon 2003: 47).
This chapter analyzes the development of Islamic activism by examining
the influence of concrete Islamic political movements on the political arena
in Muslim countries. The central questions are: What insights can be
gained from the development of these movements since the 1970s? What
reference points does this offer for rapprochement with the concepts of
democracy and human rights?
The chapter first looks at the most important features and ideas about the
state and politics that arose in Islamic activism in the 1970s (sec. 3.2). Then it
examines the interaction between Islamic activists and the state in the sub-
sequent decades, and the influence of this activism on the political order in
Muslim countries. First we will look at the countries where Islamic political
movements have (temporarily) assumed state power since the 1970s: Iran,
Sudan, and Afghanistan (sec 3.3). In these cases they were able to realize
their ambition to oust the secular state and to create an Islamic state. We will
also briefly examine developments in Pakistan, the most important Muslim
country in the South-Asian region. There the government to a great extent
adopted the Islamization agenda of the Pakistani Islamic political move-
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ments. Revolutionary movements have not come to power in other Muslim
countries. But also in those countries the political order does not seem to
have been immune to the pressure from Islamic political activists. Every-
where in the 1980s and 1990s the state engaged in its own national Islamiza-
tion politics in areas such as education, banking, family law, public morality,
and the media. In many Muslim countries the state had to allow, if not
national, then regional or local space for Islamic movements or grant them
some concessions (sec 3.4). As a result, these movements also shifted their
own strategies and ambitions. To conclude, section 3.5 will analyze the most
significant changes within the broad spectrum of Islamic political move-
ments and the current regimes in the Muslim world, and evaluate the factors
that favor and hinder these countries’ (further) rapprochement with the
concepts of democracy and human rights.
3.2 isl amic political movements in the 1970s: 
background and characteristics
3.2.1 state- formation, secul arization, and economic 
modernization
Throughout the long history of the Muslim world there have been numer-
ous episodes in which rebellious groups have opposed their rulers in the
name of Islam. Often it was individual spiritual leaders who mobilized the
believers around specific grievances. From the end of the nineteenth
century Islamic movements arose that joined the struggle against colonial
rulers. What then are the characteristics of the Islamic political movements
of the 1970s? How do they differ from earlier (religiously-inspired) protest
movements? Recent research provides no single, simple answer to this
question (Piscatori 1984: Wiktorowicz 2004b; Tibi 2001; Esposito and
Burgat 2003). It is certain that they were fueled by the discontent in many
Muslim countries over the post-colonial phase of forced national state-
formation, especially over the secularization imposed from above and the
economic modernization forced upon them. 
After independence many political leaders in the Muslim world continued
to work, first and foremost, to consolidate a national state with a strongly
centralized, powerful, executive. Usually the leadership fell into the hands
of Western-oriented political or military elites who legitimized the state in
secular terms with the help of nationalist, liberal, or socialist ideologies and
symbols (Lapidus 2002: 818). At that same time these elites did not shy
away from using religion as a social agent to strengthen the national state.
Some movements within Islam were associated with the national political
agenda, while others, usually the more folkish or mystical movements,
were excluded from it.
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Except in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, all the countries put the religious
institutions under official government control. Giles Kepel makes a broad
distinction between monarchies where the traditional, rural social classes
(the tribal aristocracy, landlords, and bazaar merchants) were in control and
states were governed by a new urban elite who had pushed the previous
leaders aside. In the first group of countries (with Saudi Arabia as the
extreme example) religious leaders (ulama) and institutions maintained
their prominent but usually dependent positions in society. They were not
displaced but embedded in the regime. In the second group the land and
other property of religious groups was seized and the ulama were paid
salaries as government employees (Kepel 2002: 47).
Thus the process of secularization mostly had the character of a subordina-
tion of an official version of Islam to the state and an enforced banning of
religious affairs from public life. However, other versions of Islam contin-
ued to play an important role in local social and cultural life everywhere.
This ‘folkish’, usually non-urban Islam was characterized by attention to
individual piety, the mediating role of local spiritual leaders and mystical
brotherhoods (Kepel 2002: 46-54; Yavuz 2003: ix). It was tolerated by most
regimes for the sake of social stability or, as in Turkey (after initially being
forbidden), Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, restricted in its freedom of move-
ment. Some regimes manipulated the traditional Sufi-brotherhoods into
the position of a buffer against socialist, communist, and later also radical
Islamic factions.
The post-colonial elites gave the state supremacy over society and the
individual. The nationalism that they employed, claimed to be acting in 
the name of popular sovereignty, but in practice only a limited, selective
participation by the masses in political power was allowed (Utvik 2003: 43;
Fuller 2003: 14). Sheri Berman describes how the new regimes succeeded
in mobilizing the masses through a large bureaucracy and an official state
culture and ideology and at the same time managed to keep them at a great
distance. She speaks of a silent contract between the state and society: in 
exchange for self-respect, self-reliance, and broad participation in education,
health care, employment, and subsidies, citizens were expected (temporari-
ly) to defer their claims to individual political and civil rights (Berman 2003:
259). From an economic perspective this meant a very activist role for the
state, which in some countries (including Libya, Egypt, Indonesia, Yemen,
Algeria, and Iraq) embraced an explicitly socialist and/or communist pro-
gram. The best-known example of this is undoubtedly the Arab nationalism
of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser’s program encompassed an unprecedented,
ambitious socialist-tinged development program that, among other things,
included the nationalization of key industries, fundamental reforms, and
prestige projects like the construction of the Aswan Dam.
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From the implicit contract with the central state that was geared toward
economic achievements there initially flowed a great measure of tolerance
towards state interference in daily social, cultural, and religious life. Civil
society organizations were compelled to show loyalty above all to the
regime in power without actually being able to get involved in the political
arena. Cultural pluralism was suppressed in favor of the project of building
the nation-state. However, groups and layers of the population that were
more or less excluded from this project sought refuge in their own religion
and/or ethnicity. Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, for example, were more or less
forced to seek refuge in the local arenas where the state had little control.
Paradoxically, this process of political and social marginalization in the
long term reinforced the significance of informal neighborhood, clan, and
religious loyalties and identities (Yavuz 2003: 52). 
In many places in the Muslim world in the 1970s and ’80s, the high hopes
crashed into the reality of the disappointing achievements of the state. The
social contract was, as it were, unilaterally terminated by all those groups
in the population that were disappointed by the economic failures and the
lack of individual and political rights (Berman 2003: 259-260). This applied
in particular to the younger generation that reached adulthood in the 1970s
during the mass migration from the countryside to the cities and their
outskirts. This was the first generation to be educated in their own
language. They could read and write and cherished no memories of the
colonial era. The knowledge, ideas, and culture of their (mostly illiterate)
parents from the countryside offered these youth too few reference points
for the new urban living conditions. They wanted the political leaders to
account for their large promises, and they sought ways to make them-
selves heard in the political and social spheres (Kepel 2002). The ideas of
thinkers such as Mawdudi, Qutb, al-Banna, Shariati, and Khomeini, which
were sketched in Chapter 2, even though diverse, fulfilled this need. Their
ideas also gave the new generation reference points to identify and inter-
pret this new, modern society and to provide their own critical (Islamic)
alternative.
3.2.2 factor s of mobilization
Research into (revolutionary) activism and social movements reveals that a
breeding ground of malaise and grievances is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for activist political protest (Berman 2003: 258; Hafez 2003:
17; Baylouny 2004). Not all the societies that have been exposed to
economic, social, cultural, and demographic pressures since the 1970s have
produced political revolutions or influential (Islamic-)political movements.
Apparently, there are other mechanisms and conditions that determine
when and how social discontent translates into social and political mobi-
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lization and in what direction these forces develop. We will examine these
mobilization factors by looking at three components:
1 the availability of means and mobilization structures;
2 the opportunities and obstacles in the internal and external political
environment;
3 culture and processes of giving meaning (Wiktorowicz 2004b).
Addendum 1 Means and mobil ization structures
Material, organizational, and institutional resources are crucial for the
effective mobilization of population groups and the coordination of collec-
tive action. Islamic political activists generally manage to make productive
use of existing, many-branched networks of mosques and religious
schools, volunteer organizations, and informal contacts for the dissemina-
tion of their ideas, the recruitment and mobilization of (potential) follow-
ers, and the raising of funds from ordinary believers as well as from rich
donors and migrants from the Gulf States. In most Muslim countries state
oversight of mosques and ngos has been intensified since the 1980s.
Nevertheless, medical clinics, hospitals, and educational and cultural insti-
tutions remain relatively effective platforms for strengthening ties with
local communities and population groups and for spreading the religious
and political message without having to fear immediate state repression
(Bayat 1997; Wiktorowicz 2004a and 2004b; Berman 2003). After all, open
attacks on religion or religious institutions often lead to a further loss of
legitimacy for the state.
The leadership and the shura were important organizational concepts in
many early activist political movements. However, there were considerable
differences regarding how to interpret these concepts. According to the
influential model of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the leader should
be chosen by the shura. Once installed, the leader’s position was nearly
sacrosanct because the shura could play only an advisory role. The leader
would have at his disposal a supporting general executive committee,
special committees (including among others for missionary work – da’wa,
and for specific target groups like students, farmers, workers, and women)
and eventually also a military, whether or not underground, branch. Radi-
cal armed movements put more emphasis on leadership than do non-mili-
tary variants.1 Opinions regarding the most desirable make-up of the shura
were equally divided, and three models served as inspiration: a shura of
only clerics, only intellectuals, and of the whole community (Roy 1994:
44-45). The first model we find only in Central Asia, namely in the Afghan
Jamaat-i Islami and the Soviet Islamic Renaissance Party. Most other move-
ments rejected the authority of the traditional ulama. Most common (espe-
cially among Sunni movements) was a shura made up of a modern, often
militant, advance guard of urban professionals, students, and intellectuals.
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The third (‘Iranian’) variant most resembled Western parliamentary
democracies and for this reason met with much criticism from fundamen-
talists (Roy 1994: 45).
Particularly since the Iranian revolution there has been extensive attention
to movements aimed at taking over the state and installing an Islamic order
by revolutionary means. Some factions, inspired by Sayyid Qutb, indeed
wanted a revolution – violent if necessary – from above (see section 2.2).
Others regarded the overthrow of the incumbent regime as permissible
only if the state had taken on the role of extreme enemy of Islam and all the
other peaceful means had been exhausted (Roy 1994: 41-42). Their more
gradual path within the existing political order took the form of political
movements and parties, and the infiltration of parts of the public sector
and the state apparatus (like the bureaucracy, the army, the police, educa-
tion, the judiciary, and specific ministries). Research shows, however, that
much of the underlying conflict between and within Islamic movements
did not concern the use of violence or large blueprints for an Islamic state,
but issues of identity and culture. In everyday practice this meant convinc-
ingly describing the problems and concerns of potential supporters, and
that worked best by using authentic symbols and language (Wiktorowicz
2004b: 16; Yavuz 2003; White 2002; Esposito 2003). Sharia, as a symbol of
an authentic Islamic system of values based on social justice and good
governance, quickly became the focus of the moral struggle (Hourani 1984:
228). Thus taking over or transforming the state was for many movements
not an end in itself but only one of the many possible ways to bring about
changes.
With the rise of Islamic political activism organizations for proselytizing
(da’wa) among (apostate) Muslims also became more popular in the
Muslim world. Da’wa calls on ordinary Muslims to reform their personal
lives. If the ‘struggle for hearts and minds’ receives sufficient support
among the broad public, so goes the thinking, it will be possible in the long
run to compel the Islamization of government and law-making from the
bottom up, without having to have a direct confrontation with the state.
Modern da’wa-movements manage to mobilize citizens chiefly thanks to
their subtle moral critique of the prevailing political regime.2
Addendum 2 Oppor tunities and obstacles in the internal and
external political  environment
The nature of the political and social system (such as the degree of open-
ness or lack thereof in the political arena and institutions, the presence of
political allies and competitors, the stability and legitimacy of the incum-
bent regime, and the degree of violent repression by the state apparatus)
determines to a large extent whether and how activists succeed in transla-
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ting protest into collective action. We see the dominant position of the
state and the limited space for political opposition and activism again in the
classification of political systems in the Muslim world. On the eve of the
rise of Islamic activism in the 1970s most of the governments by far were
considered to be autocratic and ‘not-free’ (see box 3.1 and appendix 1). Since
that time they have developed ever more sophisticated techniques to deal
with internal and external pressure from Islamic activists. Instead of
banning every form of political opposition and debate, for example, they
switch to banning political parties of a religious nature, manipulating 
elections by the redrawing of electoral districts, election commissions etc.,
restricting press freedom and access to the media, adopting the rhetoric
and some of the agenda items of Islamic activists, and harassing and arrest-
ing political opponents. 
Box 3.1 The political system of Muslim countries at the beginning of the 1970s
The so-called Polity IV score is a frequently used, compiled index for indicating regime
characteristics and types. The Polity IV score measures the democratic quality of political
systems on a scale ranging from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy) (see also the
notes in appendix 1). This index reveals that in the Middle East and North Africa only Leba-
non had the status of a democratic country (a Polity score of 4 or higher) at the beginning
of the 1970s. North Yemen, Kuwait, and Morocco received the classification ‘partly free’
from the better-known but more controversial Freedom House index; however, these
countries had low Polity scores. The cautious political liberalization during the 1970s and
’80s in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan meant that Islamic movements and
parties were recognized formally or informally and got access to a political platform. For
the most part there was no direct, substantial influence on political decision-making but
there was indirect influence, on account of the fact that they received massive support
from the grassroots during elections or demonstrations. In sub-Saharan Africa the political
climate of the early 1970s was freer, although only Gambia was considered free and demo-
cratic by both measures. Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone received the designation
‘partly free’ from Freedom House, but scored poorly on the Polity IV index. According to
the Polity IV index, Malaysia and Bangladesh, out of a small group of independent Asian
countries, were deemed to be relatively democratic in the early 1970s. It is notable that the
average scores for political and civil rights of this group of countries were higher than in
the other two regions.
In addition to domestic political factors there are, of course, also factors
from the international environment that influence the development
opportunities of Islamic activism. As Chapter 2 revealed, the Iranian revo-
lution of 1979 had an important catalyzing function. For the first time in
recent history could a country in the name of Islam claim complete author-
ity over all aspects of the state system. The revolution unleashed a process
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of Islamic consciousness-raising for which political thinkers like Mawdudi,
al-Banna, and Qutb had earlier paved the way. The awareness of the under-
lying connection of Muslims all over the world was reinforced, as was the
fervor of Islamic intellectuals, activist factions, and parties who opposed
authoritarian regimes (Kepel 2002: 130-132). The new Iranian Islamic
Republic also tried to export the Islamic revolution (the ‘people’s Islam’),
in part as a means to be able to claim the leadership of the Ummah. The
conservative regime of Saudi Arabia became the main target in the propa-
ganda war but also other Sunni Muslim states (including the Gulf States)
and Iraq were involved. After the Iranian revolution quickly assumed an
expressly Shiite character, the Saudi regime in turn, using enormous quan-
tities of petrodollars, stimulated further mobilization of Sunni political
movements.
Addendum 3 Culture and processes of giving meaning
Like most social groups and movements, Islamic social movements have
developed their own ideological frames of meaning and thought. These
frames involve conscious strategies to enable them to interpret the world
around them and their place in it in order to legitimize and incite collective
action (Hafez 2004: 156). Every frame of meaning consists of three parts: 
a clear diagnosis of the social problem and those chiefly responsible; 
unambiguous solutions, tactics, and strategies; and clear motives to shift 
to support or collective action. The more successfully social movements
manage to match their frame of meaning with those of their potential
followers, the greater their mobilization power (Wiktorowicz 2004b: 16;
Hafez 2004). 
As Chapter 2 revealed, many leading Islamic movements saw the spreading
of Western influence and values as the most important cause of wide-
spread corruption, inefficiency of the state, mass unemployment, and 
great social inequalities. The West had undermined Islamic institutions,
customs, and values, diverted Muslims from the correct path, and brought
the entire Muslim world into a state of crisis and moral decay. Many found
the solution to these problems in a return by the individual Muslim and 
the state to the pure sources and practices of Islam, the rejection of West-
ern influence and values, and the creation of an Islamic state.
‘Ummah threatened by the West’ had a prominent mobilizing function in
the ideology and rhetoric of Islamic political movements, but their concrete
tactics and strategies were directed chiefly to the arena of their own
national state. Supporters of a theocracy along the Iranian model usually
endorsed the vision that only God and not man is able to do good. There-
fore only God – or his representatives on earth – should have control of
rights, and people must subject themselves to the interests of the Ummah
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and the leadership of the state. Other activists rejected the notion of an
unimpeachable, all-encompassing God-given order that encourages a
theocracy. They saw in the concepts of the shura, consensus, and assent by
the public (baya) reference points for an Islamic democratic government.
Again others endorsed the importance of the separation of powers, but
appeared extremely fearful of political party formation and multi-party
systems, since parties would undermine the unity and consensus of the
Muslim community which they considered so crucial (Berger 2006). And
a small minority concluded that a democratic system offered Muslims the
best guarantee by far that they could follow their religion. Democracy
would after all guard against the misuse of religion by those in power and,
through the freedom of worship, would create an important condition for
a truly religious society (Abu Zayd 2006). 
3.2.3 conclusion
After 1970 many countries in the Muslim world became breeding grounds
for political unrest and activism. Large groups of well-educated youth who
had reached adulthood wanted to hold their political leaders to account
and looked for ways to exercise political and social influence (Kepel 2002).
The Islamically inspired ideas of thinkers such as Mawdudi, Qutb, 
al-Banna, Shariati, and Khomeini fulfilled this need. Whether discontent
leads to mass support for activism and influential political movements,
however, depends to a major extent on the degree to which these move-
ments have at their disposition institutions, financial resources, and local
networks to disseminate their political message, maintain their links with
their potential supporters, and succeed in gaining access to the domestic 
or international political arena. Furthermore, it is of great importance
whether movements can offer a mobilizing perspective with a clear diag-
nosis of and solution to existing social problems. Measured by these indi-
cators, Islamic activist movements turned out to be pre-eminently in a
position in many Muslim countries to possess a relatively large mobiliza-
tion-potential. 
3.3 isl amitic political activists in power
3.3.1 introduction
To date Iran, Afghanistan, and Sudan are the only countries that since the
1970s have been transformed into Islamic states by a takeover of power by
Islamic activist movements. (Saudi Arabia has for a much longer time been
an absolute theocracy. See box 3.2). Pakistan is a borderline case. Since its
partition and separation from India in 1947, the country has been the scene
of struggle between Islamic movements and political leaders who continu-
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ally manipulate eachother and Islam to reinforce their political power base
(Shah 2003). But it was above all thanks to the pressure of Islamic political
parties that in 1973 Pakistan got a new constitution which declared Islam to
be the official state religion, and the state took on an active Islamization
role (Fair 2005: 272). In Iran the transformation occurred through an unex-
pectedly fast revolution in 1979 under the leadership of the Shiite clerics
and with mass support from Islamic political youth, followed by a period
of Islamization from the top down by the state. In Afghanistan the trans-
formation occurred by means of a civil war between combatants of the war
against the Soviet Union, that was ultimately won by the Taliban, one of
the many Islamic movements in the region. In Sudan it took place via the
gradual expansion of the power base of an Islamic political movement that
seized power in a military coup in 1989. In the cases of Afghanistan and
Sudan the take-over of power occurred against the background of deep
ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions, regional conflicts, and external inter-
ference. They resulted in the collapse of the state, civil war, and political
chaos, and in the case of the Darfur region of Sudan also in mass death and
destruction. Below we will examine in greater detail the concrete experi-
ences of recent ‘Islamic activism in power’ in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan.
After that we will look briefly at developments in Pakistan.
Box 3.2 The political order in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy that since the unification of this country in 1932 has
been ruled by the royal family al-Saud. They derived their hegemony over competing
tribes by linking the legitimacy of the political order and the state to a traditional Wahha-
bist interpretation of Islam. The current king is also prime minister and his successor is
chosen by the royal family itself from among their own members. He occupies the position
of vice-minister in the cabinet. The three key positions in the cabinet (Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Minister of Defense) are all held by members of
the royal family. Article I of the 1993 constitution states that ‘God’s book and the Sunna’
shape the constitutional conditions of this country. The monarchy has an official duty to
protect Islam, the sacred sites, and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hadj) and to implement
Sharia. Therefore the state charges the people to ‘to do good and to avoid evil’ (art. 23). The
state helps them in this regard by disseminating the traditional Islamic discourse via the
texts of the Friday sermons, by strongly controlling state media, and by banning as much as
possible other interpretations and discourses. All citizens are assumed by law to be (Sunni)
Muslims, although also some Shiites live in the eastern region of the country. In 1993,
under external and internal pressure after the first Gulf War, the king established a 120-
member consultative body (conforming to the Quranic principle of shura) with extremely
limited authority. In February 2005 men could vote for the first time in the history of this
country for half of the members of the municipal council. (The other half are appointed.)
What powers this council will receive is still unclear. The forming of political parties and 
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the freedom of assembly and association are still outlawed, and criticism of the closed,
corrupt regime is mercilessly punished. In the 1970s it looked as though rising prosperity
and modernization would gradually displace traditional Wahhabism, but religious conser-
vatives successfully mounted a counteroffensive. Inspired by Khomeini’s actions against
the Shah of Iran, 500 dissidents stormed the sacred mosque in Mecca at the end of 1979.
They demanded an end to the reign of the al-Saud family, whom they accused of corrup-
tion, Western decadence, and a lack of legitimacy. They also reproached the ulama for
letting themselves be misused to further the political agenda of the royal family. After the
regime, with help from France, had put down this revolt, the rulers implemented a new
Islamization offensive to reinforce their legitimacy. 
Source: Barends and Van Eijk in Otto et al. 2006; Raphaeli 2003.
3.3.2 ir an
The authoritarian regime of the Shah of Iran had outlawed all competing
political parties and movements as well as all alternative protest channels.
Thanks to the unambiguous leadership and institutional resources of the
hierarchical Shiite clergy, the widespread unrest among students could, 
in a short time, be mobilized into a mass revolt under the banner of Islam.
What emerged was a classic protest movement: directed against the exist-
ing order and in favor of the take-over of the state, but without a coherent
ideological program like the ones available to activist movements in Egypt
and Algeria. This made it possible for the religious leaders to create an
Islamic state that would carry out a process of Islamization from the top
down (Bayat 1997: 168).
Thus Iran became the first Islamic theocracy in the modern history of the
Middle East, with a constitution and political system based in part on a
Western model and direct general elections for the parliament and presi-
dent. Although the Iranian political process is more open and livelier than
those elsewhere in the region, it is still subject to the vilaya-i-faqih, the
supreme spiritual leader and his Council of Guardians (Fuller 2003: 103-
104; Dekker and Barends in Otto et al., 2006).3 The Supreme Leader is
considered to be above political parties and to ‘protect’ the religious state in
moral respects, as it were, against the democratic role of the elected parlia-
ment. Unlike the president, he is not elected but chosen by a circle of
prominent clergy. He can reverse the democratically made decisions of the
parliament and is not accountable to the public. Moreover, he holds the
function of commander of the armed forces (with even the right to declare
war and mobilize the troops), head of state radio and television,
commander-in-chief of the revolutionary guard, the ordinary army, and
the security services. These positions made it possible over the past years
to thoroughly Islamize the state apparatus with respect to personnel. Reli-
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gious conservatives occupy nearly all the posts. The Supreme Leader has a
personal staff of around 600 persons, including advisors on military,
economic, cultural, and media matters. Around these there is a circle of
about 2,000 personally appointed or approved religious ‘representatives’
in all the important posts in ministries, other government bodies, courts,
‘councils’, and leading revolutionary, religious, and cultural organizations
in Iran and abroad. Together with the many security services and conserva-
tive foundations (bonyads) these civil servants provide spiritual leader
Khamenei a firm grip on executive and legislative power. They also
fervently pay attention to the maintenance of the many codes of behavior
and social-cultural prescriptions that guard the Islamic morals of the coun-
try.
3.3.3 sudan
The Islamization of the state in Sudan, in many respects, followed the
opposite course. While Iran had a revolution followed by a state-led
Islamization, the Sudanese state, since it gained independence in 1956, has
been continually exposed to pressure from within and outside the ruling
coalition for a progressive Islamization and ‘Arabization’ of the political
and juridical establishments (Bayat 1997; Köndgen in Otto et al. 2006). In
addition, there raged a persistent struggle over the question of whether this
Islamization should be restricted to the Islamic north or should also
encompass the Christian south, as well as whether an orthodox or rather
more liberal interpretation of Islam should determine the polity of the
state. All these factors formed the ingredients for successive civil wars and
military coups, alternating with short periods of democratic rule. It was
only in the 1980s that an Islamic movement would take control of the state,
after having first, it should be noted, gone through a learning period in
opposition to the communist regime of Jafaar Muhammed Numeiri, who
would later become an Islamic activist and coalition partner. The Muslim
Brotherhood and subsequently the National Islamic Front (a broad coali-
tion of Muslim Brothers, Sufis, tribal leaders, ulama, and army officers)
under the leadership of Hasan al-Turabi pursued a policy directed toward
the elimination of the more moderate Islamic political movements, the
gradual broadening of the economic power basis (including through
Islamic banking and take-over of the oil fields), the expansion of support
within education and the judiciary, and the building-up of a parallel mili-
tary structure and security service. 
Once in power, the president renamed himself ‘leader of the believers’ and
transformed parliament into a consultative council (in conformity with the
Quranic principle of shura) that owed allegiance only to him. Also all the
important government institutions including the judiciary were staffed by
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Turabi loyalists. The new regime could introduce Sharia legislation (with
the punishments for the five hadd crimes named in the Quran) and deploy
the army and financial reserves in the long, drawn-out civil war against the
south. More top-down Islamization was compelled by the implementation
in 1996 of the so-called Khartoum Public Order Law, designed to control
‘immoral behavior’ in public, but at the same time it further restricted free-
doms, and lawlessness and arbitrariness increased. The existing morality
legislation and the bans on alcohol consumption, prostitution, and
immorality were further supplemented with Islamic clothing prescriptions
for government buildings, schools, and universities, and all sorts of prohi-
bitions and commandments. 
The 1998 constitution seems chiefly to be an attempt by the regime of
Omar Hassan Bashir to gain international legitimacy after the illegal mili-
tary takeover and the disruption of the democratic process. The current
text designates Sudan not as an Islamic state but as a country ‘where the
religions accommodate eachother’ and Islam ‘is the religion of the major-
ity’ (Köndgen in Otto et al. 2006). Article 24 guarantees the freedom of
religion provided that its exercise ‘does not offend the feelings of others’
and that no damage is caused to the public order. Similarly vague passages
deal with the freedom of conscience and expression and the right to
privacy. The Law on Political Association ended the ten-year ban on the
formation of political parties, as a result of which many new parties were
founded. However, this same law requires that all the new parties endorse
the ideology of the ruling party. The registration of parties, moreover, is 
in the hands of a member of the governing party while the room for
maneuvre is restricted by emergency decrees and intimidation by the secu-
rity forces (uk Home Office 2005; ifes Sudan, undated). For example, a
week before the election in 2000 seven leaders of the National Democratic
Alliance, a broad opposition coalition of northerners and southerners, were
arrested and accused of conspiring with an American diplomat. Ultimately
only Bashir’s National Congress and a few small minority parties that 
were largely unknown to the voters participated in the presidential and
parliamentary elections at the end of 2000; the leading opposition parties
boycotted the elections, and as a result, the National Congress won 355 of
the 360 seats.
3.3.4 afghanistan
The takeover of the government in Afghanistan by the Taliban movement,
a movement dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group, was the result of an
ad hoc coalition of domestic and international forces. In the ten-year-long
civil war that followed the war against the Soviet Union, various ethnic
groupings, clans, and tribes struggled over power under the leadership of
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local warlords. This struggle left the country and its people destitute; the
infrastructure and the economy were devastated, and the central authority,
the government institutions, and the constitutional state were fragmented.
In the meantime the ‘holy war’ of the local warlords against the ‘godless’
Soviet Union promoted the dissemination of radical Islamic thought
among the Pashtun community and strengthened the role of local spiritual
leaders of religious schools (madrasas), in part thanks to the support of
Pakistan, the us, and Saudi Arabia (icg 2003b).4 When the Taliban fighters
began their offensive in 1992, they could use their ethnic ties with the
southern Pashtun communities to achieve quick victories. Four years later
they succeeded, thanks in part to financial and military help from al-
Qaeda, in conquering the capital Kabul. Troops under the leadership of
ousted President Rabbani ultimately controlled in the north only ten per
cent of the total territory (icg 2003b; Yassari and Saboory in Otto et al.
2006). 
The top-down Islamization carried out by the Taliban regime began with
the proclamation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the implemen-
tation of hadd punishments. There followed the draconian social and
cultural regulations of the Ministry of the Promotion of Virtue and the
Prevention of Vice, which seemed to have been borrowed from the strict
Islamic interpretations of the ideas of traditional Deobandi and Afghan-
Islamic tribal traditions. The regulations affected city-dwellers the most, as
they concerned the exclusion of women from public life, schools, universi-
ties, and government functions and the banning of television, music,
sports, games, and photography. Minorities such as the Shiite Hazara and
the one-and-a-half million Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan were
also particularly hard hit; the Taliban and their local sympathizers tried to
force these groups by intimidation and violence to submit to the Taliban’s
Islamic norms and regulations (Yassari and Saboory in Otto et al. 2006:
188; Fuller 2003: 114-117). 
After the military intervention by the us and the victory of the Northern 
Alliance in 2001, the Taliban government had to step down. The new 
constitution of 2004, which was adopted by the Loya Jirga (consultative 
assembly), describes Afghanistan as an Islamic republican state where the
president, elected directly by the people, fulfills the role of protector of 
Islam, the constitution and the other laws.5 It is the duty of the state “to 
create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, protec-
tion of human dignity, protection of human rights, realization of democ-
racy, and to ensure national unity and equality among all ethnic groups and
tribes” (art. 6). Law-making rests with a parliament consisting of a directly
elected house of representatives and a composite senate that is partly 
indirectly elected and partly directly appointed. The right to form political
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parties is also anchored in the constitution (art. 35), but is linked to the clause
that the program and charter of parties may not violate the principles of the
sacred religion of Islam and the conditions and values of the constitution. In
addition, the article forbids the formation of parties on the basis of ethnicity,
language, region, Islamic school of thought or doctrine.6 At the same time
article 83 includes measures that the election system provide “general and
just representation for all the people.” Article 2 recognizes the freedom 
of  religion (within the limits of the law), but article 3 adds the phrase: “In
Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the
sacred religion of Islam” (International Constitutional Law: Afghanistan,
undated). Although Sharia is not explicitly mentioned, moderate and secu-
lar forces fear that conservative religious leaders will employ this article 
to maintain the stifling social and cultural climate of the Taliban era.7
Given the long history in Afghanistan of conservative forces’ manipulation
of progressive constitutions, that fear is not without foundation. This is
all the more so because the central political authority still does not have
complete military control over its own territory and the Afghan economy
is largely dependent on the illegal production of opium. The establishment
of a democratic system and the maintenance of political and civil rights 
are therefore encountering major obstacles (Freedom House 2004). 
3.3.5 pakistan
After his election victory and the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, Presi-
dent Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to strengthen his legitimacy by a policy of
Islamization: the banning of alcohol, the adoption of the Islamic Friday,
and the closing of night clubs. In part under pressure from clerics in the
political opposition, he also orientated himself more emphatically towards
the Arab world. In spite of the defeat of the Islamic parties in the elections,
he gave them a role in framing a new constitution, which declared Islam to
be the state religion and charged a Council for Islamic Ideology with the
further Islamization of the country (Fair 2005: 272). After a military coup
led by General Zia Ul-Haq in 1977, Sunni movements such as the Deobandi
and the Jamaat-i-Islami saw a chance to expand the Islamization offensive
with the support of the army. Among other measures, Zia introduced by
decree classic Islamic corporal punishments, instituted one federal Sharia
court with a Sharia chamber as an appeal body, and promulgated laws
against blasphemy, especially directed at non-Muslims and Ahmadis. He
promoted Islamic banking and Islamized sectors such as the media, educa-
tion, and the civil service (Barends and Otto in Otto et al. 2006: 242-246;
igc 2005d).
Zia’s opportunistic Islamization offensive has left a dangerous legacy of
institutional intertwining between religious schools (madrasas), militant
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Islamic activism, and the army. The current president and commander of
the armed forces, Pervez Musharraf, also sees himself forced by a lack of
political legitimacy to lean on coalitions between the army and religious-
extremist forces (icg 2005d). The result is that Pakistan continues to be
afflicted by instability, sectarian violence, and lawlessness, and offers a
home base to diverse nationally and transnationally active terrorists
groups (Shah 2003; Kurpershoek 2004; icg 2005d). For these reasons and
also because of the repeated manipulation of the elections, moderate
Islamic, liberal, and secular political parties have little chance to make an
impact, in spite of their potential support among a broad layer of the
population (Kurpershoek 2004: 33).
3.3.6 conclusion
What tentative conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the
exercise of power by Islamic activists and their sympathizers? The
expressly Islamic-labeled regimes in Pakistan, Sudan, and Afghanistan
remained caught in the ‘classic weaknesses’ of their own political culture,
such as the authoritarian, unlimited exercise of power, corruption, and
gross human rights violations (icg 2005d; Fuller 2003: 117-118). They
have not succeeded in developing an Islamic model for state and society
that is broadly supported and legitimized by the population (see also
Chapter 2). Instead they remained stuck in what Bayat accurately terms
‘cheap Islamization’: a heavy-handed imposition of strict, conservative
Islamic codes of behavior and regulations (Bayat 1997). This applies most
clearly to Afghanistan under the Taliban, where the regime under Mullah
Omar linked literal interpretations of the Quran to traditional Pashtun
tribal codes and thereby seriously reduced the role of many other ethnic
groups as well as the position of women. This also applies to Pakistan,
where the cooptation by the state of militant, Islamic groups bent on
political influence has put a stranglehold on more liberal and democratic
groups and parties. In short, the Islamic regimes of former Islamic
activists have established little credit among Muslims themselves. They
have alienated themselves from the ordinary citizens who are hoping for
a better existence and a more just society, and they function almost exclu-
sively as evidence that with their presence they can amply defy ‘the West’
(or the us).
Iran is an exception because, unlike the other countries, it has experi-
mented with modern forms of politics, government, and law on an
Islamic basis. At the same time it has not avoided a strongly nationalist,
anti-American, and pro-Shiite course that has resulted in support for
violent Islamic movements elsewhere and a curtailing of political free-
doms and human rights in the name of Islam. Iranian intellectuals and
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democratically minded politicians from the opposition try on the basis of
these experiences to link Islamic principles with new, more inclusive,
pluralist and democratic policies and governing institutions (Fuller 2003:
118). They are convinced that democracy and human rights are in them-
selves valuable products of human reason that relate positively to the
intentions of the Quran. This tendency is also known as post-Islamism
(Bayat forthcoming). They have, however, so far come up short in the
struggle for power with conservative clerics, who occupy the most
important positions.
3.4 isl amitic political movements in the political
and social arena
In the great majority of Muslim states Islamic movements have not yet
succeeded in taking over state power by revolution or gradual infiltration
of the state system. But Islamic political movements there have shown
themselves within or on the margins of the national political area, in state
institutions, and in society. The movements blossomed at first in univer-
sities in large cities in Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and then
spread to students in the Palestinian territories, Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Malaysia, and Indonesia, among other countries. Additionally,
various groups developed transnational activities, in part because Muslim
groups everywhere in the world have increasingly easier contact with
eachother thanks to the advances in media, information, and communica-
tion technology. At the same time foreign governments and international
organizations have pressed the ruling political elites to bring about
democratization and the improvement of human rights. 
What is the influence of these groups on the political and social arena? 
To what extent and in what ways have activist movements succeeded in
Islamizing the political and social order and discourse? What conse-
quences does this have for the nature of the regimes and perspectives for
democratizing and the advancement of human rights? To answer these
questions this section will discuss the interaction between contemporary
Islamic activists and the state, partially in light of the mobilization factors
listed in section 3.2.2. Of course, it is not possible to sketch a complete
pattern of the development of activist movements. Therefore this analysis
will discuss a limited number of Islamic countries and movements. 
The developments in Egypt, cradle of Islamic legal rules and philosophy
and home base of the influential Muslim Brotherhood, are in many
respects exemplary for what is happening in much of the Arab world. 
The Egyptian developments, moreover, have a radiating effect on other
regions and movements. Therefore we will first treat extensively the case
of Egypt. 
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3.4.1 egyp t
In the 1970s a new generation of youth were directly confronted with the
tangible results of the ideological, economic, and foreign policy failures of
the authoritarian Egyptian state: overcrowded universities, deteriorating
education, and – in spite of the false hope of the ‘right to work’ promised
by the state – after graduation almost no prospect of a job and a marriage.8
The policy of economic liberalization and government cutbacks of the
successive governments of Sadat and Mubarak made the path to positions
in the state bureaucracy more difficult, and the few jobs that were available
did not pay enough to make ends meet. The economic recession of the end
of the 1980s in the Gulf States and the first Gulf War of the early 1990s also
meant that Egyptian migrant laborers were forced from those countries
and back onto the domestic labor market. Thus there arose an intelligentsia
of university-educated youth who, after nine years of study, could begin
their career as a street sweeper and end it as a poorly paid civil servant
(Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 62; Roy 1994: 51). Their fate stood in stark
contrast to that of a select group of foreigners, less-educated Egyptians,
and (corrupt) civil servants who could profit from selective economic
liberalization. These ‘new rich’ paid their housekeeper and nanny many
times the salary of a recent graduate. Most university-educated youth thus
concluded that Western consumption goods, social mobility, and
economic status were visibly present but lying far out of their reach, and
that connections and a bit of luck provided more social success than intel-
lectual achievements and hard work (Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 62). These
youth ranked high as potential followers of activist movements. 
Discontent and deep frustration do not on their own, however, lead to
political mobilization. Apathy and aloofness are even more obvious reac-
tions, certainly in authoritarian societies where taking part in political
opposition involves high personal costs. The step toward mobilization was
initially made easier because successive governments between the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s introduced selective political liberalization. The
government propaganda of the state media and the education system were
reduced, and a few political parties representing the opposition could for
the first time take part in the elections for parliament along with the ruling
National Democratic Party (ndp). Unlike his secular nationalist predeces-
sor Nasser, Anwar Sadat presented himself publicly as a believer, in the
hope of getting the support of Islamic movements as a political balance
against the leftist opposition (al-Sayyid 2004: 6). He released from 
prison members of the Muslim Brotherhood and allowed others to return
from exile. He promoted the establishment of Islamic student associations
as competitors to the formerly popular leftist associations and also gave
support to Islamic programs in schools, universities, and in the media. 
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A small minority of radical Muslim groups around university cities and the
poorest neighborhoods of the major cities emphatically refused to cooper-
ate with the state, however. When Sadat not only offered hospitality to 
the deposed Shah of Iran but in March 1979 also signed the Camp David
Accords, the result was massive street demonstrations of both Islamic
activists and secularists. Although the Islamic establishment of al-Azhar
University supported him and even declared the Camp David Accords in
agreement with Islamic law, some small, radical groups were stirred up.
Sadat was assassinated in October 1981.
Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, maintained the state of emergency,
which had been instituted earlier and which is still in effect. The president
remained the dominant executive power and retained his position as
commander-in-chief of the army and the intelligence services, head of
government and the ruling party. Furthermore, he retained the authority
to appoint ministers, to dismiss parliament, and to rule by decree when
parliament is not in session. The freedoms of expression and assembly
were also not expanded. Neither was the Brotherhood formally recognized
as a political party, even though it had by far the largest number of support-
ers and the most resources to mobilize politically.
The long-term consequences of this selective liberalization were paradoxi-
cal. On the one hand, a far-flung network of flourishing private mosques,
Islamic voluntary organizations (in areas such as education, culture, and
health), Islamic businesses, and (investment) banks quickly developed.
They took advantage of the influx of private capital from the oil-rich Gulf
States and the voluntary religious contributions (the zakat). And although
voluntary organizations are formally under the supervision of the Ministry
of Social Affairs, many managed to get around these controls thanks to
their close ties with mosques and religious foundations. With respect to
organization and finances, they therefore had it easier than their secular
counterparts. Moreover, initially Mubarak needed these institutions to
consolidate his regime. On the other hand, the selective opening of the
political system ultimately led to a multi-party system in which exclu-
sively political parties were active that had no real connection with the
population and that could easily be co-opted by the regime.9 The result was
that the adjusted political order maintained the old client-based power
structure and the formal political parties became further isolated, in terms
of ideology, from the ordinary people.
The growing group of university-educated youth in the cities, who were
originally active in student associations, turned away en masse from regu-
lar politics and directed their hopes to the available parallel sector of volun-
tary (religious) organizations (see box 3.3). Although they did not them-
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selves explicitly engage in politics, they could give, initially covert, finan-
cial, logistical, and ideological support to the banned Islamic political
groups (Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 97-102). In addition, they got secret help
from sympathizers within the bureaucracy, the municipal governments,
the official ulama, and the education system (Clark 2004). In short, while
the Mubarak regime forcefully combated open opposition within the
formal political system, new opportunities for mobilization sprung up on
the margins, in religious social organizations and networks, precisely
where banned Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood could
count on a growing number of supporters.
Box 3.3 Voluntary organizations as mobilization channels for Islamic activism
How were the politically aloof, skeptical youth aroused to activism in spite of the repres-
sion from the secret services, the army, and the police? The religiously inspired networks
of volunteers form crucial links for transmitting religious and political ideas and practices
to individual Muslims. They offer selective incentives (such as services, jobs, common
identity and ideals, moral and emotional support and status with the group) that often
seamlessly fit the needs and convictions of these youth. Empirical research shows that
many Islamic networks and political parties employ modern interpretations of proselyti-
zing (da’wa) for the ideological underpinning of religious activism. It is a religious duty to
spread the faith among ordinary Muslims in one’s neighborhood, under the slogan: first
Islamize the individual, the neighborhood, and society and after that also the state. The
da’wa of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, propagates the idea that every true Muslim
has the obligation to help bring about social and political reform (Rosefsky Wickham
2004: 239-244). Youth, who usually have little theological knowledge but are receptive to
concrete material and social support or are spiritual ‘seekers’, often derive their identity
and social status from their role within Islamic voluntary organizations and religious study
and discussion groups. 
Such Islamic networks play an important role in helping the youth deal with the psycholo-
gical and social stress that results from poor social perspectives. They contribute to a
process of ‘religious reassessment’: the embracing and upgrading of codes and norms labe-
led Islamic. This reassessment happens in all fields, ranging from education, gender rela-
tions, and clothing to politics. Young men without enough money to marry are advised to
pray and fast to suppress their sexual desires. Recent female graduates don the niqaab.
They marry a classmate who cannot pay a dowry and settle into a ramshackle apartment.
Goals which more than ever lie out of reach – a job with rewards based on one’s achieve-
ments, a good house, consumption goods, and a marriage according to the traditional 
norms of their parents – will, among believers, become explicitly devalued as the un-Islamic 
attainments of the parents, apostates, or ‘the West’. Thus they gain authority and status
and can thereby also more easily reject the social conventions and control of their parents.
Especially for young female graduates from the lower-middle class this can often have 
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surprising consequences that in part are determined by specific local circumstances. Some
can move more freely in the public space precisely because they appeal to their rights
within ‘Islam’. Participating in religious discussion and study groups brings them into
contact with (Islamic) feminist ideas that liberate them from the claims of men (Göle 1996;
Rosefsky Wickham 2004: 244; White 2002; Yavuz 2003). Others are weighed down by
the increasing social control and isolation of small, inwardly focused groups, and even
become receptive for religious radicalization (Singerman 2004: 157). 
In Egypt the openings in the political system caused Islamic groups like the
Muslim Brotherhood to shift more to the political center, in spite of their
illegal status. Since the 1980s political leaders within the Brotherhood have
been able to run as independent candidates in parliamentary elections and
form alliances with approved opposition parties in exchange for support
for the principles of non-violence, pluralism, and gradualness. After the
1987 elections the Muslim Brothers were the largest opposition group in
the parliament. They hammered on the issue of greater parliamentary
authority to control executive power, election reforms, introduction of
Sharia, more democracy and respect for human rights. Muslim Brothers
and other Islamic activists also became increasingly dominant in the
professional associations and voluntary organizations of engineers,
doctors, lawyers, teachers, and journalists (Esposito 2003: 84).
However, the Brotherhood was criticized by radical Islamic groups such as
the Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad for participating in politics. They
reproached the Brothers for legitimizing the oppressive regime and divid-
ing the Islamic movement. The Jihad chose to work underground on its
own to prepare a military coup. The Jamaa followed a strategy of military
actions aimed at ‘soft targets’ (‘immoral’ locations such as discotheques,
bars, and video clubs) along with a social reform strategy of assistance to
the poor. Both paths were designed to lead to a broad revolutionary mass
movement that will take over the state in the future. In spite of its anti-
state rhetoric, the movement organized almost no militant actions against
the state itself (Hafez 2003: 52).
Other political parties such as the Labor Party and the Liberal Party have
combined their election lists under the name of Islamic Alliance and have
even adopted some of the agenda and criticism of the Muslim Brothers.
This initially confirmed for many Islamic activists the idea that the parlia-
mentary route, however gradual, was better than the route of open struggle
against the state (Hafez 2003: 48-52). Their position changed in the early
1990s, when the process of political liberalization appeared to stagnate and
the state apparatus resorted to large-scale repression after an uprising of
Islamic rebels in Upper Egypt. The number of formal political parties had
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grown to thirteen, but the role of the Brotherhood, which had become in
the meantime the largest opposition force, was further restricted, in part
by a redrawing of electoral districts. The Brothers thereupon boycotted the
elections, and in 1990 a new parliament convened in which the opposition
(with only two per cent of the seats) was even more poorly represented
than in 1979. The 1995 elections were interfered with by the regime, which
had hundreds of political representatives and officials of the Muslim Broth-
erhood arrested beforehand and later sentenced 54 leaders to prison for
terms of from three to five years. Only one of the 150 candidates of the
Muslim Brothers was elected to parliament. A year later, however, he was
forced out of office on the grounds of belonging to a banned organization.
The parliamentary political opposition in the 1990s seemed to be ulti-
mately less representative than in the 1980s (Hafez 2004: 53).
Except for ‘cheap’ concessions (such as more religion in the schools and in
the state-controlled media, stricter supervision of morals, etc.) neither the
Muslim Brothers nor other Islamic parties and candidates had much politi-
cal success in the 1990s. Attempts to assert themselves politically again
through the free elections to the national professional associations were
initially successful but meant that the regime then imposed strong controls
on the remaining political space (Rosefsky Wickham 2002). Unlike in the
1980s Mubarak felt sufficiently confident of his power to abandon his toler-
ant stance and to silence his critics. That gave radical Islamic groups like
Islamic Jihad and the Jamaa al-Islamiyya, that up until then had been rela-
tively quiet for fear of losing legitimacy, arguments to denounce the Broth-
ers even more strongly and to mobilize grassroots support for armed
revolt. The political leader of the Jihad, Aboud Zumur, pointed out that
even secular states like France, Germany, and Italy allowed religious politi-
cal parties, but that Egypt stood out for the fact that it banned such parties
(Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004: 75).10 He called upon the youth to abandon
‘fake democracy’ and to join the ranks of the holy fighters for the sake of
uprooting the unjust and tyrannical state (Hafez 2003: 55).
The political leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood tried to rebut systemati-
cally these radical ideas (see table 3.1). While Jamaa defended armed resis-
tance against the incumbent regime by referring to the sovereignty of God
and the superiority of Sharia, the Brothers developed a moderate and
conciliatory discourse. In their view the state in an Islamic society must
stay true to the principles of Sharia, but the same state must also be
accountable for its actions. They also emphasized that Sharia had very few
fixed tenets: some basic principles intended to achieve justice and social
and economic equality and to protect human rights such as the right to
human dignity and the right to property. Moreover, juridical innovations
and ijtihad were available to adapt interpretations to changing circum-
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stances (Hafez 2003: 175). In these views we can recognize the ideas of
modern reformers, such as the pupils of Mohammed Abdu (see sec. 2.3).
In a similar manner the Brothers tried to rebut the radical ideas surround-
ing such subjects as the place of Islam, the position of the Muslim world,
jihad, and the role of democracy. They interpreted democracy and plural-
ism as components of the Islamic shura. On this basis they advocated
democratic elections, regular alternations of power based on the electoral
results achieved by political parties, and respect by the political majority
for the position of minorities (see table 3.1). 
Hafez shows that the taking away of political freedoms at the beginning of
the 1990s does not in itself explain why Egypt was plagued by successive
cycles of violent mobilization and repression in the period 1990-1997. He
reveals that it was chiefly the reactive and undifferentiated character of the
violence on the part of the government that contributed to the ability of 
Table 3.1 Discourse of Jamaa al-Islamiyya (up until 1996) and Islamic Jihad versus the
discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood
Source: Hafez 2003: 174-182
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Theme Jamaa and Jihad Movements Muslim Brotherhood
The Primacy of God’s
Sovereignty
Permissibility of
Democracy
Only God is sovereign and can make laws.
The state needs to obey His laws and rules.
The interest of Islam must be above all
other loyalties. Regimes and institutions
that do not recognize God’s sovereignty,
or want to replace it, must be brought
down.
Democracy is comparable to polytheism
because the system places the will of the
people above that of God. Democracy is
based on the concept of absolute freedom
and equality. The first is impermissible 
as that would give Muslims free religious
choice. The second is objectionable
because it would imply that Muslims,
Jews, and Christians, and also men and
women are equal. 
God is sovereign. Islamic law has given
Muslims the freedom to bring about 
juridical innovation and independent
judgments (ijtihad). The legitimacy of 
the regime in an Islamic society depends
on the ability of the government to earn
the approval of the people.
Democracy and pluralism are both 
permissible and desirable because they
are part of the Islamic concept of 
consultation (shura). This corresponds
to the democratic order that puts the
power in the hands of the majority 
without injuring the rights of minorities
who disagree or hold another position.
Shura is also an extension of the authority
of the nation, which designates, judges
and corrects its leaders. In an Islamic
society party pluralism means that execu-
tive power alternates between political
parties through regular election cycles.
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the Islamic activists to legitimize violence (Hafez 2003). In the 1980s the
regime had more or less turned a blind eye to the fact that Islamic move-
ments had created their own Islamic free-zones with their own paramili-
tary forces in Upper Egypt and Cairo. The Jamaa al-Islamiyya not only
provided assistance and services to the poor, but also formed its own mili-
tias for ‘supervising morals’, including the enforcement of the segregation
of men and women and the banning of gymnastics for girls. Jamaa’s taking
justice into its own hands, which was coupled with intimidation of those
who did not agree with it and sectarian violence against Copts, was initially
not punished by the regime as long as its actions did not draw the attention
of the national or international press (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004: 77). 
After a number of provocations the state took action at the beginning of the
1990s and assassinated the official spokesman of the Jamaa. In retaliation
the movement created out of the existing militias an armed wing that
attempted to murder the former chairman of the Egyptian parliament. In
the course of the 1990s the military wing would generate ever more radi-
cal, militant splinter groups and underground cells that would operate
independently of eachother and of the central leadership. This develop-
ment also made more difficult the attempts to reach a ceasefire by secret
means (Hafez 2003: 131-137). The result was successive cycles of mobiliza-
tion, violence, unbridled repression, and even more violence, which
reached a temporary nadir with the 1997 Luxor attack by a unit of the
Jamaa, which killed 66 victims (57 of whom were tourists). In the entire
period between 1992 and 1997 there were 1,200 deaths, and 47,000, mostly
militant activists, were arrested.
During the first years of the struggle, the Egyptian security apparatus had
no clear strategy to deal with the violence of the Jamaa; it reacted as if it
were exclusively a matter of isolated incidents. Later it employed massive
repression, rounding up not only the hard-core elements of the militant
Jamaa and Islamic Jihad, but also the grassroots, sympathizers, family
members, and anyone who (especially by appearance, such as having a
beard or moustache) could be considered as an Islamic activist. There was
indiscriminate torture and abuse. Wives of suspected militants were
seized and held hostage and abused until their husbands finally surren-
dered. The activists were sentenced without trial by military courts (Hafez
and Wiktorowicz 2004: 78-80). 
The heavy-handed and arbitrary acts of the regime created ever more
sympathizers who joined the underground militant activists in order to
avoid long prison sentences or to take revenge on the state. Given that
peaceful protest in favor of Islamic activism no longer meant protection
from state violence, violent acts against the state, including also attacks on
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
80
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 80
civilian targets, came to be seen as a logical and acceptable part of the politi-
cal repertoire. The ideological frames and discourse of Jihad and Jamaa, the
leading violent Islamic groups, became increasingly polarized and directed
against the state. This polarized discourse referred to a struggle between
Islam and heathenism (jahiliyya), between the sovereignty of God and the
sovereignty of the people, and between the party of God (hizb Allah) and
that of Satan (hizb al-shaytaan). Moreover, the ever-more-radicalized
splinter groups of both organizations became continually more isolated
from the mainstream and therefore outside of the control of the original
central leadership. This was especially apparent from the initiatives by 
the Jamaa leadership for a unilateral ceasefire and pleas for the renunciation
of violence in 1996. These efforts would have success only after the Luxor
attack in 1997, when the militant resources of the splinter groups were
exhausted and their leaders were imprisoned or had fled abroad (Hafez
2003: 137). 
The decision to renounce violence led, remarkably enough, to a secret
accord with the government in 2002 and a historic public explanation from
the imprisoned Jamaa leaders about their change of course. The Egyptian
authorities even allowed them to travel around the various prisons to give
an account to their followers. The leaders also published four books in
which they gave an underpinning, on the basis of the Quran, the Sunna,
and the interpretations of legal scholars, for the thesis that armed Islamic
struggle is not legitimate. Furthermore, they distanced themselves from
the Jamaa doctrine and practices of the 1970s and ’80s, including the strict
interpretation of the sovereignty of God by Mawdudi and Qutb. In order to
avoid any misunderstanding that they indeed represented a new, official
position of the Jamaa, they included the names of all the authors and their
sympathizers as well as all its founders and historic leaders. Some of them
revealed in interviews that their process of reconsideration had begun in
1982 but had been eclipsed by the escalation of violence and radical splin-
tering during the confrontations with the regime. In the meantime their
books were widely distributed in the Arab world. According to al-Sayyid,
the fact that these books based the argument for non-violence expressly 
on Islamic grounds is reason to assume that they are influential (al-Sayyid
2003: 16-19).
In the first book the authors explain that the call for a cessation of violence is
based on the self-interest of the Jamaa and the Ummah in preventing inter-
nal strife. Continuing the armed struggle would only play into the hands of
the enemies of Islam, including Israel, the us, and the secularists in the
Muslim world. Moreover, Sharia forbids violence against Muslims and non-
Muslims, even in the name of jihad. The second book continues with this
theme. It explains that the Jamaa had erred by seeking armed confrontation
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with the Egyptian regime. Furthermore, it implicitly distanced itself from
the jihad ideology of Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (who lived in
the thirteenth century); it is precisely the obligation of Muslims to protect
tourists and guests. Books three and four, to conclude, take positions against
the practice of takfir (pronouncing someone an apostate), which some
groups within Islamic movements use against politicians, intellectuals, and
others who, in their view, do not give the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam or
who cooperate with non-Muslims. The authors confirm that this practice is
based on an extremely strict interpretation of Islamic scholarship that stems
from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the religion and the meaning
of the scriptures. They also distance themselves from earlier practices of the
Jamaa militias and other fanatic followers, such as acts against ‘decadent
behavior’ or using intimidation and violence to enforce their own rules and
religious interpretations.
In spite of the moderation of the Brotherhood and the Jamaa, the regime
continued its predominantly repressive approach. It even appears that
Mubarak found the more moderate tone and the electoral successes of the
Brothers more threatening than the violence of the terrorists (Rosefsky
Wickham 2002: 215). In the full glare of the state-controlled media, he had
prominent leaders charged with membership of a banned organization and
the undermining of state security. Through the imposition of prison
sentences they were removed from the political arena and many other
political activists were frightened off. Therefore, the Brotherhood ended up
initially further on the political sideline and experienced a crisis. The older
leaders encountered increasing criticism from the younger generations,
who reproached them for being ideologically rigid and autocratic, and
insufficiently open to constructive debate and coalitions with other parties.
In 1996 several prominent critics decided to form a new party called al-
Wasat (the Center). This party, whose founders included women and
Copts, was initially considered by the regime as a clone of and front for the
Brotherhood. One of the principal founders, the now 47-year-old engineer
Abu-l-Ila Madi, two party sponsors, and thirteen leaders of the Brother-
hood were arrested and accused of membership of an illegal organization
and of conducting political activities without authorization. Ultimately
eight Muslim Brothers were sentenced to prison terms. The Wasat
founders were released after the Egyptian authorities had assured them-
selves that the relations between Wasat and the Brotherhood were
anything but amicable.
Unlike the Brotherhood, which remains vulnerable to being officially
accused of being a religious – and therefore banned – movement, Wasat
emphatically labels itself a political party that is not linked to the Islamic
faith but to ‘Islamic culture’ on the basis of citizenship. With this concept
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the party stresses the striving for a society in which Muslims and Chris-
tians would have an equal place as Egyptian citizens (icg 2004b: 17). 
They expressively distance themselves from the da’wa and Islamization
policy of the Brotherhood and following the example of modern, formally
recognized, Islamically oriented parties in Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, and
Malaysia are trying to become a broad party with a moderate, democratic,
and reform-minded direction and a willingness to form alliances. Because
of this stance, they have also received support from a number of prominent
secular opposition leaders (Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 211-220). The party
(now officially called Hizb al-Wasat al-Gedid, the New Center Party)
seems close to winning official recognition.
The Brotherhood in the meantime seems to have learned from this political
competitor and is making an unexpected political comeback. It seems clear
by now that a moderate, more inclusive and democratic position appeals to
voters. During the November 2005 parliamentary elections no fewer than
88 of the 444 seats were won by politicians from the Brotherhood, who
presented themselves as ‘independent’ candidates. They were allowed 
to stand for elections in a mere 150 of these 444 districts. Although still
formally banned, the Brotherhood is now the largest opposition group in
the parliament (Economist 2006).
What tentative conclusions can we draw from the emergence of Egyptian
Islamic political movements? It is clear that the actions of the state had a great
influence on the movements’ development (al-Sayyid 2004: 6; icg 2004b:
2). Under Sadat the state initially tried to strengthen its political legitimacy
by giving a clear field for Islamic activists of the Brotherhood and by con-
sciously playing the religious card. For example, in 1971 and in 1980 he had
Sharia introduced into the constitution as respectively ‘a’ and then ‘the main’
source of legislation (see Chapter 4). His successor Mubarak, who had to 
maneuver extremely carefully after the Camp David Accords, initially 
offered more political and social space to Islamic activists. At the same time
he adopted parts of the Islamization agenda, especially in sectors and 
institutions such as religious education, the state-controlled media, and uni-
versities. In addition to reinforcing his legitimacy this effort was expressly
intended to maintain his grip on the official interpretation of Islam and to
give alternative tendencies as little opportunity as possible. For these rea-
sons for the past two decades he has also strengthened the position of the
traditional, orthodox-oriented ulama at al-Azhar University, a policy that is
at the expense of free-thinking and enlightened as well as radical and funda-
mentalist interpretations of Islam (Wessels 2001: 70; Kodmani 2005: 9-14). 
What Mubarak initially underestimated was the speed and effectiveness 
by which Islamic activists could use resources and mobilization channels 
to mobilize their grassroots (Hafez 2003). With their own, more effective 
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social services and institutions they merciless exposed the shortcomings
of the government bureaucracy. The Brotherhood, in particular, thanks to a
strong, well-organized network of volunteer organizations and ample 
financial resources, became in a short time a dominant factor in social life.
This has become clearly visible in the public discourse and the public space,
where more and more religious schools, clinics, and banks have sprung up,
where Islamic symbols have appeared, and where religious literature in great
quantities is sold. There is also an increasingly more massive following of 
the religious prescriptions regarding clothing and behavior (such as the head
scarf, the ban on alcohol, attendance at Friday prayer, and fasting during 
Ramadan) (Esposito 2003; al-Sayyid 2004). This increases the dilemma 
facing the regime and the secular elite; through the ban on Islamic parties,
they preserve the predominance of Islamic movements in social welfare.
The decision to finally dismantle individual radical groups with massive
violence after a phase of tolerating them led to a predictable pattern of
escalation: exclusion and further radicalization was answered by violent
repression by the security apparatus and that led again to resistance,
further marginalization, radicalization, and violence (Hafez 2003: 201).
The state in these actions struck not only at violent terrorist groups but also
at groups that were prepared to follow the rules of the political and legal
order. Thus the borders between protecting the constitutional state against
terrorism and violating human rights became blurred (Esposito 2003: 85).
Since breaking out of the spiral of violence in 1997 the overwhelming
majority of Islamic activists have renounced violence. Nevertheless the
position of Islamic parties and movements remains uncertain. Their lead-
ers are sometimes tolerated or co-opted into the political and social order,
and at other times they are rounded up and declared an enemy of the state.
They are not given formal recognition out of fear that the ruling ndp and
other, marginal, secular parties would lose still more ground (icg 2004b:
2). As long as other credible (Islamic) social and political counter-forces are
still lacking, this same political elite is, however, not prepared to abandon
the status quo (Perthes 2004a: 304, 2004d: 34). On the other hand, the
voters seem to have rewarded the candidates of the Islamic parties for their
responsible attitude during the election campaign at the end of 2005 and
their readiness to reach compromises with other democratic opposition
forces (Kodmani 2005: 20).
3.4.2 elsewhere in the muslim world
In the 1970s and ’80s the Algerian regime was considered as the typical
model in the Middle East: an authoritarian government that after inde-
pendence, under pressure from the precarious geopolitical situation in the
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region, became increasingly dependent on the army and the security appa-
ratus (Singerman 2004: 146). Like Sadat in Egypt, President Boumediene
undertook a charm offensive just after the rise of Islamic groups. He gave
the traditional religious elite more influence within the Ministries of
Education, Religious Affairs, and Justice. His successor Bendjedid intro-
duced new family legislation that reflected conservative interpretations of
Islam. But at the same time he also tried to channel via political institutions
the discontent among the population about the state’s economic misman-
agement. After more than thirty years of rule by a single party, he amended
the constitution to end the dominant position of the National Liberation
Front (nfl). He allowed formal recognition of political parties, which
brought about a multi-party system. Fourteen parties were founded,
including the Islamic Social Movement (Hamas), the Islamic Renaissance
Movement (mni), and the Islamic Salvation Front (fis), an umbrella organ-
ization of Islamic opposition parties that could count on broad support
among the population. In addition to a moderate, liberal wing, the fis also
revealed a militant side; for example, during political protest marches and
mass demonstrations there were calls to have the Islamic shura as an alter-
native to democracy. Nevertheless, the leadership of the party was not
ready to introduce an Islamic state by revolutionary means because in a
short time the new parliamentary path had already produced too many
direct benefits and had won respect among the population. The result was
that the radical groups still occupied a marginal position in 1991 (Hafez
2003: 42-43).
Bendjedid hoped to be able to use the fis strategically to counter the old
leftist guard of the fln and the army that remained strongly opposed to
far-reaching economic liberalization. He declared himself ready to cooper-
ate with a fis-dominated parliamentary majority, even when this party at
the end of 1991 after earlier mass demonstrations and a victory in local elec-
tions, was on the point of winning an overwhelming victory during the
national elections (Noyon 2003: 121).11 Soon after that the army intervened,
however. It announced a state of emergency, forced the president to resign,
invalidated the election results, and banned the fis. Nevertheless the lead-
ers of the party still tried to find a political solution by taking a common
position with the fln and the socialist party against the military coup.
They also appealed to the Supreme Court for a lifting of the ban on the
party and called for the release of political prisoners and the resumption of
the election process. 
These interventions, however, were of no avail because the radical groups
within and outside the fis were stirred up due to the military coup. They
managed to convince many disappointed fis supporters that the demo-
cratic process ultimately served only the interests of the secular regime. If
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the outcome did not suit the regime, the process would be scrapped (Hafez
2003: 43). Neither could the fis count on international support because the
official reading of the events, and one that was also accepted by the West,
was that the Algerian army had intervened to protect democracy from the
fis strategy of one man, one vote, one time (Esposito 2003: 80). In reality,
the army acted mercilessly against all Islamic activists, regardless of the
nature of their activities. In early February 1992 between 6,000 and 30,000
fis activists, including 500 mayors and municipal councilors, were thrown
into jails in the Sahara and tried as terrorists before special military courts.
Persecuted by the army and the security forces that more and more often
perpetrated mass killings and ‘disappearances’, the fis broke into compet-
ing radical splinter groups. In 1993 a number of them came together to
form the Gamaa al-Islamiyya al-Musalaha (that is, the gia), a movement
that underwent radicalization, as had the Jamaa al-Islamiyya and the
Islamic Jihad in Egypt. Here, as well, undifferentiated repression resulted
in a radicalization and further escalation of violence against military and
civilian targets.
In Syria (secular) students, trade unions, and Muslim Brothers pursued
simultaneous and sometimes joint opposition by means of strikes and
protest marches. By co-opting some of the secular political leaders (partic-
ularly those from the middle class) and by heavy repression of other forces
of the secular opposition, the socialist regime of al-Assad succeeded in
driving a wedge between them. Just as in Egypt, there arose among the
Syrian Muslim Brothers a division between the activists who wanted to
reach their goal through peaceful means and those who chose violence.
However, the regime shifted to persecuting both groups. This again led to a
spiral of violence and repression, in which the violent wings of the Muslim
Brothers carried out guerilla actions and terrorist attacks, and the regime
acted across the board with increasing repression against its own popula-
tion.12 A direct result was that the majority of the population, certainly
including the secular opposition, became just as averse to its own repres-
sive state as to violent Islamic activism.
The manner by which the regimes in the Middle East attempted to control
Islamic activist movements was certainly not unique. We see that regimes
everywhere aimed at the granting of concessions to religious activists, the
use of Islam to legitimate their power, and the reinforcing of control over
(official) religion. The degree to which this occurred, however, was deter-
mined in part by the internal and external room for maneuver of these
regimes. In countries where the process of nation-building was already
under severe pressure (such as in Pakistan after Bangladesh split off in 1971
and in Afghanistan) it turned out that the concessions could not be with-
drawn or reversed. In Pakistan, for example, General Zia continued his
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destructive Islamization policy. Moreover, he employed, under the super-
vising eye of the Arab world and the us, the Jamaat-i-Islami as a foreign
policy instrument in the struggle against Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
(Fair 2005: 273; Roy 2004: 291).
It is notable that regimes outside the Middle East offered openings for politi-
cal participation well before the revival of Islamic activism in the 1970s.
Thus countries such as Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia appeared to be
better able to take the wind out of the sails of radical Islamic movements and
parties. In Malaysia the ruling coalition under the leadership of the umno
managed to introduce, with the support of the Malaysian Islamic Party
(pas) and the large Muslim youth movement (abim), a policy balancing
secularism, economic modernization, and a restricted Islamization of the
state and the law for the benefit of the Muslim population (55 % of the total
population). Non-Muslim minorities (Chinese, Indians) remained largely
protected from the effects of Islamization (Harding in Otto et al. 2006). 
At the same time the government of Prime Minister Mahathir took strong 
action against violent Islamic groups. In Bangladesh the government initially
embraced the secular state and repressed the Islamic forces. The 1975 military
takeover led, however, to a fifteen-year period of military rule (including
subsequent military coups) during which Islamic political forces gradually 
were granted a place in the political arena. Just as in Pakistan, this was
coupled with a policy of social and cultural Islamization, but unlike in
Pakistan, the path to further political liberalization in the early 1990s was
not blocked. Islamic parties were further integrated into the – otherwise
extremely turbulent – political climate. Indonesia, whose 1945 constitution
mentioned not Islam explicitly but “the belief in the one and all-powerful
God”, nonetheless excluded Islamic movements completely from the polit-
ical arena. After his military coup Suharto legalized three political parties
(Golkar, ppp, pdi) which came under the control of the government. The
Islamic ppp and the democratic-nationalist pdi could carry out a mild sort
of opposition within the margins of his stable police-state. Since his depar-
ture in 1998 Islamic parties have had a freer rein. 
In other parts of the Muslim world as well political participation offered a
safety valve for Islamic activism which confined radical groups to the
margins. In African states like Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, and
Niger, for example, Islamic opposition movements were less dominant and
the threat of radical Islamization was chiefly seen, in spite of the takeover
in Sudan, as a typically ‘Arab’ problem. At the same time these regimes
dealt in extremely pragmatic fashion with the Islamic opposition. In Mali,
for example, the new constitution of 1974 emphasized continuity with the
earlier secular constitution and the principles of universal human rights. 
In practice, the government of President Traoré gave Muslim movements
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preferential treatment with respect to Christians in certain areas (broad-
casting time, for instance). This step was prompted by the political weight
of prominent Muslim families with international business contacts in the
Middle East (Schultz in Otto et al. 2006).
In Central Asia the role of Islamic activism is strongly tied to the legacy of
Russian colonialism and the later, ‘Sovietizing’ of the region, that lasted
around seventy years. In the 1920s the Bolsheviks carried out a merciless
purification campaign against religion. In this way, Islam completely
disappeared from public life in Soviet states such as Uzbekistan, Turk-
menistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. The pass-
ing on of religious knowledge and rituals was restricted and Muslims in
the Soviet Union were isolated from the modern political thought of
people such as Qutb, al-Banna and Mawdudi. The result of this was that
Islam remained to be sure a part of the local identity, but it was almost
completely reduced to customs and traditions. Unlike in neighboring
Pakistan and Afghanistan, where someone who called himself a Muslim
also observed certain religious rituals, an Uzbek or a Turkmen, for exam-
ple, could automatically consider himself a Muslim without regard for his
personal religious convictions. After independence in the 1990s there
arose in these new countries a search for a new national identity, in the
course of which Islam was also ‘rediscovered’. Religious education reap-
peared on the scene after seventy years, mosques were reopened, and
Muslims came into contact with the ideologies and developments else-
where in the Muslim world, in part thanks to the missionary work of
diverse tendencies including Wahhabism, the Fetullah Gülen movement,
Hizb ut-Tahrir etc. Moreover, the new interest in Islam extended to its
political manifestations, including activism directed against the secular
establishment.
The former communist regimes that without exception remained in
power after the revolutions were all fearful of Islamic activism. In Uzbek-
istan the repression of Islam led to the flight of many Muslim activists to
Tajikistan and then to Afghanistan, where they formed the Islamic Move-
ment of Uzbekistan which was allied with the Taliban. In Tajikistan the
political opposition of the Islamic Renaissance Party (irp) culminated in
a civil war against the former communist regime. A peace accord was
finally reached in 1997 after the former communist leader Rakhmonov
approved the legal recognition of the irp. Since then he has further under-
mined the position of the party in the political system, however, and, as a
result, more radical, in part transnational, groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir
have gained in strength. The latter group, which in the meantime has 
been banned in Russia, Pakistan, Germany, and parts of the Middle East,
presents itself as a non-violent group that advocates strict adherence to
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Islamic behavior codes and strives through personal and social changes to
establish an Islamic caliphate (icg 2003c; Wessels 2001: 136). At the same
time the movement does not renounce violent jihad, and individual
members continue to be involved in terrorist attacks and military coup
attempts in the Middle East (Baran ed. 2004).
In Turkmenistan President Niyazov has even combined the suppression of
every form of independent religious activity with a personality cult that
also draws on so-called ‘Islamic’ elements; mosques and schools are
compelled to teach the Rukhnama, Niyazov’s own book of folk wisdom,
Turkmen history, and pseudo-spirituality, as a text alongside the Quran.
Although the authorities in the other Central Asian countries do not go so
far, they also consider all forms of Islamic activism as a potential threat to
the political order which demands harsh and repressive government
action. At the same time they try to engage Islam as an ideological instru-
ment for their own political objectives. Just as elsewhere both develop-
ments increase the risk that not only the extremists but also the enlight-
ened religious voices and activist groups will become marginalized. And
that can quickly lead to further radicalization. Given the dramatically
deteriorated economic and social situation, the restricted political free-
doms, and widespread corruption of the past ten years, it is not surprising
that Islamic activism, including radical underground movements like Hizb
ut-Tahrir, are winning support even in the strongly secular former Soviet
republics. After all, they now belong to the very few movements that
expose the social, economic, and political problems in the region (icg
2003c).
3.4.3 tr ansnational movements
In the above discussion the attention was chiefly focused on the interac-
tion between Islamic social movements and networks, on the one hand,
and the state, on the other. We saw that movements like the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami initially oriented themselves toward
the worldwide Muslim community (the Ummah). Just as Islam itself never
respected political borders and spread by trade, missionaries, and
conquests, their ideal of the Islamic project still remains universal and not
tied to the national state. In the meantime both ‘mother-movements’
functioned as international organizations with autonomous national
branches. Just as, for example, socialist and communist parties respec-
tively have their own Socialist and Communist Internationals through
which they maintain mutual contact, the Islamic parties and movements
use their ‘mother-movements’ as a forum for exchanging ideas, experi-
ences, and strategies (Fuller 2003: 42).
the development of islamic political movements
89
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 89
Thanks to the global spreading of new technologies, means of transporta-
tion and communication, increasingly intensive migration, and the exten-
sive network of transnational ngos, Islamic banks, businesses, and educa-
tional institutions, such contacts are also easier to maintain (Mandaville
2000). At the same time most of the movements and parties in the Muslim
world, just as many socialist and communist parties before them, over
time have developed a political agenda and strategy attuned to their own
specific political context. Where they have gained access to the national
political arena and have to keep up their position in the regular political
competition, most Islamic parties have renounced violence and for prag-
matic reasons have abandoned the striving for ideological purity and
exclusivity (icg 2005a: 7-8). These processes of de-radicalization, ‘nation-
alization of Islamic activism’, and Islamization of the discourse on democ-
racy, pluralism, and human rights are clearly visible in many places in the
Middle East, Asia, and in Turkey (Roy 2004: 62-63). 
On the other hand, some extremist movements have been gradually trans-
formed into fragmented, informal, and closed terrorist networks with a
transnational orientation. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the 1980s,
in the reactions to the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the war in
Afghanistan, and the struggle of radicalized activists against the incum-
bent regimes in Egypt and Algeria. The anti-Western and pro-Shiite posi-
tion of Iran under Khomeini (that supported, among others, the radical
Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon) was the direct cause for Saudi Arabia to
mobilize internationally active, anti-Shiite and anti-communist forces.
Supported by its ally, the us, and by conservative Arab regimes, the coun-
try launched itself as the disseminator of conservative Wahhabism to
Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Central Asia, and also Europe,
among other places. Also the Salafiyya movement mentioned above
became increasingly more imbued with Wahhabist influences (icg 2005a:
10). In particular, some Pakistani madrasas became breeding grounds for
jihadists, who later would also be involved in the wars in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, and Chechnya (Hafez 2003: 61; Singerman 2004: 157-158). In the
1990s these conflicts provided violent groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah
important ideological stimuli, financial resources, and manpower to
organize themselves transnationally. 13 Other groups that could rely on
Saudi support included the Arab Muslim Brothers, Hassan al-Turabi’s nif,
the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Hizb-i Islami in Kashmir, the Moros
in the Philippines, the Deobandi movement and other radical splinter
groups in Turkey. In addition, increasingly greater sums of money went to
radical groups among the migrant communities in Europe, including the
young ‘diaspora radicals’ (Wessels 2001: 58; Roy 1994: 118; Rabassa et al.
2005: 445-446). 
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This radicalized transnational activism has been characterized since the
1990s by its explicitly anti-Western character. Followers and sympathizers
of such organizations as al-Qaeda no longer direct their attacks and propa-
ganda exclusively at the governments of Muslim countries that they deem
to be insufficiently religious but also at the us, Israel, and their allies. 
Their field of operations has become global and their tactics suggest ‘elite
urban terrorism’ more than the traditional guerilla war of volunteers in
Afghanistan (icg 2005a: 16-17). With relatively limited resources, they
have succeeded in giving ‘Islamic’, jihadist, and especially anti-Western
overtones to existing geopolitical conflicts and rivalries within and outside
the Muslim world, like the Balkan wars, the struggles in Kashmir and
Chechnya, the Palestinian conflict, and the war in Iraq. This effect is rein-
forced by the influence of the (visual) media, which mercilessly magnify
the interconnectedness between what takes place inside and outside a
country’s borders. They allow the image of continuous religious conflict
between Muslims and non-Muslims to make a deep impression, which also
arouses worldwide solidarity among Muslims (and their opponents). As
Graham Fuller notes:
“Today Muslims see themselves as under siege, particularly Muslim minorities, but it is 
not just that Bosnians are perhaps being killed because they are Muslims; Bosnians see
Chechnyans being killed, and Chechnyans see Palestinians being killed, and Palestinians see
Cashmirians being killed. And Cashmirians see Moro’s in the Philippines being killed. (…)
young men [in Southern Thailand] have been watching television, and they have been
watching the war in Iraq, and they are saying ‘that is us!’ They see themselves. There is 
this echo effect across the Muslim world. It is possible to see on television what is happe-
ning to other Muslims. And this intensifies the feeling that would not be the case if it 
was simply Rwandans, because their ethnic or religious links to Rwanda are very weak.”
(Fuller 2005: 24)
Since September 11 this mechanism has worked almost equally well in the
West. The shared feeling of humiliation and being under siege in the
Muslim world that Osama bin Laden so flawlessly managed to play on is
the mirror image of the growing fear of Islam and Islamic terrorism that has
seized non-Muslims in the West (Coolsaet 2005: 19-20; icg 2005a: 25).
That equally great tensions are arising within the Muslim world fades into
the background.
3.4.4 conclusion
In Egypt as in other parts of the Muslim world, the most authoritarian
regimes tried to rein in the upsurge of revolutionary Islamic activism in the
1970s and the formation of Islamic political movements and parties
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through repression or co-optation. Many have also made use of Islam itself
to legitimate their power. Since that time the religious establishment has
either been made almost completely subordinate to the authoritarian
government or has been co-opted in exchange for further Islamization of
public life or government institutions. Nevertheless it appears in many
countries that the mainstream of the Islamic activist movements has
become in the meantime more reform-minded and moderate than revolu-
tionary and violent. But if after a phase of political liberalization the
moderate mainstream is suddenly confronted with complete political
exclusion or violent repression, the chances increase that splinter groups
will become radicalized. Algeria has become a notorious example of this
phenomenon. Just as the Iranian revolution became the specter for many
authoritarian regimes in the 1980s, so ‘Algerian-type troubles’ were
dreaded everywhere in the 1990s. In addition to these dramatic events, 
the direct experience with the carrying out of (underground and regular)
political opposition within the national arena spurred the opposition’s
pragmatic strategies of moderation, coalition forming, and support for 
the path of gradual change. The unconditional institutional inclusion of
Islamic political tendencies and movements into the regular political order
is certainly not without risk, as can be seen from the examples of Sudan
and Pakistan. But a gradual moving towards the political arena, as the
examples of Egypt and Turkey show, can in time also contribute to further
moderation of the mainstream, to marginalization of the violent, radical
minority, and to gradual democratization. It is in any case certain that as
long as Islamic political movements enjoy the support of broad levels of 
the population and there are no credible alternative political movements,
genuine democratization in the Muslim world cannot occur without 
them.
3.5 interpretation of the political dynamism
3.5.1 access to the political arena
The current and future dynamism of Islamic activist movements and
parties is closely linked to the degree of openness of the political arena. 
We saw earlier that during the rise of Islamic activism in the 1970s an 
overwhelming majority of countries had authoritarian regimes (sec. 3.2). 
In the Middle East and North Africa only Lebanon had the status of a
democratic country (a Polity score of 4 or higher). If we compare these 
indicators with the most recent scores, we can observe the following: of
the 48 countries with a Muslim majority, ten have a Polity score of four 
or higher (see appendix 1). In 2002 only six countries of the 48 were 
labeled ‘electoral democracy’: Mali, Niger, Senegal, Bangladesh, Albania,
and Turkey (appendix 2). On the other hand, increasingly more Muslims
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(within and outside countries with a Muslim majority) live in a context of
political liberalization and democratization; according to estimates, some
700 million Muslims at present live in an electorally democratic or democ-
ratizing society, namely those living in Indonesia, Bangladesh, India,
North America, and Europe (United States Institute of Peace 2003).
The regional differences within the Muslim world are very great, however.
Among Muslim countries in sub-Saharan Africa there has been an improve-
ment of Polity scores, political rights, and civil liberties (appendix 1). 
Seven countries in the region are labeled ‘partly free,’ and Mali and Senegal
are considered to be free. In Asia, the situation in Indonesia, the largest
Muslim country in the world, had sharply improved, although it was not 
yet deemed to be an electoral democracy by the compilers of the Polity score
in 2003. On the other hand, the situation in Afghanistan, the Maldives, 
and Pakistan has considerably deteriorated compared to the beginning of
the 1970s. The Middle East region and North Africa show remarkably little
improvement in political freedoms. To be sure, five of the 21 countries in the
region are considered ‘partly free’ (namely Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait,
and Morocco), but a number of countries (Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates [uae]) have experienced no noticeable improve-
ment in Polity scores between the early 1970s and 2003. In short, the Middle
East is still much more authoritarian than other regions. Just as the succes-
sive Arab Human Development Reports indicate, the lack of political and
civil freedoms in the Muslim world is to a great extent (but not exclusively) 
a problem of the Arab world (see table 3.2). 
What overall conclusions can we draw on the direct participation of
(Islamic) political parties and movements in the political arena? Saudi
Arabia is the only Muslim country that does not allow the formation of any
political parties. In 2003 thirteen of the 48 Muslim countries were labeled
‘politically closed’. Another seventeen were designated as countries where
elections were held where no real political competition could take place
(this type of regime is called, ‘electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian’,
see appendix 2). Since the beginning of the 1990s more and more citizens
(some for the first time or for the first time in a long while) are able to exer-
cise the right to vote for legislative parliaments, which, however, have very
limited powers. At the same time in many Muslim countries citizens still
have no direct influence on the representatives with executive power
(president, reigning king). Here the authoritarian regimes in the Middle
East win hands down: elections are regularly held, parliaments are chosen,
and there is a great deal of lip service rendered to the Islamic bases of the
state and the law, but the possibility of an (Islamic) opposition party
defeating the incumbent regimes through a democratic mandate remains
for the time being out of the question. Those holding political power are
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able to retain that power through shifting alliances, by playing opponents
off against each other and buying off the interested parties, by continual
alteration of the electoral system, and the maintenance or the periodic
introduction of emergency rule. They manage to estimate the strength of
the opposition and to attune their own actions accordingly. They continue
to deal with the opposition from a dominant position from which they
keep control of the (new) rules of the political game and can limit the
authority of parliament. Parties and political leaders who reject this game,
however, run the risk of being forced further to the political margins.
Islamic political parties are relatively often confronted with exclusion,
repression, and manipulation (Jones-Luong and Lust-Okar 2002).
The political elites in the Middle East and their allies in the West face major
dilemmas. Their first dilemma is that the experiences of the population
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Table 3.2 Polity scores of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries
There are no scores for Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Somalia because of an interruption of regime or a
temporary regime. There are no independent Polity IV scores available for Brunei, the Maldives, and the
West Bank/Gaza.
Source: Polity IV score
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with parliamentary systems and more or less democratic institutions are
still relatively limited, while those with terrorism lie still fresh in their
memory. Secular elites in particular raise many questions about continu-
ous political liberalization that is accompanied with political and
economic instability (Noyon 2003). They fear the scenario of one man,
one vote, one time, in which democratically elected Islamic parties abolish
the democratic system. On the other hand, to date there has been no
precedent for a situation in which Islamic activists have achieved power in
a democratic manner via the voting booth and then have abolished democ-
racy. As Roy concludes:
“The evolution of Algeria’s FIS, Turkey’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), Tunisia’s Nahda
party and the liberals in Iran towards if not democratic, then at least parliamentarian 
movements – advocating elections, political coalitions, democracy and the defence of 
‘civil society’ in the face of authoritarian secular states or conservative religious leaders –
is evidence enough that many Islamic groups have become ‘normal’ national parties, 
and that the principal obstacle to democracy is not the Islamists per se, but the Muslim
world’s more or less secular authoritarian state, supported by the West.”
(Roy 2005: 2)
The second dilemma concerns the great distance between the political
process and the ordinary people in many Muslim countries, a distance 
that Western societies increasingly must also have to face today, for that
matter. In 1992 Fatima Mernissi expressed aptly why certain groups of
Moroccans, for example, still distrusted democracy. All of them, regard-
less of education or class, could see the advantages of a mobile telephone
or owning a car but not of a relatively abstract concept such as democracy.
Therefore some had the idea that democracy was mostly for university-
educated, cosmopolitan youth with a knowledge of Western culture.1 4
3.5.2 growing diver sit y
How should the political dynamism be interpreted against this back-
ground? First there appears to be growing diversity. Since the 1979 Iranian
revolution more and more different movements have arisen that defy a
simple division into fundamentalist or moderate, violent or peaceful,
Ummah-wide or oriented to the nation state (icg 2005).15 In an attempt 
to chart the current landscape, a distinction must be made, following the
example of the icg, first between Shiite and Sunni movements. At least
eighty percent of all Muslims are Sunnis. Although, in the West, Shiite
movements since the Iranian revolution are usually associated with radical
movements directed to the restoration of the Ummah, most of them today
are active exclusively within the national context. This applies to Azerbai-
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jan, Bahrain, and Iraq, where the majority of the population is Shiite. It
also applies to Lebanon, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, Burma,
and eastern and southern Africa, where Shiites are in the minority. Shiite
minority activism is characteristically chiefly directed at the defense of 
the interests of the Shiite group against those of other population groups
and the state. For this reason, the specific goals, the political discourse, 
the forms of expression and the instruments of Shiite movements vary
according to the national and local political contexts (icg 2005a). In
Pakistan, for example, where about fifteen to twenty percent of the popu-
lation is Shiite, Shiite activists traditionally promote the interests of their
community in the areas of education and legislation, witness also their
advocacy of separate textbooks for religious education in state schools.
Under the broad umbrella of Islamic activism further general distinctions
can be made on the basis of strategies, orientations, and resources (see
table 3.3): movements that emphasize evolutionary political activism,
revolutionary (jihad) activism, movements that employ chiefly social
activism, and those that focus on missionary activities (Yavuz 2004: 274).
The first two strategies aim at a top-down Islamization, using the state
and the political and judicial systems. They make use of a political
vanguard that strongly influences the strategy, tactics, resources, and
discourse of the movement. The other two types of activism strive chiefly
for Islamization from the bottom up, through social groups, organiza-
tions, and individuals. They try to change society from the inside out. The
more group-oriented variants do this by mobilizing the communities in
which debate takes place. Since the economic (and in a number of coun-
tries political) liberalization of the 1980s they chiefly make use of their
own media and means of communication (newspapers, publishing
houses, Internet, TV) and economic and social networks (banks, social
services, associations, schools) to create free spaces for their Islamic
discourses. The more individualistic, spiritual, and missionary-oriented
variants regard changes in one’s inner self and spirituality as the key to
social transformation. They are exponents of the increasing fragmentation
of the authority of the traditional ulama that, through their close ties to
the authoritarian state, often have lost credibility and face competition
from self-declared religious leaders, Sufi movements, and religiously
inspired intellectuals (Piscatori 2000: 4). If these spiritual groups close
themselves up even more strongly in their own communities of believers,
there is a chance that they will withdraw from the legal political and
juridical framework of the national state. But by engaging with, and inte-
grating into society through missionary work, they can also transform
into socially and politically oriented organizations.
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Politically activist groups can have, in addition to an evolutionary program,
social and religious organizations and a militant revolutionary branch.
Depending on the obstacles in the external environment, such as the space
to maneuver in the political arena, they will employ alternating mobiliza-
tion strategies and resources and also adjust their frames of meaning and
political discourse. The classifications in table 3.3 thus do not suggest that
these strategies and orientations are mutually exclusive or immutable;
changes in the mobilization factors described above (sec. 3.2.2) often lead
also to changes in the orientation, strategies, and direction of development
of activist movements.
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The growing diversity within the Muslim world means that more and
more competing Islamic movements present themselves on the national
political and social stage. The largest political activist movement in the
Middle East and North Africa is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has
branches in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan, Iraq, and Yemen. The Broth-
erhood also supports other national organizations including the Tunisian
Nahda party, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (pjd), and – the
exception to the rule regarding nonviolence – Hamas in Palestine. Other
movements are linked to the Jamaat-i-Islami. In addition to their home
base in Pakistan, these can be found in India, Bangladesh, Central Asia and
North Africa. Elsewhere in the Muslim world we encounter politically
oriented tendencies in countries like Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia,
Turkmenistan, Nigeria, and Sudan.
3.5.3 from revolutionary pan - isl amism to evolutionary 
religious nationalism
In addition to a growing diversity, a second trend is visible. The politically
oriented activist movements have mostly abandoned their revolutionary
and militant aspirations for an evolutionary, moderate path within the
national state. Instead of striving to replace the secular national state, by
violence if necessary, with an (Ummah-wide) Islamic state, they aim at
participation in the political order and taking part in elections as a regular
political party. That means that the revolutionary power of Islamic
activism has largely past its peak. This change is in part the result of a real-
ization that the social costs of anarchy and of possible state failure are enor-
mously high, including the possibility that the mobilized population
could, in such a case, easily turn against the revolutionary leaders. In part it
also reflects a more recent political learning process of Islamic movements,
their leaders, followers, and the governments in Muslim countries. In most
countries where activists have acquired any access to the political arena, the
benefits of using political channels have appeared in general greater than
the costs of armed confrontation with the state that controls a powerful
and experienced security apparatus. Therefore the activists stand less and
less of a chance of taking over the state. The state, however, pays the price
of a diminished grip on the public arena and the social manifestations of
Islamic activism (Fuller 2003: 126, 169).
The development of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood exemplifies this
evolutionary process. Begun as a fundamentalist, explicitly anti-state
movement, the Brotherhood has now turned into a more moderate politi-
cal opposition force that functions as a political party. The Brothers recog-
nize not only the legitimacy of the Egyptian state but also the current
government. The electoral success of the leaders of the Brotherhood has
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also brought the imprisoned leaders of the once-so-radical Jamaa to the
realization that social Islamization from the bottom up and a future role in
the electoral system are more effective than armed resistance (al-Sayyid
2004: 22). A comparable development process has taken place among the
Muslim Brothers in Jordan, the pjd in Morocco, al-Nahda in Tunisia, and
Refah in Turkey. We also see a preference for evolutionary politics among
Shiites in Pakistan. Although Pakistan’s first Shiite political party was
founded immediately after the Iranian revolution, its revolutionary fervor
has in the meantime lessened. Just like most Shiite minority communities,
the vast majority of Pakistan’s Shiites have come to accept the legitimacy 
of the national state. Their political activism is largely directed to the
advancement of their own position within the state, especially since
sectarian violence has grown in the last twenty years. This explains in part
why their political discourse is pervaded by modern interpretations of
pluralism, human rights, and a concept of citizenship that is independent
of religious identity (icg 2005a).
In general it is true that politically oriented and institutionalized activism is
the least fundamentalist and violent and therefore also appears to be the
least vulnerable to processes of radicalization in the direction of jihadist
groups (icg 2005a). But armed resistance, military takeovers, and terror-
ism have not disappeared as activist strategies. Nor does it mean that such
activism cannot still return. In countries or regions where liberation move-
ments motivated by nationalist or separatist goals are active, Islamic
activism can expand into a broad national resistance movement that some-
times can make things very difficult for the state. We have seen this in the
conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and in the Philippines, among
other places, where Muslims are fighting against non-Muslims (Fuller
2003: 126). Sometimes local Islamic activists in these places are spurred on
by cells and groups that operate transnationally and are thoroughly radical-
ized. Conflicts like the wars formerly in Afghanistan and Bosnia and
currently in Iraq work then as catalysts for further escalation of violence.
There are conflicting forces at work here which makes it difficult to assess
the dynamics. The ease by which transnational and international contacts
can be maintained and resources can be transferred explains in part the
dissemination of conservative Wahhabism from the Arab world to other
parts of the Muslim world, Europe, and the us. However, after reaching 
a peak in the early 1990s this influence seems to be on the decline again,
especially since Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia itself is showing cracks (see
below) and the international battle against terrorism has been intensified
(icg 2005a). Against these conservative fundamentalist forces that have
spread to the rest of the Muslim world there is also the gradual spreading 
of the ideas and political practices of enlightened Islamic political thinkers
from countries like Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia (see Chapter 2).
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In countries where Islamic activists have succeeded in attaining positions
in the army or where the state is losing its grip on the government appara-
tus, attempts at military takeovers cannot be excluded. This applies, among
other places, to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, and Morocco, where
the regimes have not managed to keep Islamic activists out of the army
(Fuller 2003: 169). As we have seen, Pakistan also wrestles with the prob-
lem that Shiites are threatened by puritanical Sunnis, like the Deobandi
who are affiliated with Wahhabism (icg 2003a).16 As in so many develop-
ing countries, the regimes are very dependent on the army for maintaining
social and political stability. However, that also makes them vulnerable to
military coups.
3.5.4 political r approchement with concepts of democr ac y and
human rights
In addition to the moderating of the mainstream of political activism,
many political activists have a growing inclination to employ a political
vocabulary in which political parties, elections, and terms like democracy,
human rights, and pluralism play an increasingly prominent role (Fuller
2003: 25). In this regard they are clearly influenced by the confrontation
with Western political ideas and debates that, as we saw in Chapter 2, have
a very long history. That does not mean that they have abandoned their
own Islamic discourse nor that these concepts have the same significance
and support in every context or for every group. But it does appear that
through this Islamic vocabulary they are engaged in re-evaluating tradi-
tional ideas about the relationship between state, society, and politics.
Thanks to the banner of Islam and the Islamization of political discourse, a
bridge can be built between culturally familiar Islamic categories and
concepts (like shura, baya, Sharia) and concepts of democracy and law that
formerly had been employed only by a small, Western-oriented secular
elite. In most Muslim countries Islamic activism is socially more deeply
rooted. It also has greater potential to bring about changes than other
reform movements and ideologies that are led from the top down such as
Kemalism in Turkey or secular nationalism in Egypt (Yavuz 2004).
How powerful the vocabulary of Islamic political activism can be as a
motor for change is especially apparent in political systems that are almost
completely closed. Recent developments in Saudi Arabia are illustrative.
The stationing of American troops on Saudi territory during the first Gulf
War (1991-1992) was the immediate cause for the quietist Wahhabists,
whose actions had been directed at the private sphere, to openly act in
public as Salafiyya political activists. Religious leaders, judges, and intellec-
tuals drew up a petition in which they called upon the regime to restore
Islamic values. The petition listed all sorts of concrete proposals for politi-
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cal reform, including the instituting of a consultative assembly, fair admin-
istration of the law, redistribution of wealth, and the primacy of religious
law. Only the Islamic vocabulary and Islamic authority made it possible to
abandon the strong norm of self-censorship and to of express the kind of
political criticism unheard of in the Saudi context. It is more difficult for
the regime to outlaw criticism that comes under the banner of Islam
because it is Islam that gives the regime its legitimacy. The Islamic frame 
of thought and discourse is also more effective than any other because it is
shared by all the groups in the society, whether they are women, national-
ists, city or rural dwellers. It functions as a crowbar that can break open 
the closed political climate so that criticism can be expressed and debate
started. Other critical groups can ‘hitch a ride’ in the wake of this Islamic
frame of thought (Okruhlik 2004: 261-262). In Saudi Arabia we see indeed
that a number of liberal and Islamic activist intellectuals increasingly dare
to speak out more sharply against the excesses of Wahhabism. These
excesses include terror by the religious police, the ban on women driving
cars, and also militant jihadism that, since the attacks of September 11, 2001
in the us and those of 2003 in Saudi Arabia, is increasingly heavily criti-
cized. One thinker has even called for a return from Wahhabism to the
‘true’, more tolerant Salafism. He considers Salafism a good theological
underpinning for his pro-democratic activism (Lacroix 2005).
The growing significance of electoral channels and processes and concepts
like democracy and human rights is also evident from the lack of sharply
defined notions of Sharia and the Islamic state in the political arena.
Slogans like ‘Islam is the solution’, ‘the Quran is our constitution’ and also
the striving for an Islamic state following the Iranian model become scarcer
as Islamic movements commit themselves to programmatic politics.
Instead they call for justice, freedom, independence, recognition by the
state of pluralism and Sharia (see Chapter 4). The Egyptian Brotherhood,
for example, now employs the slogan ‘respect for the constitution’, and the
once-so-revolutionary Lebanese Hizbollah advocates a policy of openness
(infitah) and integration within the national state (Perthes 2004a: 134;
Alagha 2006). Moreover, political activists increasingly link their call for
Sharia to two important conditions. The first concerns the need to
acknowledge that everyone has the right to interpret Islam (ijtihad ) in
order that legislation can be fitted to the needs of a modern society. The
second qualification follows from the first, namely that ijtihad implies an
acknowledgment of actual differences of interpretation over the place and
position of Islam in society and thus also over the right to and the need for
political debate and consultation. At the same time there is a role reserved
for programmatic politics and representative parliaments in the legislative
process (icg 2005a: 7). 
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When these Islamic political parties and movements gain access to the
system, they are often inclined in practice to acknowledge a de facto differ-
ence between politics and religion as more or less separate domains within
the modern state. The developments in Iran are illustrative. The establish-
ment of the Iranian Islamic state through a popular uprising against the
authoritarian regime of the Shah led to a further Islamization, from the top
down, of the political arena, political discourse, and Iranian society. This
process has, however, also led to further pressure to separate the political
from the religious domain. Already under Khomeini it was decided in Iran
that the national interest superseded that of Islam, but now even influen-
tial religious leaders are trying to ‘rescue’ Islam from the hands of the
rulers (Roy 2004: 91). At the same time, for a growing proportion of the
population religion is a personal matter, by which they mean that the state
should stay out of it. Especially youths, who make up more than fifty
percent of the eligible voters, have become cynical about the stifling
‘Islamic’ social norms that are enforced on behalf of the state and the
repression and corruption in the name of theocracy. In Iran there is also a
lively debate over democracy, human rights, and pluralism, in spite of the
Islamic vocabulary that even Iranians who are hardly religious feel in part
compelled to employ and in spite of the recent victory of conservative
political forces. The intellectual and social debates in Iran also stimulate
discussions elsewhere in the Muslim world over the value of the autonomy
of mosque and state as a safeguard against the misuse of religion by the
state. 
We can see in Turkey, a secular republic par excellence, how Islam has
become the discourse of the resistance of the marginalized periphery
against the strongly centralized state. This ‘opposition Islam’ from the
bottom up is not a closed front but one that, because of internal and exter-
nal economic changes, has broken down into various social movements
and groups that have developed their own identity via Islam. Thanks to the
economic liberalization of the 1980s, for example, a new bourgeoisie arose
that found a new modern discourse based on the Quran and the hadith as
opposed to the enlightened fundamentalism of the elite and equally
opposed to the ‘primitive’ ‘folk’ Islam of the lowest classes (Yavuz 2004:
273). The Islamic modernity of these groups also produced its own ‘high
culture’ in fields like music, fashion, literature, and cuisine, which
competes with other Islamic cultures and identities. In this way, the inte-
gration of some religious groups and social classes comes about through
participation in consumer culture, while others are marginalized, and thus
we see growing differentiation among Muslim cultures. Similar complex
processes are taking place in many locations within the Muslim world and
outside where Muslims live in a minority situation.
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As Yavuz shows, processes of emancipation and integration lead to a far-
reaching objectification and therefore secularization of religious identity
through the mass production of Islamic goods and symbols, ranging from
stylish head scarves to halal foods, hotels, and vacations. Through these
new ‘Islamic’ consumption patterns large sections of the modern public
space, including the media, education, the market, and fashion, are rede-
fined. For example, female students can, thanks to an ultra-stylish head
scarf, participate in the public space without having to deny their religious
identity. The head scarf, which represented for the Kemalists a symbol of
backward, peasant identity, has been upgraded to a symbol of new chic,
social mobility, emancipation, and individuality. The secular elite in
Turkey, however, interpret this item of clothing as a provocative expression
of Islamic radicalism and undesirable Islamization (Yavuz 2004: 280-281).
In many countries where Islamic political parties have meanwhile gained
access to the electoral process and, thanks to their social roots and associa-
tions, have maintained contact with the population, it appears that these
parties experience a learning process in which they can also bring along
their grassroots supporters. They gain experience with gradual, step-by-
step political liberalization, how to deal with political institutions, how to
reach compromises and make alliances within a pluralistic environment,
and how to formulate concrete political programs that connect with broad
layers of the electorate. Through this process they distance themselves
from fundamentalist dogmas or undefined forms of ‘opposition Islam’,
which appeal above all to radicals. Moreover, they learn from experience
the lessons and principles of electoral competition; they know that Islamic
political parties, just as the others, are ultimately judged by their accom-
plishments not in the area of Islam but in concrete tasks like combating
unemployment, corruption, lawlessness, and the arbitrariness of the
regime. In short, in a number of Muslim countries, in addition to threats,
there are also opportunities for further political institutionalization, grad-
ual political liberalization, and the strengthening of human rights. Chapter
5 examines whether and how Dutch and European policies can support
these processes.
3.6 conclusion
In many parts of the Muslim world Islamic political parties have for a
considerable time been among the most important mobilizing forces.
There is not one political activism; activist political movements come in 
a number of shapes, coalitions, and contexts, and represent a vehicle for
countless aspirations. The primary political playing field of these move-
ments might be the national state, but it could also be international or
transnational politics; their orientation might be pan-Islamic, anti-West-
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ern, or anti-Shiite. Movements oriented to domestic politics have numer-
ous diverse goals, such as the introduction of an Islamic state and constitu-
tion, the countering of Western interference in national or regional poli-
tics, the spreading of belief and the provision of social services, the
combating of corruption and the exposure of failed government policy, the
advancement of human rights and the position of women, and the eleva-
tion of the emerging religious middle class. Additionally, these movements
alter their strategy and tactics often, while they also use multiple tactics at
the same time.
The Islamic activists who seized power in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iran
after 1970 all tried to base the state and society on an Islamic model. They
remained in general stuck, however, in a superficial, conservative Islamiza-
tion: the heavy-handed imposition of strongly anti-modern vocabularies,
behavior codes, and prescriptions labeled as Islamic (Bayat 1997). That
especially applies to Afghanistan under the Taliban, where the regime
linked literal interpretations of the Quran to traditional tribal codes. Iran
represents an exception to the resorting to a distant Islamic past because
that country has, like no other, experimented with new forms of politics,
government, and law based on Islam. It is a hopeful development that
precisely in this Islamic theocracy one can find among large segments of
the middle class support for an extremely pragmatic, de facto seculariza-
tion of Iranian politics and social life. This offers opportunities in the
longer term to link Islamic principles with democratic politics and the
improvement of human rights.
In many other parts of the Muslim world the agenda of Islamic activists has
led to a redefinition of the state, the society, and the public space in
‘Islamic’ terms. Sometimes this took place directly as Islamic movements,
organizations, and parties could implement their political agenda through
the political and social arena. More often it occurred indirectly as the
incumbent regimes tried through a policy of Islamization to take the wind
out of the sails of rising religiously inspired groups. At the same time they
tried to play these groups off against one another to prevent them from
forming broad, reform-minded coalitions. This resulted in an intensified
control of the exercise of religion and religious education, the use of Islamic
religious symbols and the taking over of the agenda of reactionary Islamic
political movements in areas such as law, morals, and the position of
women. It is precisely these top-down Islamization processes imposed by
strongly authoritarian regimes that have few correction mechanisms in
politics or society. They run the risk of serving the most conservative,
fundamentalist agendas and of excluding the more progressive Islamic
political movements that are oriented toward political liberalization and
good government.
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The growing presence of activist movements oriented to the national polit-
ical order, however, offers opportunities for democratization and the
advancement of human rights. Many leading revolutionary activists have in
the 1990s chosen an evolutionary, constructive agenda within the constitu-
tional limits of the national state. Instead of striving to replace the secular
state, by violence if necessary, with an (Ummah-wide) Islamic state, they
aim at participation in the political order and taking part in elections as a
regular political party. Just like other movements, they are exposed to
diverse transnational and global forces, such as the international media,
companies, and ngos, global terrorist networks and money flows from
Saudi Arabia. And, of course, their political thought, discourse, strategies,
and agenda are in part determined by international issues that are impor-
tant for Muslims, such as the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian prob-
lem. But it is remarkable that many of them increasingly are guided by
issues like economic development, political reform, good government, and
cultural and social emancipation in their own political arena. Wherever
these developments contribute concretely to democratization and the
advancement of human rights, they deserve support from the Netherlands
and Europe.
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notes
1 For example, the Afghan political and spiritual leader of Hizb-i Islami,
Hikmatyar, demanded unconditional loyalty from his followers and the
exclusive right of religious interpretation (ijtihad). Thus he put himself
above the authority of the ulama with respect to religion.
2 Examples of similar movements include the fundamentalist movements
Tabligh Jama’at and the Nur. The first arose in India in 1927 as part of a
broader movement that had groups of laymen travel around to convey to
fellow Muslims the essential values and rules of the faith. The most impor-
tant ceremonial event in the Tablighi calendar is the so-called Raiwind, the
yearly mass gathering of more than a million Muslims in Pakistan. Outside
of Pakistan the Tablighi has developed an extensive global network of sister
organizations in the us, Canada, the uk, and the Netherlands, among other
places. Although the Tablighi is explicitly apolitical, the movement repre-
sents for some young people a step towards (sometimes violent) Islamic
political organizations. The Nur movement of Said Nursi (created in 1926)
and its successor, the neo-Nur movement of Fethullah Gülen of Turkey, are
among the largest Muslim movements in the world. The movement care-
fully stays out of the political arena, regards education and knowledge as
the most important means to attain religious insight, and in particular
directs its activities to the building of schools within and outside Turkey,
especially in Central Asia. At the same time, the group’s leader Gülen is
known as a fierce anti-Communist. In the past he criticized the Turkish
Islamic Refah party and regularly gave advice on how to vote. Since the
1960s the Nur has succeeded in playing a more important role in the ideo-
logical and political mobilization of parts of the new Turkish middle class
and the traders from Anatolia, who discovered their own version of
modernity (Yavuz 2003).
3 Half of the members of this Council of Guardians are chosen by the parlia-
ment (from a list of candidates of the High Council of Justice which is
appointed by the Supreme Leader) and half are appointed from the ranks of
the clerical elite (fuqaha). 
4 In 1997 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates officially
recognized the Taliban regime. However, the latter two countries with-
drew their support after the attacks by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001.
The regime did not succeed in occupying the Afghanistan seat in the un
and the oic.
5 Article 149, Chapter 10 also states: “The provisions of adherence to the
fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam and the regime of the Islamic
Republic cannot be amended.” (International Constitutional Law:
Afghanistan, undated)
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6 At the same time there are no limits proposed for the ethnic, religious, or
cultural composition of the parliament (see Art. 83).
7 The first commotion surrounding Article 3 arose in January 2005 when
Afghan state television broadcast images of a once-beloved Afghan female
singer. It was the first time since the Taliban regime took over Kabul that a
female singer had appeared on the screen. Conservatives cried that this 
was in conflict with the Islamic code and the constitution, a claim that was
adopted by the Minister of Justice but was contested by the Minister of
Information and Culture, who referred to the constitutional equality of
men and women. President Karzai aimed at a compromise with his state-
ment that the Afghan radio and television had allowed female singers for
more than sixty years, but that all parties simply must work in the context
of the current cultural and social climate and must act in agreement with it
(Tarzi 2004). 
8 Between 1976 and 1986 the professional population in Egypt increased by
2.2 per cent annually and the number of graduates rose by 7.4 per cent
annually. The average waiting time for a recent graduate to obtain a govern-
ment job increased from three to ten years in the period 1979-1985 (Rosef-
sky Wickham 2002).
9 The statement of a former party leader of the leftist National Progressive
Union Party, the npup, is telling: “All the political parties are isolated from
the people. We are like boats floating on a river. Some of us trail longer
anchors than others, but we are all floating on the surface, even the Islamic
associations. The overwhelming majority of the citizens are simply not
politicized.” (Quoted in: Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 69)
10 Zumur’s party newspaper concluded: “All the peacefulness and gradualism
upheld by the [Muslim] Brothers during their political struggle, and their
work through the regime’s legitimate, legal [channels] did not save them
from being handcuffed, tried in front of military courts, and dragged to
prison. All the while their preachers declare that they will not be provoked
and will not attempt confrontation” (Hafez 2003: 55). 
11 The fis obtained more than 47 per cent of the votes (or 188 seats) in the
first round of the 1991 election. To gain an absolute majority in the parlia-
ment they would have needed to win only 28 more seats in the second
round.
12 During a 1982 uprising, for example, between 15,000 and 25,000 Syrians
were killed within a week in battles with the army. 
13 According to estimates Saudi Arabia alone funneled 3.5 billion dollars to
the Pakistani army for weapons and additional support for Sunni groups on
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (icg 2005d: 12). 
14 In Mernissi’s words: “Others feel their interests to be terribly threatened
by that dimuqratiyya. This is apparently the situation of all those excluded
from the good things mentioned above. Can it be that the most dispos-
sessed in our societies cling to Islam because they fear being forgotten by
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their own people, who have found another identity and are involved in
other networks, especially those very strong ones that create profit on an
international scale?” (Quoted in: Noyon 2003: 43).
15 Olivier Roy, in his sketch of twenty-first-century Islamic activism, makes a
distinction between Islamism, neo-fundamentalism, and jihadism. The
International Crisis Group employs a three-part division of political
Islamism, missionary activism, and jihadism to describe contemporary
Sunni tendencies, while an author like Graham Fuller uses the terms polit-
ical Islam and Islamism as interchangeable concepts. In Fuller’s definition it
concerns a broad spectrum of movements that assume that Islam has an
important mission regarding the organization of contemporary politics and
culture, and that want to implement this basic principle in one way or
another. Within this he makes a distinction among traditionalism, funda-
mentalism, and reformism (Fuller 2003: xi and 47-49). All these authors
recognize, however, the relativeness of these labels; the changes in the
Muslim world go too fast, the (national) diversity of these movements is
simply too great, and also the border between national and transnational
orientations is becoming ever more porous.
16 More than seventy per cent of the victims of sectarian violence since 1985
are Shiite. See icg 2003b.
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4 the development of l aw and
legal systems
4.1 introduction
This chapter examines the development of law and legal systems that has
taken place in Muslim countries in recent decades under the influence 
of Islamic activism. An important question in this regard concerns the 
relationship between the Islamization of national law and the concept of
human rights – and the possible rapprochement between them.
In Muslim countries perhaps the most central aim of movements that are
oriented toward Islamization is to introduce Islamic law – Sharia – into the
national legal system. Islam is a religion that in its development has been
strongly based on a just life: that is, on religious codes of behavior for the
individual believer in his relationship towards God and the community of
believers (Platti 2004). Thus, for many Muslims ‘Islam’ and ‘Sharia’ more
or less converge (Kadhim 2003). This also means that Muslims view ‘law’
more broadly than is common in Western legal traditions. Certainly in
many Muslim countries the state is granted an important role to support,
through law, the individual in his or her realization of religious duties, but
the relevance of Sharia goes further still. Pleas for the honoring of Sharia
can refer to the national law but also to norms of behavior outside of the
sphere of the state, for example in informal social and cultural groupings.
In this chapter, however – in keeping with the issues of concern in this
report – we are concerned primarily with national law, though we do not
ignore the competition between government and religious authorities
regarding control over that law.
Many in the West as well as in Muslim countries regard any development 
toward Islamization of law with great suspicion. Alongside jihad, in the
sense of armed struggle, Sharia is for them a central factor in the confronta-
tion between the West and the Muslim world. Movements oriented toward
Islamization are seen as always wanting to replace the formerly secular law 
in Muslim countries, which was derived from the West, with Sharia or with
legislation based on Sharia. ‘Sharia’ is therefore an extremely loaded concept,
which in the eyes of many people contains many of the negative characteris-
tics they ascribe to ‘Islam,’ such as the rejection of the separation of religious
community and state, rejection of universal human rights, re-introduction
or maintaining of antiquated views about the relations between men and
women, and the application of draconian punishments, such as stoning and
amputation of body parts. The experience of the application of law in Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and – during the Taliban regime – Afghanistan, three countries
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that actually put Sharia into practice, of course also gives little reason for
minimizing the differences with law in force in the West. One could add that
the efforts to bring Sharia into force are not limited to Muslim countries. Al-
so in Western countries Muslims or Islamic movements sometimes declare
that for them only one law holds, namely that of God. Or they advocate the
idea that elements of the Sharia should be honored in the prevailing laws
and/or in the legal system, as some Muslim groups in Canada and Great
Britain have urged. This fuels the notion that Muslims in the West, too, re-
ject the existing constitutional state and would like to replace it with Sharia.
Therefore the question regarding what Sharia in theory and practice entails,
how both these aspects relate to Western law, and whether Western percep-
tions and fears are justified, is a significant one.
The rise of movements oriented towards Islamization is not the only factor
that has influenced the development of law in Muslim countries in recent
decades. In the same period that Islamic activism increased, the importance
of human rights also received new impulse, and scores of multilateral insti-
tutions and (trans)national non-governmental movements were founded,
exerting pressure on Muslim states to conform to standards of human
rights and acting as watchdogs to oversee compliance. Therefore, national
law and legal systems, which first and foremost have their own dynamics,
are exposed to forces from within and without. And just as Islamic
activism in Muslim countries is nourished internationally, international
pressure to respect human rights has resonated among many national and
local human rights movements in Muslim countries.
Against this background of national and international influences, section
4.2 examines the scope of Islamization of national law that has occurred in
recent decades in Muslim countries. We will see that this scope is limited
and, besides constitutional aspects, mainly affects criminal law. Family law
in many Muslim countries has long been based on Sharia. In both cases,
there exist important areas of conflict with universal human rights. Section
4.3 discusses the theme of ‘Islamic’ and ‘universal’ human rights and the
dynamism that can be observed. Section 4.4 attempts to characterize and
interpret this legal dynamism in Muslim countries. Finally, some conclu-
sions are drawn in section 4.5.
This chapter is based to a large extent on a comparative law study conducted 
explicitly for this report by the Van Vollenhoven Institute  for Law and
Administration in Non-Western Countries of the University of Leiden;
where use has been made of other sources, this is indicated. The research
analyzes the developments of national law in twelve Muslim countries,
meaning countries in which the majority of the population is Muslim. 
The study covers Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Turkey, Pakistan,
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Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Thus, all of the
core countries are represented, and the selection also encompasses the
important regions. The three publications resulting from this study delve
deeply into questions of theory and terminology which are important for
comparative law (Otto 2006; Berger 2006; Otto et al. 2006). They were
issued simultaneously with the Dutch version of this report.
4.2 recent islamization of law and legal systems
4.2.1 meanings of ‘sharia’
Before we go into the nature of Islamization, it is worthwhile to provide 
clarity about the concept of ‘Sharia’ that is so often employed in relation 
to ‘Sharia’law. To what extent is Sharia an unambiguous concept that refers
to a firm collection of prescripts which apply to all Muslims? Despite the
many seemingly self-evident references to ‘Sharia’, the term is used with
many different meanings that are of great importance for judging the nature
and scope of the Islamization of law. Distinctions can in fact be drawn be-
tween Sharia as an ideal, as a classical system of law, as a contemporary inter-
pretation of this law (Otto 2006; Berger 2006) and as a ‘lived’ practice of law.
Sharia as ideal alludes to the religious and metaphysical principle of a
divine plan for human beings and their society. In this sense, the term has a
strong motivating and mobilizing meaning, for example, as a plea for
greater justice or against corruption, but it says little about concrete rules of
law that would serve this end.
As a classical legal system, Sharia refers to the body of legal rules laid down
in the so-called fiqh by legal scholars and theologians. The most important
written sources of Sharia are the Quran and the Sunna (the recorded acts
and sayings of the Prophet). In these sources themselves, there are few
statements to be found that could be interpreted as rules of law; those
statements that can be applied, concern mainly family and inheritance law
and rules about a limited number of offenses. Through various techniques,
concrete precepts are laid down in the fiqh for these and other areas of law.
Important differences of interpretation have arisen, including between
Shiites and Sunnis and among schools of law. The concrete differences also
correspond to the enormous geographical spread of Islam, whereby local
legal practices and royal decrees are included in the fiqh in various areas.
Sharia in this sense thus incorporated many rules of behavior that were not
originally Islamic. The Sunni world recognizes, along with many smaller
ones, four large schools of law, which mainly differ in ways of applying the
legal rules. The Hanafite school is the most liberal of the four and empha-
sizes systematic consistency and consensus among recognized jurists.
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Reasoned insight plays a large role as well; this school of law is the least
puritanical of the four and also the most widespread. It prevails mainly in
the former Ottoman Empire, in Pakistan, India, and China. The Malikite
school of law emphasizes the Quran and the Sunna as sources of law and
can be considered as traditionalist and conservative. It prevails chiefly in
North and West Africa. The Shafite school of law stands somewhere
between the Hanafite and Malikite schools and appears especially in Egypt,
Jordan, East Africa, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The Hanbalite
school of law arose as a legalistic and conservative offshoot of the Malikite
school. It holds that Sharia can only be based on the literal texts of the
Quran and the Sunna. This very puritanical school is found especially on
the Arabian peninsula; it also later produced the Wahhabism prevailing in
Saudi Arabia (Berger 2006: 21-25). Within each of the schools of law, there
exist yet again differences between more orthodox-classical and more
liberal or modern interpretations. Thus, compared to the contemporary
national rules of law in Muslim countries, the area in which unanimity
about the legal rules themselves exists is very small. 
Due to its casuistic character, the fiqh is often compared to Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence. But there also are great differences: Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence has been developed by practicing jurists and is based on the practice
of law, while the fiqh has been developed by scholars and to a considerable
extent has a theoretical character.
In orthodoxy the fiqh was rather quickly, after two centuries, considered
completed and seen not so much as human elaboration of Divine Law but
as the Law itself. In this way, the interpretation took on a status of infalli-
bility and immutability, valid for every place and time. Because the devel-
opment of the law was considered completed, from the tenth century the
legitimate right of interpretation – ijtihad – was taken away from scholars
and believers. In this manner, the path toward modernization was closed,
and the legal system was fossilized for a long time. Only from the nine-
teenth century has ijtihad again been applied, although the permissibility
of reopening the gates of interpretation has been very controversial. 
In the present time, too, new interpretations occur everywhere, which
often meet sharp opposition – although certainly not always on the same
grounds – from the orthodox ulama and radical Islamic movements (Berger
2006). So it was that when a new family law, the Muddawana, was adopted
by the Moroccan parliament in 2004, the proponents of the changes justi-
fied their position by continually referring to ijtihad. Appealing to the fact
that he as ‘sovereign of the believers’ represented the highest authority
regarding the right to ijtihad, the king, against all opposition, played a
breakthrough role in bringing about this law. The result is a sweeping break
with the patriarchal family model; henceforth men and women are
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together responsible for the family, instead of only the man, as had been
the case previously (Buskens in Otto et al. 2006). Total application of the
classical fiqh no longer exists anywhere, not even in Saudi Arabia. While
according to classical Sharia slavery is permitted, it was outlawed in Saudi
Arabia in the 1960s. As we will see, despite the recent Islamization of
certain areas of law, including in core areas that in most Muslim countries
always were determined by Sharia, there exist great differences from coun-
try to country.
In addition to the principle of ijtihad, that of siyasa is also an important
avenue toward modernization of law. The classical Sharia recognizes in the
ruler his own freedom of discretion (siyasa) to regulate everything neces-
sary to execute God’s plan, provided it does not conflict with Sharia. This
right already implied de facto a certain separation between religious and
secular power in the Islamic kingdoms. So it was that the Ottoman state 
of old formed in practice a secular government apparatus long before the
reforms, based on a European model, began in the nineteenth century
(wrr 2004: 43). That area of discretion obviously has increased strongly
virtually everywhere with the rise of the modern state. The formal require-
ment that law developed in this domain not be in conflict with Sharia
usually causes no problem, so that national law in Muslim countries often
can closely dovetail with law in other parts of the world, such as with
Common Law or Civil Law structures.
The fourth meaning of Sharia relates to law as lived. Sharia is religious law
and therefore concerns precepts of belief. Even where this finds expression
in formal, national law, the individual believer or an Islamic movement can
find his/her/its own interpretations for rules to live by and be able to
employ them in fulfillment of – or in deviation from – the formal law in
place. In many Muslim countries the state has not yet won the battle over
the monopoly of law over all areas. This holds true not only in states with
large ethnic diversity or religious differences. In various Muslim countries,
such as Pakistan and even Egypt, religious movements have sometimes
managed to ‘hijack’ sections of cities and have actually proclaimed and
imposed their version of Sharia (Roy 2004). Also, customary practices,
forbidden by national law, nevertheless can be regarded by believers as
‘Islamic’ or as conforming to their interpretation of Sharia. This holds, too,
where it concerns customs, such as female circumcision, that in some areas
are also observed by followers of other religions. Certainly in regions far
removed from the seat of government in a country that is barely controlled
by the state, there reigns a mixture of unwritten Islamic law with custom-
ary law. This also applies in cases where the state apparatus has collapsed or
is barely functioning, as currently in Afghanistan and Iraq. The informal
forms of law which may be resorted to, are then often exercised by people
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who still have authority or power, and these often are religious functionar-
ies and local war lords (uk Home Office 2004).
Because this report concerns the relationship between Islam and national
law, Islamization of law here refers to the first three meanings of Sharia.
The differences among these, and also the large differences of interpreta-
tion that exist within each meaning, indicate – unlike what is often
thought – that Sharia is no unambiguous system of legal rules and behavior
codes. Given the large differences, it is actually a mistake to speak of ‘the’
Sharia. It is not at all clear in advance what is meant by pleas for the intro-
duction of Sharia or what the effect will be of amending systems of law
according to Sharia. Such pleas or references do not automatically mean a
return to orthodox precepts of behavior. Islamic activism of the last decen-
nia must partly be seen as a reaction against the mindless following of
traditional rules of behavior. When a plea is made for the incorporation of
Sharia into national law, this can refer to a modern as well as a puritanical
interpretation. It certainly is true that a pious Muslim would give a sacred
and positive connotation to the concept of Sharia as such. Most Muslims
view the Quran, as the most important basis for Sharia, as the Word of
God. The positive connotation of Sharia that is derived from this sacred
nature – the first meaning – closely resembles ‘social justice’. It can be
compared with the positive sentiments that most Westerners associate
with ‘liberty, equality, fraternity.’ But as with this trinity of values, refer-
ring to ‘the’ Sharia does not say much about the concrete laws and duties
that issue from it.
4.2.2 isl amization of the l aw in muslim countries
The present-day call in Muslim countries to Islamize the law dates mainly
from the 1970s. There were certainly always movements that stood for this
cause, but in many Muslim countries the ruling elites in the decades prior
to the 1970s were mainly concerned with nationalism and modernization.
Both colonized countries and countries without a colonial past such as
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, in many areas witnessed the introduction of
Western-inspired law. From the 1920s onward, there was a heavy-handed
push toward national unity and modernization, often also colored by
socialism. Religion was either paid little attention or its public influence
was curtailed, as in Turkey and Iran. The rising call for Islamization of law
at least in part emerged from this forced modernization and the marginal-
ization of Islam and its authorities, the legal scholars. This resistance was
directed against failing authoritarian regimes and their programs of
modernization. It also had a strong anti-Western content due to Western
support of and influence on these regimes and their attempts at modern-
ization according to a Western model.
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In many cases, the desire to introduce Sharia should therefore be seen as a
striving toward restoration of the connection with one’s own heritage, i.e.
from ‘Islam is the problem’ to ‘Islam is the solution.’ Nevertheless, this
does not imply any discontinuity across the board or the complete re-intro-
duction of earlier legal systems. Thus the international order of nation
states, which emerged from the two world wars and the wars of independ-
ence, has remained unaffected. As a constitutional concept, the Quranic
unity of the entire community of belief – the Ummah – could not match the
nation state (An Na’im 1990; icg 2004a). Law and legal systems are tied
therefore to individual states, and on that basis alone they already exhibit
great differences. This incorporation of law by the state also implies, that
the principle of codifying law that was introduced by the colonial powers
or copied from the West, has been retained. This is also true for nearly all
the Sharia core countries. All Muslim countries have a written constitu-
tion, even – since 1992 – Saudi Arabia, which is called the Basic Regulation,
because the Quran and Sunna are regarded there as ‘The Constitution’. But
in this country, the law of persons, for example, is not codified. Apart from
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan in the Taliban phase, Islamization of the law
plays itself out within the framework of national law, through amendment
of legislation and jurisprudence. The same holds for the entire legal system,
that was modeled more or less everywhere on European examples of the
nineteenth and twentieth century, particularly those of Great Britain and
France. Islamization can thus lead to an extension of the formal structure
of courts and courts of appeal with Sharia tribunals.
Similarly, if we look at the content of the law, there is considerable continu-
ity. In most Muslim countries, family and inheritance law for Muslims was
always based on Sharia and on customary law – and this has not changed.
But in many other areas, despite formal Islamization, existing laws have
been maintained, including those laws derived in the past from the West
or shaped on Western models. This was and is possible because of the
siyasa described above, which grants to the ruler legislative authority in
areas which the Quran or Sunna do not cover, provided such legislation
does not conflict with these texts. In areas such as, for example, general and
private contract law, torts, labor law, property law, procedural law, partner-
ship law, bankruptcy law, transportation law, intellectual property, elec-
toral law, information law, general administrative law, public planning law,
environmental law, education law, postal and telecommunication law, and
large sections of criminal law, the Sharia has no, or scarcely any, substan-
tive influence. Measured against the entire body of national law, the poten-
tial scope of Sharia is very limited. This holds true also for countries that
advocate the general introduction of Sharia. But the limited substantive
scope naturally does not mean that the influence in areas of law that do
indeed fall under the Sharia would be limited. In the following sections, 
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we examine successively the constitutional aspects, criminal law, and
family law.
4.2.3 constitutional isl amization
The concepts of state, state law, and constitution do not appear in classical
Sharia, and their equivalents also receive little treatment. The starting
premise of classical Sharia is that of a community of belief with a leader.
Relations within a state context hardly receive any attention. The state and
administrative law have long been regulated by the ruler himself on the
basis of siyasa, which grants him freedom of policy. The independent states
that arose in the twentieth century built further on the older Muslim
empires but also on the colonial or Western-inspired conceptual frame-
work of public law, such as head of state, government, ministers and parlia-
ment. The Islamic activism of the 1970s also had ‘Sharia-zation’ of consti-
tutional aspects on its agenda, for which there were therefore few historical
models available. For example, the Caliphate is an Ummah-wide rather
than nation-state concept; besides which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, its
Islamic foundations are very controversial. Thus, constitutional Islamiza-
tion’ is truly experimental, involving many juridical ambiguities and
uncertainties.
The British legal philosopher Hart points out that constitutions include 
so-called rules of recognition: rules that define that a rule is a legal rule. 
The appearance in constitutions of such basic norms of positive law is not,
however, sufficient ‘proof’ for their actual functioning. According to Hart,
whether such a ground rule can be accepted, should mainly be derived
empirically, from the conduct of judges, legislators, and the administration.
Besides, in the text of a constitution itself, there can be various ‘highest’
norms; on that basis alone, their factual meaning requires empirical exami-
nation (Hart 1997). When one wants to study the role of Islam in connec-
tion with the state, the constitution is the obvious document. After all,
such a text always shows how a country defines itself. An important form
of ‘constitutional Islamization’ – at least on paper –  concerns the explicit
changing of the state into an Islamic one. It is also important whether or
not Islam is regarded as a state religion. In addition, Sharia can be included
in the constitution as source of legislation.
Below we will first analyze these issues for all Muslim countries, meaning
countries in which Muslims make up a majority of the population (see
appendix 3). From the classification employed, it appears that the constitu-
tional position of Sharia (or Islam, Quran, Sunna, fiqh) in regard to legisla-
tion can vary widely, namely from ‘the’, ‘the most important’, ‘an impor-
tant’ to ‘a’ source of legislation. As the formulation becomes weaker, the
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constitutional room increases also for other sources of legislation and
therefore also ‘highest’ norms. Of the 45 Muslim countries for which we
have data, ten appear to define themselves constitutionally as Islamic
states. In these ten countries, Islam is at the same time the state religion; 
it is also the state religion in eleven other countries. In eight Muslim coun-
tries, Sharia is ‘the’ or ‘the most important’ source of legislation, and in
nine countries Sharia counts in the constitution as ‘an important’ or ‘a’
source of legislation, therefore along with other sources. In total, 17 of 45
Muslim countries thus give Sharia some sort of constitutional role as a
source of law and legislation (appendix 3). Obviously, this holds for nearly
all the states that define themselves as Islamic. Morocco represents an
exception; this country is an Islamic state, Islam is the state religion, but
Sharia is not considered a source of legislation. Morocco’s constitution
speaks of ‘the will of the nation’ that must be expressed in the law. In the
preamble reference is made to human rights. 
Clearly, then, there is no one-to-one correspondence between ‘Muslim
country’ and ‘Sharia’; Sharia has a constitutional position in only about
one-third of all Muslim countries, while in about one-sixth of Muslim
countries it is recognized as having formal supremacy as source of legisla-
tion. This does not mean, however, that the substantive influence of Sharia
is great in these countries. Nor, on the other hand, does it mean that
substantive influence is lacking in countries where Islam constitutionally
has no influence.
For more insight into constitutional Islamization in recent decades, we will
now begin by examining the twelve countries selected for closer research.
First we look at their form of government. Defining a state as Islamic
means that state power itself and not only law is legitimized religiously 
and made sacred. In such cases, criticism of the state can easily be made
equivalent to criticism of the religion itself and be considered as heresy, as
has been the case in Iran (Hajjar 2000). Of the twelve countries, there are
four where in the last three decades the form of government was changed
(temporarily) into an Islamic one, namely Iran, Pakistan, Sudan (now no
longer), and Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and Morocco were already Islamic
from their formation as independent states. Below we look at each of the
four (permanently or temporarily) Islamized states.
Iran
The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979 definitely
involved the most radical formal change of form of government in the
Muslim world, from a secular monarchy to a theocracy. At the same time it
is striking that, from the very beginning, this theocracy ascribed a formal
place to democracy; in this respect as well as with regard to constitutional
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rights, the founders allowed themselves to be inspired by France. The
Islamic Republic, therefore, can be seen as a sort of ‘theo-democracy,’ the
term that Mawdudi reserved for the system that he advocated for Pakistan
(Mawdudi 1980). The constitution has two basic norms: supremacy of God
and supremacy of the people, with the first determining the borders 
of the second. The institutions whose members are chosen by general elec-
tion – president and parliament – are subject to the supervision of the
Supreme Leader, de vila yat-i faqih, and the Council of Guardians, consist-
ing of religious scholars and professional jurists, which stands in service to
the leader. Constitutionally, primacy belongs to Sharia, and the Council of
Guardians has the task of testing all legislation against it. In spite of the
explicitly hierarchical structure, the last 25 years reflect a history of regular
clashes between the two constitutional basic norms. Although parliament,
on the basis of the Sharia adhered to in the constitution, has the status of a
consultative assembly, it has regularly sought to strengthen its authority to
the disadvantage of the theocratic institutions. The most important result
of these confrontations has been the creation of a new state body, the 
Expediency Discernment Council for the System. This council arbitrates
between parliament and the Council of Guardians, a practice which thus
far has led to approval of seventy per cent of the legislation proposed by
parliament. The new council is based on some fatwas (juridical instruc-
tions) issued by Khomeini, which indicates that the state’s interest can
prevail above Sharia. All the same, if differences persist, the last word is
given to the faqih (Dekker and Barends in Otto et al. 2006).
Shiite Iran is thus, along with the Sunni Saudi Arabia, the most marked
example of a constitutional Islamic theocracy; both countries have a system
of law that in principle is based on classical versions of Sharia. There is still
an important difference between these two countries: unlike in Iran, the
theocracy in Saudi Arabia is absolute. Saudi Arabia has no written consti-
tution and thus, constitutionally, has no place for democracy. The
members of the advisory body (shura) are appointed, and not – as in Iran –
chosen by universal suffrage (Barends and Van Eijk in Otto et al. 2006). In
2005, under American pressure, the first local elections were held; only
men were given the right to vote. The theocracy is constitutionally
anchored in Iran, but space is also created in the constitution for many
modern rights (education, etc.). 
Pakistan
Pakistan, since its founding as an Islamic state, has been exposed not only
to forces that wanted to found a theocracy (Mawdudi, mentioned in Chap-
ter 2, was an important exponent of one of these, the Jamaat-i-Islami-
movement) but also to forces directed toward democratization. The vacil-
lating power relationship between these forces was expressed in successive
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constitutions. The constitution of 1956 mentioned ‘the Islamic Republic’
and had a strongly religious character. That of 1962 dealt with the ‘Republic
of Pakistan’ and instead of speaking of ‘the holy Quran and Sunna,’ spoke
of the wider concept, ‘Islam.’ This illustrates how Pakistan has struggled
and still struggles over determining the priority between a clearly Islamic
and a more secular system of norms. In the third constitution of 1973, the
first drafted by an elected representative body, place was also created for
Islam (art. 1: “Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan”), as well as for democracy, freedom, national
unity, equality and solidarity. General Zia ul-Haq suspended this constitu-
tion in 1977 and sought support for retaining power in the radical Islamic
groupings that were growing in membership. He considered Islam irrecon-
cilable with democracy on a Western model and assigned to himself a
special status. During Zia’s dictatorship (1977-1988), Pakistani law was
extensively Islamized, including the introduction of an Islamic criminal
law and the notorious blasphemy law, both of which remain in force. 
A new constitutional article, introduced by decree, stated that the precepts
of Islam shall be the highest law of the land. This was in contradiction to
other constitutional articles that designated the constitution as the highest
norm. A special legal body was charged with testing legislation and legal
judgments concerning some crimes cited in the Quran against Islamic
precepts. This ambiguity led to great controversy within the judiciary. 
The contest between forces directed toward Islamization, on the one hand,
and secular forces, on the other, has continued since 1988. Nevertheless, 
it appears as though the Islamization project lost a lot of its fervor in the
1990s. Since 2003, the constitution of 1973 is again in force (Barends and
Otto in Otto et al. 2006).
Sudan
Sudan’s temporary, secular constitution of 1956 laid great emphasis on
parliamentary democracy but, from the very start, strong forces manifested
themselves, directed toward an ‘Islamic parliamentary republic,’ with
Sharia as the most important source of legislation. The high point of
Islamization was reached in the 1980s when the attempt was made, by
amending the constitution, to bring the constitution into line with ‘the’
Sharia. The president was given a new name as ‘leader of the believers,’ the
parliament was changed into a consultative council (in conformity with
the Quranic shura), its members were obliged to be loyal to the leader, and
Sharia became the only source of law. These changes effectively put the
‘permanent’ constitution of 1973 out of use. In this constitution, as in that
of the provisional one of 1956, Sudan had been designated a parliamentary
democracy. The Christian south received a form of self-government. The
new constitution was granted only a short life and was unable to prevent
bloody conflict between the north and the south. From the time of inde-
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pendence in 1956, the non-Islamic south, rich in raw materials, had tried to
withdraw from the (legal) hegemony of the Islamic north. The constitu-
tional struggle, however, not merely concerned the role of Islam through-
out Sudan but also whether to adopt an orthodox or liberal interpretation
of Sharia. In the constitution of 1998 currently in force, Sudan is not
defined as an Islamic state, but as a country in which “(…) religions concil-
iate. Islam is the religion of the majority (…)” (art. 1 of the Constitution).
Other provisions also secure Muslim dominance. Whether this constitu-
tion is meant to be valid until the 2011 referendum on the possible separa-
tion of South Sudan is still unclear (Köndgen in Otto et al. 2006).
Afghanistan
In the new constitution of 2004, Afghanistan is held to be an ‘Islamic
republic,’ Islam is ‘the sacred religion,’ and the head of state is designated as
patron of Islam with the task of guaranteeing the basic principles of the
holy Islamic religion, the constitution, and other laws. Because the consti-
tution also employs sources other than Sharia, its theocratic character is
less explicit than during the period 1994-2001, when the Taliban gave
Islamization a completely forbidding face. During that time, all the laws
and regulations that the Taliban found to be in conflict with the strict
Islamic interpretation of traditional Deobandi and Afghan-Islamic tribal
traditions were abolished; government ruled by decree and a very stringent
version of Sharia was implemented (Yassari and Saboory in Otto et al.
2006). 
The remainder of the twelve countries researched do not define themselves
as Islamic states. However, constitutional Islamization can also manifest
itself in the adoption in the constitution of Islam as state religion and/or
designation of Quran and Sunna, fiqh or Sharia as sources of legislation.
Thus, unlike in a theocracy, the state does not base its authority on the
Islamic law itself, although it does link state power to applying and enforc-
ing compliance with Sharia. With regard to this category one could speak
of ‘nationalization’ of religious legislation and jurisprudence (Hajjar 2000).
Since the 1970s, other than in the countries already mentioned, Islam has
only been (re-)installed as the state religion in Egypt (1980) and Turkey
(1982). In Morocco, Islam had already long been the state religion, as in
Malaysia since the first constitution of 1957. In Nigeria, Mali, and Indone-
sia, Islam is not the state religion (Otto 2006; Otto et al. 2006). 
As is evident in the overview of all Muslim countries in appendix 3, termi-
nology is very important with regard to the source of legislation. The
sources may involve (principles of) Islam, the Quran, Sunna, Sharia or the
fiqh, and the degree of exclusivity granted to the source can vary strongly.
If we speak of ‘a’ source, there are also by definition other sources, as laid
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down in other articles of the constitution. We can thus speak of a double,
or at least an ambiguous, constitutional basic norm. Since most constitu-
tions also contain provisions about fundamental rights, such as the princi-
ples of equality and of freedom of religion, there is ample room for conflict.
The extent to which this is the case, is evident from the fervor with which
the discussion over these questions has been or is conducted from time to
time. Recently the conflict also occurred in Iraq, when the question arose
whether in the new constitution Sharia should be designated as ‘a’ or ‘the’
source. The outcome in Iraq is that Islam is a fundamental source for legis-
lation and that no law can be adopted that is in conflict with its undisputed
stipulations. It is up to the supreme court to interpret this stipulation
(Coleman 2006: 30).
The situation in the countries more closely studied for this report is as
follows (Otto 2006; Otto et al. 2006). Iran employs a strict formulation in
the constitution of 1980: all laws and rules must absolutely be based on
Islamic criteria and classical Sharia takes precedence above any form of
customary law and international law. The formal position of Pakistan
seems to be somewhat less stringent: the constitution of 1973 stipulates, 
on the one hand, that “obedience to the Constitution and law is the [invio-
lable] obligation of every citizen” (art. 5.2 ), but, on the other hand, all laws
ought to be line with “the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah” (art. 227 ). In 2002, however, the introduction of a
puritanical interpretation of Sharia was proposed in one of the Pakistan’s
provinces. In Egypt the principles of Sharia were set down as the only
source of legislation in 1980. The testing of legislation against this constitu-
tional stipulation is reserved to the High Constitutional Court of Justice.
The Court has determined, however, that only legislation from after 1980
must be in agreement with the principles of Sharia. Furthermore, these
principles are interpreted in a very restricted fashion, namely, it considers
only the rules of Sharia that are indisputably established in the Quran and
Sunna. In this way, laws can still be adopted that meet all Western stan-
dards. The empirical test of Hart (1997) shows, therefore, that even if the
constitution considers Sharia as the exclusive source of law, this may in
concrete terms have only a limited meaning. The Sudanese constitution of
1998 states: “Islamic law and the consensus of the nation, by referendum,
Constitution, and custom, shall be the sources of legislation and no legisla-
tion in contravention with these fundamentals shall be made…” (art. 65).
This plurality has been chosen for the sake of restoring national unity, after
twenty years of Islamization of law along orthodox lines, and resistance
against it, especially but not exclusively in the Christian south. In the
Afghan constitution (2004) it is stipulated that no law can be in conflict
with the precepts of “the the sacred religion of Islam and the values of this
Constitution” (art. 3). Formally, the law is based on a dual structure of
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norms: Sharia as well as human rights. Only when no legislative stipula-
tion exists, should courts directly follow the principles of Sharia and of
jurisprudence according to the Hanafite school of law (art. 130). In the
constitution of Malaysia, Sharia is not indicated as a source of legislation.
Furthermore, in 1988 it was determined by the highest judge that Sharia
does not apply to public law but only to the law of persons and family law.
Moreover, under the constitution legislative authority in matters of Islamic
law does not lie at the level of the Federation but of the states. In a couple of
states, with Islamic political parties in power, this led in the 1990s to crimi-
nal legislation based on Islamic principles. This situation is, very contro-
versial however, including from the point of view of division of jurisdic-
tion within the Federation. In Indonesia and Nigeria Islam plays a role as
source of legislation on the decentralized level. Attempts in Indonesia to
Islamize the national state and to introduce Sharia have up until now had
no success. However, in the framework of decentralization legislative
authority has been granted to some districts. National law grants Aceh the
possibility of introducing certain elements of Sharia. Whether the recent
Nigerian constitution (1999) grants the states competence to enact criminal
legislation is a controversial question. The jurisdiction of Sharia on state
level is, however, as in Malaysia, limited to the law of persons and family
law. Despite increasing political manifestation of Islamic movements, the
constitution of Mali (1992), because of the secular character and the balance
of power, carefully avoids naming Sharia or Islam as source of legislation.
We have already seen that although Morocco is an Islamic state, Sharia is
constitutionally no source of legislation. In Turkey, finally, there is no
constitutional reference to Islam or Sharia as source of legislation. In this
secular state, an Islamic political party in fact was banned in 1997 because
of suspicion that it wanted to introduce elements of Sharia (wrr 2004). 
Conclusion
The Islamic activism that has appeared in all Muslim countries in recent
decades has led to diverse consequences from a constitutional point of
view. The role of Islam and Sharia in state and law was controversial in
most of the twelve countries studied and sometimes led to unusually fierce
conflicts, as in Sudan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. As we saw in Chapter 3, the
conflicts were not only between those motivated by Islam, on the one
hand, and Christian or secular forces, on the other, but also conflicts
between radical and moderate Islamic groups or between Islamic schools of
belief. The result is that Muslim countries display great differences with
regard to the constitutional place of Islam and Sharia. Only a minority of
Muslim countries define themselves as Islamic states, and Sharia is
formally the most important source of legislation in only a minority. Also,
if a country defines itself as an Islamic state, it is not always a theocracy
(e.g. Pakistan). Neither does being an Islamic state wholly exclude democ-
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racy in principle, nor does it imply that the system of law in these countries
is per se wholly determined by Sharia.
The constitutional variety we have observed can be summed up in three
parts, namely theocratic systems, secular systems, and mixed systems. Of
the countries examined more closely, Saudi Arabia and – to lesser extent –
Iran are closest to theocracy, and at the other extreme stand secular states
like Mali and Turkey. In between is a large group of mixed systems, which
also can be further subdivided. First, there are three states with a predomi-
nantly secular constitution, namely Nigeria, Indonesia (not even a single
reference to Islam in the constitution), and Malaysia. None of these coun-
tries defines itself as an Islamic state, Sharia does not serve as a source of
legislation, and, except in Malaysia, Islam is not the state religion. This
country illustrates that even when Islam functions as the state religion,
this does not have to exclude a secular form of government (wrr 2004).
Finally, there are five countries where Islam constitutionally has more
influence because it is the state religion; they define themselves as Islamic
states and/or Islam/Sharia are ‘a’ or ‘the’ source of legislation. This group
consists of Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But that is
not the whole story. Proclamations of Sharia as sources of legislation can
have great influence, but not necessarily. Given the various meanings of
the concept, Sharia can have a high ‘declaratory’ or ‘preambulatory’
content, without a lot of demonstrable influence on positive law; this is the
case in Egypt. Again this does not imply that placing law under the symbol
of Sharia is wholly without meaning; we will return to this point later.
Finally, it also can be concluded that Islamization of state and law is not a
unilinear process that is going to occur in an ever greater part of the Muslim
world, neither is it an irreversible process. Certainly each of the twelve
countries studied has been exposed to sometimes heavy pressure from
Islamic activism, but in countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Sudan and Egypt counter movements also have (had) a place.
These could result in a weakening of the role of Islamic law or in more
liberal interpretations. Furthermore, it seems that the sharpest phases of
constitutional Islamization took place through revolutions, coups d’etat, or
during states of emergency (Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan respectively). When
populations in the last few years could express themselves in elections,
moderation was fairly often chosen (Iran, except in 2005, Egypt, Morocco,
Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia). Therefore there is no unam-
biguous process supported by the mass of Muslims, directed toward
Islamization of state and law according to the classical model. Here, how-
ever, it must immediately be noted that – as was shown in the preceding
chapter – elections were not always possible nor always allowed to proceed
fairly; thus one can only speculate about the outcome of honest elections.
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4.2.4 criminal l aw
The area of law where Islamization in a number of countries most comes to
mind is certainly Islamic criminal law. Because of the cruel punishments, it
is precisely Islamization in this area of law that stands as a model for the
perception of ‘regression to the Middle Ages,’ which the concept of Sharia
evokes for many.
Classical Islamic criminal law consists of three parts:
• The hadd crimes: this concept involves five offenses described in the
Quran and the punishments prescribed, namely theft (amputation),
highway robbery (from banishment to crucifixion, dependent on the
seriousness), consumption of alcohol (whipping), zina: sexual relations
outside of marriage (from lashing to stoning), and false accusation of
zina (whipping). There exists controversy over whether or not apostasy
in regard to Islam also is a hadd crime. The classical schools are in agree-
ment regarding the measure of punishment for apostasy: the death
penalty, in cases where the apostasy is not retracted. The schools of law
vary on homosexuality and its sentence. In the fiqh, legal scholars have
laid out stringent procedural conditions in such a way that applying the
hadd punishments on the basis of provable evidence is always very diffi-
cult.
• Jinayat: rules for the application of the pre-Islamic principle of retribu-
tion ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’, or compensation with blood
money in the case of murder, manslaughter, or assault and battery.
• Siyasa: the authority of the government to set rules for the remaining
category of criminal offenses that cannot be counted among the above.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in most of the Muslim countries
Islamic criminal law had made way for a Western form of criminal law; only
in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Qatar was it retained. According to Berger
(2006), beginning in the 1970s the following countries re-introduced
Islamic criminal law: Libya (1972), the United Arab Emirates (1978, though
not implemented), Iran (1979), Pakistan (1979), and Sudan (1983). The cur-
rent situation regarding the hadd punishments in the twelve countries more
closely studied is shown in table 4.1. The table reveals that the examples 
of Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan are not followed in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco,
Indonesia, Mali, Malaysia, or Nigeria. However, some states in the federa-
tions of Nigeria and Malaysia have introduced Islamic criminal law (Nigeria
in 2000, in Malaysia in 1993, where it has not yet been implemented). 
The fact that Islamic criminal law has not been introduced even though the
basis for it exists in the Quran and the fiqh, does not mean though that this
was not on the agenda or is not still on the agenda for some Islamic group-
ings. In countries like Malaysia, Egypt, and Nigeria there are proponents of
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incorporating Islamic criminal law into formal law. Table 4.1 makes it clear
the adoption of hadd punishments in criminal law does not always imply
that these are also carried out; indeed, it seems that this is increasingly less
the case.
Table 4.1 Hadd punishments according to the law and in reality
One must not take lightly the abandonment of the hadd punishments or
the failure to implement them by countries that constitutionally have
placed their law under the banner of Sharia. Exactly because the Quran
enjoys such high status and is so explicit about some crimes and their
punishment, the relevant Quran verses cannot simply be ignored. The
deviation from the literal text demands – always controversial – interpreta-
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Egypt
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Turkey
Afghanistan
Iran
Pakistan
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mali
Nigeria
Hadd punishments in the
law11
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes, but legitimacy disputed
Yes
Yes
No
No, except some states
No
Yes, in northern states
Execution of stoning 
and/or amputation2
No
No
Regulated
Sharply decreased
No
No
Sharply decreased3
No
No
No
No
Stoning no, amputation 
sharply decreased
1 The criminal law of Saudi Arabia is completely based on classical Sharia, including hadd punishments.
In the other ‘yes-countries’ these punishments were adopted through legislation: Sudan, criminal law
of 1991; Afghanistan, 1976 code of criminal law; Iran, 1996 code of criminal law; Pakistan, hudud 
ordinances of 1979; Malaysia, hudud laws of two provinces, Kelantan and Terengganu; Nigeria, code 
of criminal law of eleven northern states. 
2 It must be noted here that in some countries whipping is regularly imposed, for example, in Pakistan
particularly in the early 1980s.
3 In July 2005 two boys were hanged in Iran after being convicted of homosexuality. This sentence was
shocking and remarkable because since 2002 Iran had dropped the most severe forms of corporal
punishment – stoning, amputation – for hadd offenses. Moreover, the punishment did not corres-
pond to the hadd punishments stipulated in the classical Sharia.
Source: Otto 2006
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tion, ijtihad. Via this method, the hadd punishments are interpreted alle-
gorically or as something clearly to be considered as a theoretical maximum
for the punishment or as punishments that are only valid in an – alas, not
yet realized – ideal Islamic society. There also is the possibility, when hadd
punishments are indeed part of the country’s criminal law, to tie imple-
mentation to very stringent procedures for furnishing proof of the crime
(Shahrur 1992 in Trautner 1999a: 19; Bielefeldt 2000: 107).
The equally harsh punishments for jinayat crimes are in force in Iran,
Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and northern Nigeria. Behavior
subject to public prosecution on the grounds of siyasa may relate to
offenses against religion and violation of religious prescriptions, in so far as
these are not punishable as hadd offenses. They can involve apostasy
(rejection of the faith); insults in addressing religion (such as the infamous
blasphemy laws in Pakistan); missionary activity by non-Muslims; reli-
gious practice and proselytizing by Muslims with inadmissible religious
beliefs; sexual behavior considered sinful such as adultery or physical
contact in public; immoral cultural behavior such as dancing and singing;
failing to observe religious duties such as Friday prayer, abstaining from
alcohol, and fasting during Ramadan (Otto 2006; Berger 2006). In Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan during the Taliban period, public
morals were guarded by the morality police, who often came under an
‘office for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’. The situation in
regard to the law and actual punishments concerning rejection of the faith
is reflected in table 4.2.
Apostasy is threatened with very heavy punishment in Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iran, with a lighter punishment in Malaysia. In
seven of the twelve countries studied more closely, apostasy is not
addressed in the criminal code; in Afghanistan and Iran the subject is
disputed. The death penalty for apostasy has not been carried out in recent
years in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and in Sudan it is carried out only occasion-
ally. According to Otto (2006), Beke’s observation in the 1990s still applies:
while actual punishment for apostasy is an exception nowadays (Beke
1996), the threat that arises from the penalization of this offense is, of
course, exceptionally high.
The summary above indicates that it is especially in the countries with an
Islamic state that Islamic criminal law is introduced, but this does not hold
true for all cases. In Afghanistan, after the period of the Taliban govern-
ment, the criminal law code from the 1970s is again being applied. A new
criminal code is being prepared; it is unclear to what extent the hadd
punishments appear in it (Yassari and Saboory in Otto et al. 2006: 195). At
the same time it is worth considering that in Afghanistan the legal system
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under construction still finds itself in a chaotic situation. Where the formal
system has not been working for a long time, there has been a resort to the
informal customary law that in practice is interwoven, in incorrect ways,
with stipulations from Sharia. In practice, then, hadd punishments will
certainly be carried out (uk Home Office 2004). Among the countries
where hadd punishments are now formally in place, there are great 
variations in interpretation and application. In addition to Saudi Arabia, 
in Iran and Sudan the stringent forms of hadd punishments are actually
employed in such a way that even the religious scholars sometimes protest
that the conditions formulated in the fiqh for the furnishing of proof are
insufficiently brought into consideration. Corporal punishment may
sometimes also be introduced ‘for the sake of convenience’ for offenses that
fall outside of the Quranic hadd definition. At present it seems, however,
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Egypt
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Turkey
Afghanistan
Iran
Pakistan
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mali
Nigeria
Penalization of 
apostasy1
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Disputed
Yes, legitimacy disputed
No
No
Yes
No
No
Conviction for apostasy and 
execution of punishment
No
No
Not recently2
Occasionally
No
No
Not recently3
No
No
Very rarely4
No
No
Table 4.2 Apostasy: penalization and actual punishment
1 Criminal law in Saudi Arabia is completely based on Sharia. Apostasy is a capital offense. If the crime
is proven, the punishment is imposed. In Sudan (article 126 of the criminal code) apostasy is also a
capital offense. 
2 According to the us International Religious Freedom Report 2004 there have been no executions for
apostasy in recent years.
3 According to an official report by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005, p. 31, there have been
no persecutions of individuals in recent years for conversion to Christianity. No executions for
apostasy have taken place recently. 
4 Here this refers to very rare actions on the basis of state legislation, where the maximum punishment
is three years imprisonment.
Source: Otto 2006: 107
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that in Iran and Sudan, as well as northern Nigeria, the application of hadd
punishments is decreasing; sensitivity to international protests has some-
thing to with this decrease.
It is remarkable that, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran (up 
until 1982), the issuing of rules follows the model of national legislation
and is applied by a national judicial power. At the same time, through this
hybrid construction, brakes are built in against applying hadd punish-
ments. Judgments by lower courts, staffed by conservative judges, often
are overturned at higher levels. Higher judges, in particular, apply their
authority – sometimes also with the effect of limiting the political power
of the regime – to limit the range of hadd punishments and/or to make
more demanding the furnishing of proof so that it is made more difficult
for an offence to come to judgment as a hadd crime. Even in Libya, in the
space of thirty years, only once has the most severe punishment been
carried out, while in Pakistan, where the relevant highest law court
consists of a majority of professional judges, the most severe punish-
ments (stoning and amputation) have not to date been implemented (but
punishments with lashings and also the jinayat-punishments have been
carried out). Islamic criminal law is applied in a limited way on the level
of individual states in northern Nigeria, but in Malaysia it is not yet or
rarely applied in certain states. In both countries the authority to apply
Islamic criminal law is very controversial due to the constitutional divi-
sion of authority over criminal law between the federation and individual
states; in Nigeria, criminal law is explicitly reserved to the federal level.
Non-implementation of the most severe hadd punishments does not
mean, though, that these offenses are not punished at all. The perpetra-
tors of these ‘crimes’ can in general count on lighter physical punish-
ments (whipping) or imprisonment.
Conclusion
We can conclude that Islamic criminal law is implemented only by a
limited number of Muslim countries, namely eight of the 48, as well as by
individual states/provinces in two Muslim countries. There is thus no
foundation for ideas based on the assumption that in a Muslim country
Islamic criminal codes always apply, nor for the opinion that such law is
applicable in all the countries where law is formally (partly) based on
Sharia. Moreover, formal implementation still does not mean that this
criminal code also is actually implemented according to classical Sharia. In
some countries the professional judges and higher bodies of law function
as a brake on its implementation. The implementation of classical Sharia
occurs in only a few countries; furthermore, in some of these countries it
is limited to less extreme punishments (whippings). Other than in the
case of some individual states, this criminal law is not introduced by
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normal democratic procedures but by the decree of rulers in coalition with
the army or militias and radical Islamic groups. Such rulers avail them-
selves of this criminal law, either to take the wind from the sails of radical
Muslim movements or to create an extra instrument of repression against
opponents, all the better if it can be done ‘in the name of Islam.’ That this
criminal law is implemented undemocratically does not, incidentally,
mean that it is always rejected by the people. Certainly in situations of very
high criminality and supposed harm to public morals accompanied by a
weak or corrupt criminal investigation and trial apparatus, populations can
feel the need for a firm hand (Otto 2006).
4.2.5 family and inheritance l aw
Family and inheritance law are the areas of law that in most Muslim coun-
tries have long been determined by Sharia; even under colonization this
Sharia law was retained for Muslims. Conversely, these areas of law clearly
represent the kernel of classical Sharia and are the most fully developed
Islamic legal sources. Therefore it is not surprising that more or less im-
mediately after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, previous reform 
laws were abolished and replaced by the uncodified Sharia (1931: abolish-
ment of polygamy, required marriage registration; 1967: equality under law
for men and women; 1975: Family Protection Act). When the Taliban came
to power in Afghanistan, the existing legislation was also abolished, and it
was proclaimed that the laws could not be in conflict with the interpreta-
tions of the classical Hanafite school of law. But new national laws failed 
to appear; in practice there prevailed a very crude form of discrimination
against women, who were almost completely excluded from the public
domain and, through the religious police, also strictly controlled in their
behavior in the private sphere (Yassari and Saboory in Otto et al. 2006: 
187-188). Therefore, with the exception of these two countries and also
Sudan, where the existing Islamic family law has been codified, there has
been no recent Islamization in this area of law, at least in the sense of
replacement of secular law by a specific version of Sharia. At the same time,
this area of law encompasses subjects involving tensions with important
conventions of human rights. Although family law forms only a small part
of the whole body of present-day law in Muslim countries, it is naturally a
very far-reaching area of the law, as it restricts the position of women, half
of the population.
Where Sharia family law is in effect in Muslim countries, minorities 
who are members of another religion often have ‘own’ law in this area,
frequently also with their own courts (Berger 2006: 37). This represents an
important difference with secular systems of law, which are based on equal
rights and duties for all. When religious law is the starting point for family
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law, legal pluralism is to be expected in religiously mixed populations:
group rights in a given area for one group elicit group rights for others.
Just as in many other religions, in Islam the family is viewed as the sacred
cornerstone of society. In Article 5 of the Cairo Declaration of Human
Rights in Islam (see sec. 4.3) the family is quite explicitly referred to as the
cornerstone. The reasoning is that men and women are equal in human
value, but not in rights and duties. According to Dr. Yousuf al-Qaradawi 
in an explanation of the position of women in Islam, they are created in
complementarity, and from their differences in natural disposition, differ-
ent rights and duties follow. By nature, the woman is relatively weak,
instinctive and seductive, and therefore limitations are placed on her
behavior; it is also up to the man to protect her dignity (al-Qaradawi
undated). In the classical view the man has the obligation to support his
wife/wives financially from the moment the marriage is ‘consummated’,
whereas the woman is responsible for maintaining the household and
caring for children and for protecting the honor of her husband and his
family. In this view the woman falls under the authority of her spouse, and
therefore ought to be obedient, an obedience that may be compelled finally
with ‘not dishonorable beating’. The schools of law differ about the content
of the demands for obedience, but in every case the woman cannot leave
the conjugal house without the husband’s permission. A notoriously
controversial point is that a Muslim woman is forbidden from marrying a
non-Muslim. The reverse is indeed possible; these marriages and the chil-
dren born of them fall automatically under Islamic law. Other points of
conflicts are the right of the man to have up to four wives at the same time
and also the law on divorce. While the husband has the right to end,
unilaterally and without giving a reason, the marriage by casting off the
wife, in the classical view the woman is not granted the same right of
divorce. She does have available some possibilities for dissolving the
marriage, such as in the case of the man not fulfilling his conjugal duties,
contractual conditions (dissolving in the case of a man’s second marriage),
and ‘divorce with mutual consent’ (Berger 2006: 38-41). All in all, classical
family law reflects very patriarchal relationships, in which women occupy
a position derived from that of the man. Although in the seventh century
the Quranic rules represented an improvement in position of women who
had previously been without any rights at all, from the present-day point of
view of individual rights, the legal position of women according to classical
Sharia is an anachronism.
The law of inheritance, too, belongs to the core of Sharia and is also devel-
oped in a very detailed manner. Just as marriage law, it reflects the classical
tendency to closely guard the borders of the group. Muslims and non-
Muslims are by law not named as one another’s inheritors; it is in fact
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possible for a non-Muslim to inherit from a Muslim by testament, for no
more than a third of the legacy. The inheritance right of women –  divided
into eight categories of claimant – is established by the Quran; they are
considered as the ‘Quranic’ inheritors and receive their part first. The
portion to be received by the diverse categories for women is always half
that of her male counterpart (Berger 2006: 41-42). Here, too, the law 
represented a positive improvement at the time of its first introduction, 
but today implies discrimination in terms of the standards of international
law.
Because family and inheritance law are so central to the classical Sharia and
the rules concerned have such a high Quranic content, one would expect
that exactly in these areas of law little would change or that, under the
influence of the Islamization movement, they would in fact be further
purified, as took place in Iran right after the revolution. However, in many
countries we can actually observe a dynamism in law, and this often
implies an improvement in the legal position of women. Still, this applies
more to family law than inheritance law; large change did not occur in this
latter area. A first factor that contributes to an improvement in the legal
position of women is the codification of this part of Sharia in the course of
the twentieth century in nearly all Muslim countries. The legislation and
application of law were thus at least partly taken away from the ulama.
Legislators use this formalization of Sharia in national systems of law for
all kinds of improvements in the legal position of women. Thus it is the
legislators themselves who take control of the interpretation of Quranic
stipulations (ijtihad). This new ‘state-regulated’ reading or interpretation
of the holy sources led in Tunisia to a ban on polygamy; in Egypt, Pakistan,
Iran and Algeria to an expansion of the divorce possibilities for women
(Berger 2006; Otto 2006). In Morocco, through application of the Quranic
principle of ijtihad, sweeping changes were brought about. The break with
the patriarchal model in the new family law of 2004 expresses itself,
among other ways, in full freedom in the marriage contract and in regard 
to the custody of children after divorce (Buskens in Otto et al. 2006).
Moreover, one of the forms of separation introduced, unknown in classical
Sharia, places women in a position to request divorce on the grounds of
‘structural breakdown’ of the marriage (Berger 2006).
This ‘secularization’ of Islamic law (Baelz 1998) also expresses itself in
other ways, this time via siyasa. Where Sharia family law is founded to a
great degree on explicit rules in the Quran or Sunna – rules therefore that
are supposed to have eternal validity and are thus seen as immutable – the
governments of by far most Muslim countries use their free policy space
– siyasa – to create all sorts of administrative and trial law conditions,
procedures, and legal consequences that build a dam against automatic
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application. Polygamy is, if not abolished as in Tunisia, linked to all kinds
of conditions, such as agreement by the first wife and the requirement to
report to the wife or a court that the man is capable of sustaining two or
more households. Casting off of a wife is only permitted after settlement
of financial conditions and/or after a required attempt at reconciliation
through the court. This latter mode is not unknown in classical Sharia; the
Sharia courts for family matters often follow the traditional line, where
great attempts are made to move the two parties of the marriage toward
reconciliation (Berger 2006: 71-73). Similar negotiation or mediation,
furthermore, is also becoming increasingly significant in the pre-judicial
stages of divorce proceedings in the West.
The result of the various Islamic modernization techniques is that in Saudi
Arabia, Mali, Sudan, Nigeria, Iran and Afghanistan there are still few limits
to polygamy; in Mali, Nigeria and Sudan, furthermore, polygamy is seen
not primarily as an Islamic right but as stemming from customary law. In
the remaining countries either all sorts of limits have been imposed upon
this Quranic right (for example the requirement of approval in advance
from the judge or another body and/or approval by the present wife or
wives and the new one entering the marriage) or polygamy is forbidden
(Turkey, Tunisia and – for government officials – Indonesia). In the coun-
tries where it is tied to conditions, the requirement based on Sharia of
sufficient means of support and equal treatment, is often set by law. Relax-
ation of conditions occured in Malaysia. In this country the requirement 
for prior legal advance approval of polygamy, in force since 1984, lapsed in
1994. Casting off of a wife meets with few restrictions in Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, and Afghanistan or – based on customary law – in Mali and Nigeria.
In Egypt, Morocco, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia the ‘God-given’
right to cast off a wife without formalities is somewhat restricted by the
required mediation of the court or the mediation council, by compulsory
attempts at reconciliation, by the duty to register and/or by alimony
requirements. In Turkey, casting off a wife is forbidden. Only in Saudi
Arabia and Afghanistan do women have no broader divorce rights than
those accorded by classical Sharia; in the remaining ten countries the 
possibilities have been considerably expanded, even in Iran (Otto 2006:
99-201).
The reforms are not limited to the three themes of polygamy, casting off of
the wife, and divorce rights for women. There are still many other contro-
versial issues, such as age at marriage, freedom of choice of marriage part-
ners, freedom of movement for women and inter-faith marriage. In the
revised family legislation there also is movement in these areas, with the
exception of the right to enter an inter-faith marriage (of a woman with a
non-Islamic man). 
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All in all, it appears that in a number of Muslim countries where family law
is strongly determined by Sharia (something which was ended completely 
in Turkey in 1924), innovation is not ruled out. With the exception of Iran,
Afghanistan during the Taliban government, and a period in Sudan, the
rising Islamic movements have not succeeded in bending the family law
that they considered as too liberal, in an orthodox direction; the divorce
legislation for women, relatively liberal in countries such as Egypt,
Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia, has not been reversed. Nor has
important new legislation, as in Egypt in 2000 (likely to have great influ-
ence on surrounding countries) and Morocco (2004) been blocked. The
reforms were not without controversy; the ‘great leap forward,’ for exam-
ple, of Morocco in 2004, which broke with the patriarchal family model
and granted equal responsibility to men and women, provoked heavy
resistance. Indonesia, which has had a relatively liberal legislation in regard
to marriage since 1974, has further liberalized its laws. Polygamy and cast-
ing off of a wife have been radically restricted. An exception concerns
inter-faith marriage in Indonesia; since the 1990s in this multi-religious
country such marriages have been made more difficult. As mentioned
earlier, in Malaysia, too, there has been a regression, namely in regard to
polygamy.
Conclusion
In a great part of the Muslim world, Islamic family and inheritance law
form the areas of law par excellence that are seen as something authenti-
cally Islamic, as symbolizing genuine Muslim identity. In almost all
Muslim countries the law in these areas is founded on interpretation of the
Sharia. Yet this does not exclude changes, especially with regard to family
law. And in so far as changes occur, they move for the most part in the
direction of the principle of equality, which is an important basic assump-
tion in the constitutional state and in international law. What is involved
here, however, is not so much external pressure from human rights organi-
zations as an endogenous dynamism that partly comes from pressure from
the women’s movement. The discourse about (changes in) the rights of
women in these countries remains cast in Islamic jargon and makes use of
mechanisms of change acceptable in Islam, but nevertheless the trend in
most countries is one of strengthening the position of women. Concerning
Morocco, Buskens – in his country report – concludes that the role of
Islamic law in the area of women’s rights is decreasing, but as result of, in
fact, a political idiom of Islamization, which serves all the participants
(Buskens in Otto et al. 2006). The long-run trend in the improvement of
the position of women also holds where Sharia is introduced instead of
customary law or even secular law. In the first case, Sharia represents a step
forward compared to the informal law in place, for example in Aceh; in the
second case, the step is also forward when, as for example in Malaysia, the
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existing secular legal institutions are difficult to reach or function poorly
(corrupt judges, etc.) Although hesitatingly (but much too fast for the
orthodox parts of the society), family law is distancing itself from classical
Sharia and, along with this, modern interpretations have made their
entrance.
4.3 isl amic and universal human rights
4.3.1 univer sal and isl amic decl ar ation
The universality of the human rights concept is strongly disputed in the
Muslim world as well as in the West. Thus the former Malaysia prime-
minister Mahathir, in the face of Western criticism of his human rights
policy, regularly attacked this universality as a display of Western imperial-
ism and called for Asian or Islamic values (Noor 2000). On the Western
side, the criticism of universality is insistently represented by Huntington.
In his view, the constitutional state, human rights, and democracy not only
arose in the West, but also are bound to the unique configuration of charac-
teristics upon which Western culture is founded. He mentions characteris-
tics such as the classical Greek heritage, Catholicism and Protestantism,
separation of secular and religious authority, social pluralism, representa-
tion and individualism. His view is that the non-Western world, including,
certainly the Muslim world, increasinly wants to base itself on its own
Islamic civilization and will reject Western innovations, such as democ-
racy and human rights (Huntington 1996).
The attraction of these Western innovations for many in non-Western
countries is certainly greater than Mahathir and Huntington suppose.
Opinion polls regularly show that democracy stands high on the wish list
of populations in Muslim countries (Hofmann 2004; Inglehart and Norris
2004; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2003). Bielefeldt contests the idea that
the principles named here inevitably flow from Western history and are
exclusive to it. Retrospectively, humanitarian motives behind what now is
understood by universal human rights can be traced to the Greek philoso-
phers, the Church fathers, and the Reformation. But the present-day result
was not pre-determined by these and is at the very least the result of an
organic development; the contingency of history might well have led to
another outcome. Fear of moral decline, of losing positions of power and of
the undermining of the hierarchical order of church and society provoked
increasing resistance to the notion of rights for all on the part of church and
non-Christian conservatives. Human rights are therefore better seen as 
the outcome of lengthy and very fierce conflicts than as something deeply
rooted in the cultural and religious traditions of Europe. Europe, then, has
little reason to regard human rights as in essence a Western concept to be
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exported to the developing world from a position of moral superiority.
Instead, the West itself should be more self-critical, and realize that its own
rise and fall in overcoming the structural injustices which culminated in
barbarity, can contain important lessons for others (Bielefeldt 2000).
This more modest proposition does not deny the universal value of human
rights but strips the human rights concept from Western imperialist con-
notations. Respect for human rights is also for Western countries a task
requiring continuous vigilance; thus, the situation is not: ‘we in the West
have them and they don’t’. This position also sharpens the focus on the
historical dynamics; in the West, there was little talk of formal – let alone
actual – equal rights for men and women until a long time after 1948. The
Western experience teaches also that striving toward human rights can
provoke conflicts with the elites in authoritarian societies and protracted
resistance from religious organizations. Only with the Second Vatican
Council in 1965-1967 was the concept accepted by the Roman Catholic
Church.
Recent Islamic activism arose in precisely the same period as ‘human rights
activism.’ In Chapter 2 we sketched the negative attitude of Khomeini
toward the concept of universal human rights. The views of Pakistan’s
Mawdudi were similar. He rejected the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (udhr) because of its Western bias and the arrogance with which
the West imposed these rights on others (Mawdudi 1976 in Bielefeldt
2000). Just as there could be no democracy based on the sovereignty of the
people – sovereignty belongs only to God – the same idea applies to the
rights of people: Islamic law is about obligations toward God and fellow
believers. Furthermore, the duty of one does not imply the right of the
other: men are responsible for supporting their wife or wives, but she or
they do not automatically have the right to be supported by their husband.
Also, if obligations are owed only to fellow believers that means that we
cannot speak of universality, at least as long as the Ummah is not equiva-
lent to humanity (Trautner 1999a: 3). On a conceptual level universal
human rights here stand diametrically opposed to conservative and puri-
tanical interpretations of classical Sharia. By founding human rights on
human dignity we are indeed looking at a universal concept that abstracts
from religions and religious grounds. With its ascribed rights, the Univer-
sal Declaration aims to protect the individual from the state; reciprocity of
the rights of the individual and the duties of the state is therefore the core.
Given the orthodox Islamic view of an inherent conceptual antithesis of
human rights and Islamic law, it is all the more remarkable that the formal
discourse shows all the signs of appropriating the human rights concept
(Halliday 2003). The Organization of the Islamic Conference, at its found-
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ing, referred in the preamble of its charter of 1972 without religious reser-
vations to international law and fundamental human rights and declared
that these are compatible with Islamic values (Mayer 1999). This reflects
the initial secular-nationalist orientation of many Muslim countries. For
the conference in 1981, however, two years after the Islamic revolution in
Iran, a first concept was formulated of the Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam, which was not yet accepted. In 1990 a new version was indeed
accepted, the already mentioned Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in
Islam. The course of development after 1972 thus reflects the influence of
rising Islamic, as well as human rights activism. The concept of human
rights as such remained accepted, but in 1981 and 1990 only in so far as it
agreed with Islam or Sharia. Given the conceptual differences cited above,
which were much played up by Islamic movements after 1980, this is an
important fact. In the Declaration of 1981 the rights of the individual
person were actually discussed, although they were still derived from reli-
gious duties. This recognition of rights as such was a major innovation
compared to the orthodoxy. The changes in the period 1981-1990 go even
further. The Declaration of 1981 still contained all sorts of quotations from
texts out of the Quran and words of the Prophet; yet in tone and style the
declaration of 1991 resembles much more strongly that of the udhr.
Instead of on all kinds of Quranic stipulations based on religious groups,
the focus in 1990 is on the individual as such. This is an important innova-
tion and a rapprochement on the level of principle with the secular concept
of human rights (Trautner 1999a).
The Cairo Declaration has, therefore, much more than its predecessor a
hybrid character, and is not recognizable as a classical Sharia text. This also
can be read from the role that the Declaration grants to the state; the state,
in conformity with the Universal Declaration, is charged with the duty of
guaranteeing the rights of the individual. But the Cairo Declaration is
indeed a hybrid: fundamental rights and universal freedoms are presented
as an integral part of Islam. The hybrid character manifests itself also in
referring not only to the state but also to society and the individual as
bearer of duties. Furthermore, Sharia is indicated as the source for the
interpretation of the cited rights, duties, and freedoms. What is under-
stood by Sharia here is not further specified and leaves, therefore, much
room for interpretation. Sometimes the Declaration is more specific, such
as on the right to life and respect of the person, which the state should
protect and which can be violated only by “a reason prescribed by Sharia”
(art. 2). The text, however, is perfectly clear regarding one central point: in
spite of a ban on discrimination on the ground of religion, Muslims are
forbidden to convert to another religion or to become atheists; Islam is seen
as the religion of “unspoiled nature” (art. 10). In this, we can recognize the
notion that Islam represents the ultimate revelation.
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In conclusion, one could posit that the human rights concept is gradually
being adopted, but specifically by ‘Islamizing’ it and by giving it a Sharia
seal of approval. Stated a different way: precisely by fitting it to Islam’s
own discourse is this concept legitimized and appropriated (Halliday
2003). This does not exclude further dynamism; perhaps such a translation
of the concept into Islamic terms is exactly what is needed as a condition
for further dynamism (Coleman 2006). The development from 1981 to
1990, in any case, reveals that the terminology displays rapprochement
with that of the Universal Declaration, without coinciding with it. Traut-
ner judges the Cairo Declaration to be an enormous step forward. That the
duties, rights and freedoms are founded upon Islam and subject to Sharia,
he considers logical. Such documents always involve stating the philo-
sophical basis for positive law; as in the Universal Declaration, the stipu-
lated rights and freedoms in the Cairo Declaration in themselves do not
make up positive law. For that, one must refer to the binding laws that are
based on the Declarations (Trautner 1999a).
4.3.2 muslim states and conventions: r atification and 
reservations
The way in which many Muslim states have bound themselves to the
important human rights conventions also displays a hybridness. Table 4.3
gives an overview of the ratification by the twelve countries researched of
three conventions that are very important for human rights, and also of the
reservations they have expressed on grounds of Sharia. This concerns the
following three elaborations of the Universal Declaration of 1948:
• the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) of 1966,
that went into effect in 1976;
• the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (cedaw) of 1979, that went into effect in 1981;
• the Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment (cat) of 1984, that went into effect in
1987.
The three conventions cover important dimensions of the rule of law,
namely, basic political rights (iccpr), the principle of equality (cedaw),
and the integrity of the human body (cat). They all came into effect in the
recent period of Islamic activism and concern very sensitive subjects,
certainly according to the classical interpretation of Sharia. The table thus
could have been empty, but it is not. All twelve countries have joined at
least one of the three treaties. Even Saudi Arabia, the only Muslim country
which has not committed itself to the Universal Declaration, is party to
two conventions. The cedaw, the subject matter of which was the focus
of section 4.2.5, and which forbids discrimination between men and
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women, is the only convention that runs up against reservations on the
ground of Sharia; this is the case in four countries. Of the four countries
which have taken up the hadd punishments in their national criminal law
(Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia), two (Iran and Pakistan) are not party
to the cat; Sudan has not yet proceeded to ratification.
The conventions contain many points of tension with classical Sharia.
Those concerning the equality of men and women and criminal law have
been discussed in the preceding sections. Along with many other free-
doms, the iccpr deals with freedom of religion. According to classical
Sharia, freedom of religion is formally not problematic for ‘people of the
Book’, that is, Christians and Jews, no matter how many obstacles can be
raised to the actual practicing of their religions. Depending on the ethnic
and pre-Islamic situation, the constitutions of the various countries also
recognize other religions, such as Zoroastrianism in Iran, and Hinduism 
in Indonesia which became a monotheistic religion under the Pancasila
principle. But, as the Cairo Declaration demonstrates, Islam is certainly
seen as the ultimate revelation and is formally accorded preferential treat-
ment on many fronts (for example, in the marriage and inheritance laws,
religious education, access to high state functions). It is sometimes also
expressed in the severe sanctioning of apostasy or atheism. This formal
position has, of course, drastic practical consequences. The appreciation 
for pluralism is limited; as Tibi argues, in the orthodox vision there is no
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
138
Egypt
Morocco
Turkey
Afghanistan
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Pakistan
Iran
Malaysia
ICCPR
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
CEDAW
x 1) 2)
x 1) 2)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1) 2)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1) 2)
CAT
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x 1)
x
x 1)
x 1)
Table 4.3 Signatories to three human rights treaties
1) Ratified
2) With reservations, based on Sharia
Source: Otto 2006: 165.
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modern understanding of tolerance (Tibi 2004). In section 4.2.4 we saw
that in some countries apostasy is a grave offense. Yet discrimination is
directed not only against other religions; Islamic doctrines other than those
recognized by the state in coalition with the orthodoxy or with Islamic
movements, also can become victims of discrimination. Thus in Pakistan
the Ahmadis were declared to be apostates, as were the Baha’i in Iran, and
the Alewites in Turkey are not recognized as a religious minority. Thus, the
definition of apostasy can be drawn very broadly. 
Against this background, one could be cynical about the meaning of joining
and ratifying human rights treaties. A right on paper is not yet a right in
practice. The human rights situation in many Muslim countries is not rosy.
But the goal of this chapter is not to make a survey of the current human
rights records of Muslim countries, but to assess to what extent Islamiza-
tion of the law blocks the development toward accepting universal human
rights. That is a question about dynamics. If and when this rapprochement
presents itself, it represents an important reference point for the intensifi-
cation of relations directed toward further rapprochement with the coun-
tries concerned.
At least on paper, there is acceptance of important human rights. Some
countries have expressed reservations on the grounds of Sharia. In itself,
that is not surprising for countries which, during their entire political
history, have viewed maintenance of Sharia as being an important source of
legitimation. Mayer notes in this regard that, in the last decade, Muslim
countries increasingly less often advance the position that the human
rights laid down in international treaties are in conflict with their Islamic
law. Unlike in the past, their standpoint is now that both are indeed
compatible; reservations are no longer motivated by Islamic law but by the
position that one should stand by the principles of one’s own national law
(Mayer 1998). Otto comes to the same conclusion on the basis of the
records of discussions held with the representatives of these countries in
the treaty commissions dealing with national reports on treaty countries.
In these commissions, there is widespread criticism of the laws and prac-
tices of the Muslim countries researched. But the discussions are now less
about the general opposition between ‘Islam’ or ‘Sharia’ and the conven-
tions than they used to be. Instead, they are more concrete and construc-
tive, and progress is observed. Where Muslims also sit in these expert
commissions, claims in terms of ‘Islam’ are no longer automatically
accepted, and attention can be paid to national legal developments in rela-
tion to legal developments in other Muslim countries (Otto 2006).
Being party to a human rights treaty does not guarantee a spotless human
rights situation. However, against the background of classical Islamic
doctrine which rejects the concept of human rights as such, the situation
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has fundamentally changed. One now encounters many more opinions to
the effect that Islam or Sharia is reconcilable with human rights, or even
that human rights were actually invented by Islam and all already present
in the Quran (see Chapter 2). Be that as it may, annexation of the concept
by translating it into one’s own ideas is a very important reference point for
the further development toward a constitutional state. It creates a basis on
which the national and international discussion can further build without
there being immediately polarized positions. That Muslim countries 
are exposed to world mechanisms of social control by becoming parties 
to international treaties, and – as it appears – now take a learning rather 
than a confrontational stance on the findings and recommendations that
issue from these mechanisms, confirms that previous conflicts are losing
force not only conceptually but also practically. In this regard, Nobel Prize
winner Shirin Ebadi’s call upon the West to no longer continually ascribe
factual violations of human rights to Islam is important. Attributing
human rights violations to Islam not only ignores this rapprochement, 
but also stirs up past conflicts and undermines practical progress (Ebadi
2004).
Baderin tries to further an objective discussion by systematically compar-
ing the articles of two human rights conventions and their explanations
with the pronouncements of Islamic legal scholars about these subjects. 
He also looks at the opinions of the Islamic schools of law. One of the two
conventions he analyzes is the iccpr, discussed above. This convention
also contains many subjects that are further elaborated in the cedaw and
the cat. On the grounds of his extensive research, Baderin concludes that
for the overwhelming part of the very detailed iccpr, there is no difference
with Islamic law. The areas of conflict concern the scope of equality
between men and women and between Muslims and non-Muslims, the
ban on inhuman and humiliating punishments, freedom of religion and
freedom of expression, and some crimes for which the death penalty is a
possibility. But even in these cases, the differences can, in his view, be
reduced , because in the various law schools one can almost always find
interpretations that – while not in their outcomes than still in their reason-
ing – come close to those of international law (Baderin 2003). Berger
reports that, unlike what formerly was customary, legislators meanwhile
have given themselves the right to make a choice from among the legal
rulings of all the schools of law (Berger 2006: 72). This flexibility, therefore,
makes it possible to interpret the Sharia in as humane a manner as possible.
The Sharia can – provided indeed that it is humanely interpreted – serve as
an engine for the realization in Muslim countries of rights such as those
laid down in the iccpr, (Baderin 2003).
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4.3.3 conclusion
The human rights situation in Muslim countries does not meet interna-
tional standards, but this situation in Muslim countries is no less favorable
than in other developing countries. The various indices in the Human
Development Report 2004, that measure the position of women, show a
great spread. Several Muslim countries score better than non-Muslim
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (undp 2004). It is a hopeful
development that the concept of human rights as such has gained entry
into Islamic juridical thinking. Given the nature of classical Islamic think-
ing, that is an important innovation. It does not, however, for the most
part, represent a full acceptance of that concept; rights and freedoms are
still filtered through an Islamic lens. But that does not exclude further
rapprochement, and signs of such developments can in fact be observed.
This represents an important reference point for reducing the tensions
between Sharia and international law.
At present the ideas of the modernizers of the end of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth centuries mentioned in Chapter 2, such as
those of Mohammed Abdu, are being implemented in various countries,
despite attempts by the orthodox and fundamentalist sides to bring the law
more into agreement with the fiqh or so-called ‘true’ Islam, respectively. 
At the same time, the current hybrid situation creates a great deal of uncer-
tainty. Law on paper, with its often differing constitutional basic norms,
does not have to be in agreement with law in practice, and this discrepancy
can just as well fall to the advantage as to the disadvantage of actual human
rights. Law on paper can fulfill the function of pure symbolism or window
dressing (Aubert 1971). It can, however, be intended as much to satisfy the
national and international guardians of human rights as the guardians of
‘true’ Islam. An indication of the first is the constitutional right to freedom
of religion, while apostasy is made punishable in criminal law. An indica-
tion of the second is that in some countries the hadd punishments are
indeed formally introduced, but are not carried out due to buffers built into
the legal system. This hybrid situation raises questions about future devel-
opments.
4.4 interpretation of the legal dynamism
This chapter illustrates that one cannot make generalizations about Islamic
law in Muslim countries. Great differences are hidden by the banner of
Sharia, and Muslim countries are also very diverse in the ways their
systems of law fit an Islamic template. This holds as much for constitu-
tional aspects as for important areas of law, such as family law and criminal
law. There is only one country that is governed by classical Sharia, namely
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Saudi Arabia, and even here, not fully. All the other countries defined as
Islamic in their constitutions, namely Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and the present
Afghanistan, have not only Sharia as a constitutional basic norm, but the
constitution itself, which also includes references to concepts other than
religious norms (rule of law, rights and freedoms). The comparative study
of legal systems for this report shows that all other countries exhibit a 
large measure of variation in the relationship between religious and non-
religious basic norms. Even where the areas of law most influenced by
Islamization are concerned, variety is the most striking characteristic. Otto
proposes, on the basis of research in twelve countries, three categories:
classical Sharia (Saudia Arabia and Iran), secular systems (Turkey), and
mixed systems. The last, and largest, category can in turn be divided into
three sub-categories on the basis of the role of Islamic precepts in some
areas of law. This role is the greatest in three countries, that is in Sudan,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, though less explicitly than in Saudi Arabia or
Iran. Indonesia and Mali comprise the most ‘secular’ of the three
subgroups. The group in between consists of Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and
Mali (Otto 2006: 37-39 and 128-132). This large spread regarding the role of
Sharia in the legal system would not be less for the legal systems of the
whole population of 48 Muslim countries.
Against the background of the historically given need for political legiti-
macy, it is not surprising that the Sharia or Islam, however further inter-
preted, have gained a place in the law of a number of countries. In the past
decades, the card played by movements based on the Islamization of the
law also therefore could not simply be ignored. Recently, as in Afghanistan,
Nigeria, and Sudan, this has led to fierce and sometimes very bloody con-
frontations about ‘Islam’ and ‘Sharia’. But rather than between ‘civiliza-
tions,’ clashes (Huntington 1996) have occurred, and continue to occur,
within the Muslim world. As far as law goes, the question here is whether
or not the confrontations lead to an ‘Islamization of the law’ or indeed a
‘nationalization of Sharia into an all-encompassing national legal system.
Put another way: what will be the outcome of the struggle for the mono-
poly of national law? In Muslim societies with heterogeneous views on
legal systems, different ‘masters of the law’ are involved in this struggle:
traditional tribal leaders, religious scholars, political rulers, elected repre-
sentatives, professional national and international jurists. The coalitions
that form among these ‘masters’ are important for the development of law
(Otto 2006: 136-138).
A definitive answer to the question posed cannot be given, for neither the
process of state formation nor the striving toward ‘Islamization’ consti-
tutes a closed chapter. There are also great internal and external uncertain-
ties: how stable are the peace accords in Afghanistan and Sudan, and what
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is the chance that their constitutions are going to function? What is going
to happen in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and with the peace process between
Palestine and Israel? How stable is the situation in countries such as Egypt,
Iran, Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, and Malaysia? What will be the political
and military position of Western countries? Everywhere the contingencies
are great and events have consequences that reach beyond the countries
directly involved. With the exception of Iran, Muslim movements have 
not yet succeeded in bringing about a national revolution. Other than was
feared, they have not fallen like dominos before classical Sharia either.
Although the system of law in Iran is indeed formally ‘Islamized,’ accord-
ing to the classical model, this ‘Islamization’ itself is not complete and has
partly been tempered again. The double constitutional basic norm – Islam
as well as raison d’etat – which also became translated institutionally, 
has brought about a permanent struggle. This led to the creation of a new
institution with the authority to define the ‘common good,’ which also
formally prevails above Sharia. But in Iran, even this Sharia itself is not
unambiguous; although the reform movement has temporarily come off
the worst politically, it has contributed to the concept that Islam permits
multiple interpretations. Thus, in this theocracy, a ‘hermeneutical plural-
ism’ has been introduced (Arjomand 2004: 22). Chapter 2 shows that this
plurality also includes opinions that set themselves against the theocracy
precisely on Islamic grounds. Here, too, we cannot speak of an unequivocal
Islamization in the classical style; and furthermore there is rather a consid-
erable measure of nationalization and encapsulating of Sharia in national
legal systems. 
The process in which Muslim countries are involved exhibits a certain anal-
ogy to the process of secularization of canonical law in Europe (Berman
1983). Just as in Europe, the nationalization of religious law in the Muslim
world is not a process that takes place quickly and smoothly but one that
comes about over a very long period and through great controversies and
confrontations between the religious and state authorities and their
followers. Even so, as Otto describes, the main line in Muslim states is still
one of incorporating the legal system into the state and its constitution,
and thus of nationalizing Sharia. This nationalization is paralleled by large
changes in the sense that the formal and substantive characteristics of
Sharia law increasingly differ from those of the classical fiqh.
For most countries, the answer to the question of who will be the winner
of the struggle for the legal monopoly has until now come down in favor of
the state. The codification that parallels state formation simultaneously
leads toward a substantive change in the tenets of belief. The definition of
national law is increasingly taken out of the hands of the ulama and is
placed under the jurisdiction of state actors, in regard not only to legisla-
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tion but also to judicial intervention. In Muslim states, the customary
model is that of a Ministry of Religious Affairs controlling religious devel-
opments. Its jurisdictions is often considerable, including the design and
execution of Sharia-related legislation, the management of religious courts,
the control over religious education, the construction and administration
of mosques, the distribution of religious information, the collection and
distribution of religious taxes, and supervision in matters of marriage and
divorce. These ministries form a buffer between the state and the ulama,
and may thus offer a counterweight against radicalization. However, it is
also possible that radicalization is strengthened, for example if regimes 
feel they can benefit from taking over parts of the Islamization agenda or 
if their efforts to propagate a ‘moderate’ Islam has the unintended conse-
quence of playing into the hands of radical Islamic movements. Further-
more, such forms of state Islam will not easily encourage ‘free thinking’ ,
since this is seen as a threat by the vested (state) interests (see also Chapter
3). Thus, in these cases, too, it is the state that defines the space for religion,
and not the reverse (Otto 2006: 189). 
The role of the judiciary is striking. Where there exists a constitutional
double basic norm, higher law institutions such as the High Council, the
Constitutional Court or the Sharia Court of Appeal, in various countries
(such as Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan) have limited the reach of
classical Islamic norms in favor of more modern interpretations or existing
secular norms. Thus in Egypt, the scope of the 1980 constitutional amend-
ment that Sharia is the source of legislation has been severely curtailed by
the Constitutional Court. It has thus also declared the development of
secular law in many areas not to be in conflict with Sharia. Furthermore,
the Court claims the exclusive right to interpret the principles of Sharia,
without following the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (Arjomand 2004: 20).
In Pakistan the high law colleges play a comparable role. The High Council
has come down decidedly in favor of secular articles of the constitution a
number of times in legal cases where conflicts between the two constitu-
tional basic norms were in play. The Federal Sharia Court, given authority
in, among other matters, hadd punishment cases, has time after time
annulled decisions of lower courts that had imposed the highest hadd
punishments. Both bodies are mainly composed of professional jurists.
Just as in Egypt, it is therefore now the non-religious scholars who judge in
matters of religious law (ijtihad). From Lau’s research it appears in fact that
also these non-religious judges nevertheless employ religious arguments
for judgments that deviate from those of the ulama judges. Just as in coun-
tries like Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, the higher law colleges in
Pakistan thus erect a barrier against Islamization of the law in a classical
direction. This battle over the right to judge is intertwined with another
similar struggle, namely that against the instrumentalization of the law and
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
144
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 144
the judges by the executive. Where the Pakistani government has tried to
meet radical groups with radical laws (rule by law), the higher law colleges
have resisted this by calling upon fundamental principles of law on behalf
of the public interest. Thus, they try to affirm their own formally inde-
pendent position and also to underline the principle that the executive is
also subject to the rule of law (Lau 2003). Independence of the judiciary is
not yet self-evident in most Muslim countries. Rosefsky Wickham shows
that for Egypt the ‘victories’ of the Constitutional Court over the ruling
power can partly be traced to the willingness of the government to respect
the Court’s decisions (Rosefsky Wickham 2002: 224).
The comparative law analysis also shows that the re-introduction of
Islamic law mainly occurred in the period 1965-1985. After that, it lost
force, despite the growing tensions between Western and Muslim coun-
tries. This confirms Roy’s view that the Islamic revolution has passed its
zenith (Roy 1994 and 2004). Measured against the ‘fervor’ and the claims
of Islamic activist movements described in the preceding chapter, the
Islamization of law has actually remained limited. Except in Iran and for a
time in Afghanistan (Taliban), and in Sudan and Pakistan, Islamic forces
and the people in power could not ‘hijack’ the state and formal law; rather,
the reverse has been the case. Islamization sometimes seems to be more of
a symbolic exercise (such as, for example, in the case of introducing general
references to Sharia in the constitution) than a major influence on positive
law. In the preceding section, furthermore, mention was made of the rise
of the concept of Islamic human rights, as a reaction against the universal
concept of human rights. Nevertheless, in practice there seems to be
rapprochement between both concepts. Also, it appears that more and
more Muslim countries – even Saudi Arabia – want to become party to
human rights conventions, and ever less resort to reservations based on
Islamic argumentation. Even in the heavily Quranic field of family law,
Sharia does not block the modernization of law in several countries.
This raises the question of whether modernization of law may actually
become easier precisely because it takes place under the banner of Sharia
and through reasoning based on Islam. If that were the case, then the adop-
tion of Sharia as a basic norm in a constitution would not be an empty or
purely tactical gesture but an important condition for further development
towards a democratic constitutional state. In postmodern jargon: if
changes can be legitimated from one’s own frame, they are more easily
acceptable than if they are supported by arguments that are foreign to that
frame or even – for the time being – seem to be conflicting. Proof of this
possibility cannot of course be given, but it seems quite plausible.
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The adoption of Sharia in the constitution as a or the source of legislation
does not – functionally – have to do with the level of binding law itself but
rather with its legitimation. In this logic, it would facilitate the legitimation
of law if legal subjects can experience it as their own. Thus, the framing of
law becomes essential. While acknowledging all the cynical reasons for
rulers to use Sharia as an instrument to maintain their position (for exam-
ple as the result of a deal with the Islamic opposition), it must still be
remembered that in recent decades, large sections of the Muslim world
have been very receptive to a discourse in an Islamic key; rulers know what
chord to strike. The slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ found and continues to
find considerable resonance among the population. If the development of
law follows an Islamic template it would be able to give modernization a
less threatening face than is currently the case. In his study on the develop-
ment of law in Morocco, Buskens shows that with the new openness in
that country since the 1990s, two discourses have started to dominate 
politics, namely Islam and human rights. In part these go together: Islamic
movements combine Islamic discourse with the idiom of human rights. As
we have seen, in Morocco this has culminated in an important innovation
in the area of family law (Buskens in Otto et al. 2006).
Trautner considers developments toward democratic constitutional states
in the Muslim world as likely options, but he also sees it as essential that
this takes place in an Islamic frame. He urges the West to pay more atten-
tion to the ideas of contemporary Islamic reformers, such as those
discussed in section 2.3. Thinkers like Soroush (Iran), An Na’im (Sudan)
and also al-Ghanushi (Tunisia) fit in with the need for authenticity and
thus lay the theoretical basis for the Islamization of democracy, rule of law,
human rights, plurality, etc. At present, various parties with essentialist
motives still often claim a monopoly on the interpretation of Sharia.
According to Trautner, it is precisely through a reconceptualization of
traditional Islamic concepts that they can contribute to a gradual ‘democra-
tization’ of interpretation (Trauner 1999b).
If the universal and the Islamic human rights declarations or the constitu-
tions of some Muslim countries are compared with those of Western coun-
tries, we find evident differences alongside rapprochement. If on the basis
of these differences we would conclude that these differences are funda-
mentally irreconcilable, then we would assume that legal systems cannot
change. Such an assumption would ignore the dynamism that the law
experiences everywhere as a result of changed circumstances, both – and
perhaps first and foremost – in the application and in the substance of the
positive law. Thus we are confronted with the question of whether the
modernization of Sharia interpretations will not ultimately converge
toward international law. This may occur not because of the hegemonic
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influence of international law but because countries simply want to catch
up. ‘Catching up’ – in all imaginable variations – ultimately suggests a
certain ‘equality’. This argument will be illustrated by looking at the posi-
tion of women.
Legal rules to a certain extent and at the risk of becoming dictatorial or
irrelevant, reflect social norms. The qualification ‘to a certain extent’ is
deliberate because a complete reflection of ‘lived’ norms is of course
neither possible nor desirable. Certainly in countries with large inequali-
ties, such norms vary greatly, for example between the elite and the
masses, between traditional and modern, and among ethnic communities.
This also means that formal law is connected to the stage of development
of a country. From a Western point of view, the legal position of women in
many Muslim countries is seen as ‘strange or ‘different’, as characteristi-
cally belonging to ‘Islamic’ and thus foreign norms and values. Yet it must
be remembered that many of the (sacred) beliefs about marriage, the family
and the role of women in Muslim countries were not so long ago also
generally accepted in the Netherlands, and are still harbored by some. 
In Christian circles – and not only there – the family was and is seen as the
cornerstone of society. Dissolving marriages made in church through
divorce was not possible in many congregations. Sex outside of marriage
was also taboo for a very long time, and homosexual behavior is still taboo
for many Christian denominations. The recent letter from the Vatican to
the bishops on the cooperation between men and women in and outside
the church still exudes the atmosphere of a ‘natural’ division of roles
between men and women and of the special responsibility of the woman
for the family, which is seen as “the primordial and, in a certain sense
sovereign society” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2004).
The idea of complementarity, in which there was no equality of rights and
obligations and women were seen as the weaker party deserving of protec-
tion, also prevailed in the Netherlands until the 1970s. Until 1957 married
women in the Netherlands did not have full legal capacity, and until 1971
the man was the head of the family (In’t Veld-Langeveld and Schoonen-
boom 1976). 
In many Muslim countries there are large inequalities in levels of develop-
ment: apart from a prosperous, well-educated elite there is also much
poverty and illiteracy, especially among women. These differences mani-
fest themselves in many other qualities such as the number of children,
knowledge of the world, and religious views. Unlike the elites, the masses
still hold very traditional norms with regard to the position of women.
These societies live, as it were, simultaneously in different times: one layer
lives in the highly modern era, the other still in the premodern era. Yet the
developments in the coming decades will not leave the masses undis-
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turbed. Further urbanization, rising levels of education for women, smaller
families, participation in the workforce, increasing wealth and media
consumption are changing the position of women, their self-perception
and independence. In Iran, which has seen a rapid improvement in
women’s levels of education in recent decades, it is precisely women that
have voted in favour of a deradicalization. Their ‘subversive’ actions against
classical Islamic prescriptions also found other means of expression. In 
the heavily Islamic-ideological period immediately after the revolution, 
the regime lowered the minimum age of marriage from 15 to 9 and later
raised it again to 13. However, the actual average age at marriage has now
increased to above the age of 24. With the rise in the age of marriage, the
number of children per woman declines. The ideologically sacrosanct voca-
tion of women in marriage and family is thus refuted by actual behavior;
the best possible education and a fitting job have become a normal part of
the life of many young women, and the Iranian economy also needs them
badly. Sooner or later the legal norms will follow the direction of social
changes, be applied differently or become a dead letter. The recent expan-
sion of divorce opportunities for Egyptian women, which were thought to
be chiefly for the benefit of affluent women, illustrates this kind of differ-
ent application of the law. This so-called khul divorce through which
women who waive their financial rights are able to divorce in court with-
out the agreement of their husbands, actually turns out to be used mainly
by poor women (Berger and Sonneveld in Otto et al. 2006). Comparative
legal research shows that in other Muslim countries such as Pakistan,
Indonesia, and even Saudi Arabia, the juridical norms are also adapting to
changes (Otto et al. 2006). Roy, too, observes that actual developments in
the Muslim world in the areas of marriage, family, and divorce, among
other things, correspond – with a delay – to those in the West and that even
behind an ostensible return to tradition, like the return to the headscarf,
modernization is hiding (Roy 2004: 140-141).
As lost ground is made up and this is translated into changes in family law,
one can expect convergence. However, given the arrears of many countries
in, for instance, education levels and the distribution of wealth (see Chap-
ter 2), this is likely to be a long-term project that may take generations,
even though this will differ among Muslim countries. At the same time, it
must be remembered that adapting formal law to actual developments can
be speeded up by the activities of social movements. Arjomand points out
that, at present, women’s movements are one of the most dynamic factors
in Muslim countries (Arjomand 2004: 25). Even in Saudi Arabia women’s
ngos are making themselves heard. Under their influence, one of the legal
pillars of Wahhabism is now under fire, namely the principle of ‘blocking
of the means’. This principle forbids acts that can lead to sin; on this basis,
women are forbidden from driving a car (Meijer 2005). Just as women’s
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movements in the West in the 1960s and 1970s had a major influence on
legislation, that may now be the case in the Muslim world. This may be all
the more true once democratic openings are also available to women. 
No matter how plausible continued convergence may be, there will remain
differences or ‘multiple modernities’. Eisenstadt uses this concept to oppose 
the idea, still present in the West, that modernization is a uniform and
linear process leading to a situation in which the West – as forerunner – is
still the model. Following Max Weber, Eisenstadt sees modernization as
the gradual rooting of the idea that the universe does not represent an
unchangeable, Divine order but one that can be changed by conscious
human action. Through this insight, man becomes an autonomous factor
who can free himself from traditional political and religious authority. 
The reactions to this process are not identical within and outside the West;
they are context-dependent and continually evolving. History, social and
economic dynamism, and institutional structure are all relevant. This does
not exclude similarities in trajectories and/or results, nor does it exclude
differences and hybrid forms (Eisenstadt 2000). 
Eisenstadt’s concept of ‘multiple modernities’ raises the question of what
the ‘multiple’ will refer to in the area of family law. One can only speculate
about this, but it does not seem plausible that religion and Sharia will
disappear as sources of inspiration for law in the foreseeable future. In
Western Europe, the development of secular law was to a great degree the
result of its separation from canon law during the eleventh century. This
created distance between religious and worldly law, but also created room
for the development of secular law. Concepts like the rule of law, to which
the king was also subject, could emerge because the resulting distance
allowed the kingship to be stripped of its religious legitimacy (Berman
1983). This fundamental division of the two domains could occur because
the church was an institution with decision-making power. This institu-
tional condition is lacking in the Muslim world; certainly in the Sunni
world institutional structures more resemble those of Protestantism than
of Roman Catholicism. That does not mean that a separation of the reli-
gious community and the state or a secularization of law cannot occur; 
de facto this is going on everywhere. But the path of development is not
identical.
‘Sharia’ in itself is plurifom and flexible enough to adapt to all sorts of
circumstances; whether this will actually occur is of course dependent on,
among other things, the development process and power relationships. It
seems plausible that in the longer term, Sharia will, even more than now,
function in the more abstract meaning of God’s way and social justice than
now is the case. In the discourse relevant for the legitimacy of the law,
the development of law and legal systems
149
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 149
Sharia will remain an important source of inspiration. Positive law,
however, will increasingly be imbued with the values behind the letter of
the commandments and the prohibitions. It will result in the implementa-
tion of all sorts of procedures that further soften the commandments and
prohibitions, thus moving further away from classical Sharia. But this
development will continue to take place in a religious discourse. And
although the outcomes in many areas of law will appear normal to Western
eyes, such a discourse will presumably lead to other restrictions on behav-
ior than are drawn in parts of the West. For the time being, controversial
issues will remain, from the acceptance of religious plurality to related
issues of minority rights, of apostasy and unbelief, freedom of expression,
the privileged position of men, and a complex of moral questions like sex
outside marriage and homosexuality (Takeyh 2001/2002). There is also
dynamism in all of these areas, although the situation differs from country
to country. This dynamism expresses itself more in the shelter of the
private sphere than in the public space. The heavy punishments for apos-
tasy in some countries will discourage many from explicitly abandoning
their religion; however, that does not rule out departing from the faith in
less conspicuous ways, such as gradually complying less with religious
prescriptions. Discrepancies between public prescriptions and privately
exercised behavior creates tensions which sooner or later induce adapta-
tion. In Malaysia, for example, in the relative anonymity of the Internet, 
a prison sentence for apostasy for the first time provoked a semi-public
discussion over this taboo, in which Muslims spoke out in favor of the
right to abandon one’s religion as a part of religious freedom (Internet
Malaysia 2005). Religion and morality will retain importance in legal
thinking, but it is difficult to predict in what ways and how compellingly
they will set the norms for social development. 
4.5 conclusion
The concept of Sharia has many meanings. It can be an indication of the
abstract plan of God for the community of believers, it can refer to the 
elaboration of this plan in a set of rules of behavior by the early religious
scholars, or it can involve contemporary interpretations by states, institu-
tions, and groups. If we examine current law based on Sharia, we are 
especially struck by its great diversity. There are great differences among
Muslim countries in the Sharia-based legal rules themselves and in their
application. Furthermore, the Islamization of law since the 1970s has had 
a limited scope in most countries. The development of national law that
meets modern social-economic needs and cannot be based on Sharia, 
also proceeds normally. The first wave of Islamization has not (yet) 
been followed by a second; rather there has been a decline in the influence
of classical Sharia on national law in the part fifteen years (Otto 2006: 
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189). 
In the overwhelming majority of Muslim countries we cannot speak of an
effective constitutional state or a fully fledged rule of law. Instead, these
states are marked by great heterogeneity in the field of law. However, the
uncertainties and tensions resulting from legal plurality in these countries
is similar to that of (other) developing countries. On balance, the
confrontations over law following the wave of Islamization have resulted
rather more in a ‘nationalization of Sharia’ than an ‘Islamization of the law’
according to the classical model. In only a limited number of countries have
the form of government and the law (for a while) been Islamized in a classi-
cal direction under the influence of the Islamic activism of the past decades.
Islamic law as a source of legislation plays a role in many countries, but this
certainly does not always result in changes in positive law. The infamous
Islamic criminal laws also only prevail in a small number of countries and
moreover not always implemented. The recent Islamization of law and 
the long-standing national family laws based on Sharia have not blocked
reforms. They do not seem to pose a hindrance on principle to further
dynamism in the direction of international standards.
The West can contribute constructively to this process. Not only indirectly
because it plays a role in the political contingencies mentioned above, but
also because it meets with the Muslim world in many committees which
are important for the development of law. It is of great importance that the
West no longer characterize Sharia as self-evidently in conflict with
universal human rights (Aliboni 2004). To this end, it must take into
account the diverse meanings of Sharia: what is true about one country
does not apply in another, and that also holds for the content and role of
Sharia. One local version of Sharia is close to international human rights
standards, while elsewhere the worst violations of human rights are
committed under the banner of Sharia. The West does not have to shy
away from criticizing such practices simply because they use religion as
a justification for power considerations. Criticism does actually have an
impact. Conversely, however, the West must also appreciate the positive
meanings of religion and religiously-inspired law for large segments of the
Muslim populations. Islam-based reforms of Sharia and islamic reforms
in the direction of international human rights standards often appear to
Western eyes either as going too slowly or even as a step backward.
However, one should not exclude the possibility that it is precisely these
kinds of reforms that have a better chance of taking root than large or
Western-imposed steps. The following chapter will explore this theme
further.
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5 polic y perspective
5.1 introduction
The efforts by Islamic-inspired activists to take part in political power and
to put law into an Islamic framework have caused considerable tension in
the Muslim world. In addition, international Islamic terrorism in recent
years has also led to fear of Islamic activism and Islamization in the West.
This report focuses on the emotionally charged relationship between the
Islamization of politics, the state, and law, on the one hand, and democracy
and human rights, on the other, within the Muslim world. It examines the
development of Islamic activism in Muslim countries and the possible
starting points this offers for a rapprochement with the concepts of democ-
ratization and human rights. The central questions read as follows: 
• What insights can be derived from the development of Islamic activism
since the 1970s in relation to democratization and the advancement of
human rights?
• What reference points does Islamic activism offer for rapprochement with
the concepts of democracy and human rights?
• What policy perspective for the Netherlands and Europe can, in the long
run, reduce the tensions related to Islamic activism within the Muslim
world and also support the processes of democratization and the advance-
ment of human rights?
In the preceding chapters, we examined the development of Islamic
activism in Muslim countries and the reference points for a policy perspec-
tive along three dimensions, namely, the development of Islamic political
thought, of Islamic political movements, and of Islamic law within the
Sunni and Shiite mainstream. These chapters revealed a varied picture of
the degree of Islamization of politics, the state, and law in different Muslim
countries. The efforts toward Islamization seem to create no permanent
impediments to democratization and the advancement of human rights; on
various levels there is even rapprochement. These findings offer reference
points for a policy perspective, in the sense of a vision and guiding frame-
work with general policy principles that can contribute to reducing the
tensions between Islamic activism, on the one hand, and democratization
and respect for human rights, on the other. In this concluding chapter the
wrr presents the main outlines of such a policy perspective.
Unfortunately, the current relationship between the Muslim world and the
West does not offer a favorable context for reconciling the potential antag-
onism between Islamic activism and democracy and human rights. A nega-
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tive spiral has arisen that has left deep marks both nationally and interna-
tionally (sec. 5.2). At the same time this increases the urgency of a construc-
tive approach to supporting democratization and the promotion of human
rights. The empirical analyses of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 indicate what points
for policy action can be derived from the development of Islamic activism
(sec. 5.3). The general policy principles are explored in section 5.4. This
report is, of course, directed to the Dutch government. Nevertheless, a
number of policy proposals concern cooperation on the European level
because through that larger framework the Netherlands can exercise a
much larger influence. Which specific European and Dutch policy options
are available to give concrete shape to this engagement, is described in
section 5.5. Although the wrr has not conducted any empirical research
on the development of Islamic activism in the Netherlands, the policy
vision developed here also has implications for domestic relations with
Islamic activism within the Netherlands, also given the interrelatedness 
of domestic and foreign policy. These implications are discussed in section
5.6.
5.2 the world political situation 
5.2.1 conflicts
Recent developments in world politics make a constructive approach
toward the Muslim world to promote democratization and human rights
both more complicated and more urgent. The context within which these
efforts must take place, have already been damaged by, among other
events, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the first Gulf War, the war in
Afghanistan, and the long drawn-out Middle East conflict. However, since
‘9/11’ there has been an escalation of conflicts. The ‘wars’ against terrorism
in Afghanistan and Iraq have provoked discussion of a clash between Islam
and the West. Whether it indeed is primarily this clash, is disputed. Reza
Aslan emphasizes that what is taking place now in the Muslim world as
well as what took place after the attacks of 2001 is a purely internal conflict
between Muslims and not a struggle between Islam and the West (Aslan
2005). In his view, clashes with the West are instrumental for conflicts
within the Muslim world on the role and interpretation of Islam. Kepel
supports this view; he sees terrorist acts in Western countries or elsewhere
against Western targets as ultimately aimed at the mobilization of Muslims
against the corrupt, apostate regimes in Muslim countries (Kepel 2004).
Others, like Buruma and Margalit, believe that the West as the ‘hotbed of
idolatry,’ arrogance, domination, and moral degeneration does indeed
represents for radical Islamic movements the principal target for a violent
‘jihad’ in the name of Islam (Buruma and Margalit 2004: 126). Hans Jansen
believes that both of these views can be true. He suggests that in today’s
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radical ideology different motives have gradually come into play: resistance
against apostate rulers of Muslim countries and apostate Muslims, as well
as resistance against the West and, especially, the us (Jansen 2004).
Whether the earlier attacks on Western targets were aimed at punishing
the West for acts of war against Muslims or Islam, at forcing Western coun-
tries to discontinue their support for authoritarian governments in Muslim
countries, or primarily at impressing and mobilizing the Muslim popula-
tion, one thing is clear. Since 9/11, the struggle against the West as the
domain of ‘Zionism, crusaders and unbelievers’ has, in any case, become
more explicit. Of course, that also has to do with the dynamics and charac-
teristics of the conduct of the war itself. Earlier in this report we pointed to
the increasing independence of violent transnational activism. It has sepa-
rated itself from national agendas and is now directed at the international
struggle against (alleged) injustice against Muslims anywhere in the world.
The military intervention of the West in Afghanistan and Iraq strengthens
the image of the West, or of the participating Western countries, as
enemies of Islam. This also increases the willingness of the many thousand
well-trained combatants from these conflicts to respond militarily else-
where or in their own countries. Smaller units or ‘cells’ of these transna-
tional networks have established themselves in many countries, thus creat-
ing a global battleground. If only because of the existence of this army of
(ex-)combatants, it seems unlikely that the phenomenon of terrorist
attacks against Western targets will disappear soon, even if the develop-
ments in Iraq and the Middle East proceed favorably.
The West itself has become a recruiting ground for this ‘foreign legion.’
Some Muslim youth feel themselves called to the defense of ‘Islam under
threat,’ even though Western governments define their struggle as
directed against terrorism and expressly not against Islam. Olivier Roy
points out that a process of ‘deculturalization’ is taking place, particularly
among the youth of the second and third generations. By abandoning the
religious and cultural traditions of their parents, they become increasingly
open to other influences, including those of a transnational religious
nature. Under the influence of these new interpretations of religion, some
become more susceptible to radicalization (Roy 2004). To them, ‘Islam’
and the Ummah are more important reference points than the country of
their parents or the country where they live (Phalet et al. 2000/1). They
view confrontations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq not as conflicts
between states but as attacks on ‘Islam’.
Some Salafist tendencies fit well with this process of deculturalization and
identification with a collective Muslim identity. Through their emphasis
on the ‘true’ Muslim and on personal piety, Salafist movements can assume
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extreme forms. The violent, jihadist tendencies within these movements
are, of course, also suitable for transnational forms of violent activism
(aivd 2004a; igc 2004 and 2005a). The requirement to conform to the
example of the first followers of the Prophet can mean that these Salafists
take the relevant Quran texts in such a literal and absolute fashion that no
other interpretation is permitted. Because every reflection on the sacred
texts is forbidden and because they consider all the interpretations of the
text since the seventh century as deviations, Salafists are not very suscepti-
ble to politics or theological debate.
The obvious radicalness of these ideas means that it is precisely youth, who
are in an impressionable phase of life, that have a greater chance of turning
into radical born agains. The attractive power of these ideas is also great for
some young people because they satisfy a need for a positive identity that
neither their parents nor the society they live in can provide. The militant
Islamic movements to which they feel called and the role models supplied
by the intifada, Osama bin Laden, and other ‘resistance heroes’, do address
that need. These youth are not only receptive to recruitment for participa-
tion in military operations far from home. They also turn their rage and
feelings of victimization into religiously justified heroics by transferring
the ‘holy war,’ through their own initiative, to the local context. Because
they operate in “fluid, dynamic and often vaguely defined opportunity-
structures,” they especially contribute to fifth-column-like feelings among
the population. This is the case even though in the Netherlands at least
there are only an estimated ten to twenty such groups (Tweede Kamer
2005c: 29). From the research of Phalet et al. it also apparent that only a
very small number of Dutch Muslim youth are prepared to adopt violence
in the defense of religion (Phalet et al. 2001/1). But even if there are in fact
very few youth who cross the threshold into active participation in terror-
ist activities in the countries where they live, the consequences of their
actions can be completely out of proportion to their numbers. With only
a few violent acts and threats of terrorist acts against public figures and 
vital objects, they succeed in creating an atmosphere of fear and mistrust
between population groups.
5.2.2 consequences
Transnational and national terrorism and counterterrorism have, first and
foremost, worsened the internal relations in many countries, both in the
West and in the Muslim world. Pew Research Center reported that among
the nine Western, non-Muslim countries surveyed, people in Germany
and the Netherlands were the most negative towards Muslims: respectively
47 and 51 percent expressed a negative attitude (Pew Research Center
2005).1 There is much fear in Western countries of fresh attacks, even
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though only a limited number of attacks have actually taken place. Because
of the disproportional influence of small groups of extremists, an image
has arisen of Islam as an inherently threatening religion which incites
terrorism. Certainly in the Netherlands, a social and political division
seems to have emerged between ‘Muslims’ and ‘the autochtonous’ popula-
tion (Shadid 2005). This terminology has also penetrated policy papers
(Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2005). Such a divide is not
only dangerous because it suggests conflict where none exists, but it also
gives short shrift to the enormous plurality in the Netherlands in the
sphere of religion, philosophy of life, country of origin, etc.
In some countries, the fight against terrorism has been seized upon for
domestic political goals, namely the increased repression of unacceptable
persons and groups. In Israel, the last few years have witnessed intensive
anti-terrorist actions with American support and, again under the banner
of combating terrorism, a wall has been erected that takes up a large space
on Palestinian territory. The International Court of Justice termed the
building of the wall contrary to international law (icj 2004). In their rand
study The Muslim World after 9/11, Rabasa et al. list several Muslim coun-
tries, for example Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, where the fight against
terrorism has led to increased government repression (Rabasa et al. 2005:
50-52). According to the International Crisis Group (icg), the fight against
terrorism in a country like Somalia is so far off the mark that it causes the
jihad movements to gain rather than lose sympathy among the population
(icg 2005b).
International relations have also been deeply influenced by the war in Iraq.
It has damaged the Atlantic alliance and has brought about disunity within
the eu. From the perspective of the subject of this report, however,
perhaps the most negative aspect has been that ‘the West’ has lost moral
authority and has thus sustained damage as the champion of democracy
and respect for international law and human rights (undp 2005: 67). The
‘war’ against terrorism has strengthened relations with the governments of
countries like Egypt, Libya, and Pakistan, which are not very particular
about democracy and human rights. The American government justified
the invasion of Iraq primarily on the grounds of the supposed presence of
weapons of mass destruction and (later) the possible links of the Iraqi
regime with al-Qaeda. When these motives could not be substantiated, the
justification for the invasion was shifted to humanitarian goals and the
establishment of a democratic regime. Although the weapons inspections
indicated otherwise, the ‘coalition of the willing’, which initially consisted
of more than thirty countries (including the Netherlands), persisted in
defending the correctness of the invasion. This has not only damaged the
international standing in the rest of the world of these countries involved,
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it has also fed the anger of many Muslims (Pew Research Center 2004).
Along with this came the treatment of the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay
(Cuba) and the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Not only was this particularly
offensive to Muslims, but it was certainly also a violation of the spirit of
human rights incorporated in international treaties. All of this has further
increased the cynicism among Muslims about how seriously the West 
itself treats democracy and human rights. It does appear, however, that the
political damage on this score will be greater for the us than for the Euro-
pean Union. The division among European member states over whether 
to participate in the invasion of Iraq has also had as a partial consequence
that ‘the’ West is now seen less as a unified quantity in the Muslim world
(Joffé 2005). 
All these events underscore the extent to which the world finds itself in a
negative spiral. ‘Security’ has become a top priority in the international
and national politics of many countries. In the West suspicion against
Muslims has grown. It would, however, be incorrect to define this escala-
tion exclusively in terms of the ‘West’ versus ‘Muslims’ or ‘Islam’. The war
in Iraq has the characteristics of – again cast in religious terms – a civil war
between Sunnis and Shiites. But there are also tensions within these
Islamic religious denominations; indeed there is a ‘clash within’ (Aslan
2005). As Chapter 3 revealed, the radical Islamic movements also put pres-
sure on Muslims themselves – inside and outside Muslim countries – to
conform to the norms of ‘true’ Islam. Some radical movements are just as
violent towards what they consider to be apostasy among Muslims (takfir)
as they are towards Western non-believers (Jansen 2004). Terrorist attacks
occur regularly in Muslim countries; and attacks against Western targets
also result in many Muslim victims.
In The Future of Political Islam – a book published before the invasion of
Iraq – Graham Fuller described what a worst-case scenario would look like.
It would include a difficult to settle war against terrorism led by the us,
regular fresh attacks, growing animosity between and within population
groups, restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a ‘bunker America,’
and authoritarian states which would use the war on terrorism as an excuse
to intensify domestic repression. Actual developments in world politics, to
a large degree, match this scenario. The spiral effect predicted by Fuller has
had disastrous consequences not only for open Western societies. The
confrontations appeal above all to the violent and dogmatic side of Islamic
activism. This has condemned itself to a permanently joyless and negative
stance against the West and also against the mainstream of the Muslim
population, with an obsession about everything that is forbidden and
wrong (‘The Islam that says no’). With this nihilistic role it has deprived
itself of the chance to play a constructive and future-directed role with
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regard to the moral, social, and economic problems which confront many
Muslim countries (Fuller 2003: 194 and 211-2).
5.3 reference points
5.3.1 introduction
The world political situation outlined here offers little to indicate a quick,
substantial improvement. The existing spiral of action and reaction cannot
easily be reversed, either with respect to the international political or local
motives behind terrorism. The reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq is
encountering great resistance, and an end to the violence appears to be still
a long way off. The chronic Middle East conflict also remains for the time
being an important breeding-ground for extremism on both sides and a
divisive issue for relations between the Muslim world and the West.
Nevertheless, the characteristics and dynamics of Islamic activism itself
over the past thirty years that were analyzed in this report, show that there
are also positive developments. There exists a great diversity of activist
orientations, not only in the field of Islamic political thought but also of
Islamic political activism and Islamic law. Furthermore, developments in
the past decades reveal reference points for a gradual rapprochement with
concepts of democracy and human rights. The findings for each of the three
areas will be briefly elucidated below.
5.3.2 isl amic political thought
In Chapter 2 it was found that many of the current militant Islamic move-
ments derive their substantive inspiration from thinkers from the first half
of the previous century. They advocated new power of expression for Islam
in public life. In addition, they strongly opposed religious traditionalism,
the passive submission to God (quietism) and the dominance of the West
or Western ideas in the Muslim world. They also turned against the
monopoly of religions scholars over the interpretation of the Quran and
the Sunna. The utopia of Islam’s founding years served as the principal
source of inspiration for their vision of the role of Islam in public life. The
literal text of the Quran and Sunna served as their guideline for pursuing
an Islamization of society and/or the state, from below or above, by evolu-
tion or revolution. They rejected concepts developed in the West that were
important in state-formation, such as the separation of church and state,
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, as conflicting with Islamic
principles and the supremacy of Islamic law. The mobilization these
thinkers had envisioned, has materialized; their beliefs have determined
the image of Islamic activism in the West. 
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This explains in part why little attention is paid to other reform thinkers
who, also since early in the previous century, opposed the reigning
dogmatic traditionalism and also those who wanted to strictly comply with
the letter of the Quran and the Sunna. These other reform thinkers are
looking rather to connect Islam with modernity. They also want to come to
new interpretations, but, unlike the above-mentioned category of reform-
ers, they do not leave the texts of the Quran and the Sunna undisturbed in
this effort. They believe that the meaning of the texts can only be under-
stood from the context in which they were produced. Accordingly, these
thinkers are concerned not with the letter of the text but with its spirit and
its expressive force for conditions other than those of its conception. By
recognizing the particular meaning of the historical context, a mental space
is developed for appreciating human innovations like democracy and
human rights. Some of the thinkers accept such innovations by grounding
them in Islamic concepts, such as shura (consultation). Others see democ-
racy and human rights as valuable products of human reason in themselves
that favorably relate to the intentions of the Quran; Bayat identifies this
tendency as post-Islamism (Bayat forthcoming). These two positions can
be designated as the ‘Islamizing of modernity’ and the ‘modernizing of
Islamic thinking,’ respectively. No matter how the relationship between
Islam and the principles of democracy and human rights is precisely
drawn, both positions imply a mutual rapprochement.
In Chapter 2 only a limited selection of these reformist thinkers was
presented. Nowadays thinkers with similar views can be found in many
Muslim countries. Their views are often controversial not only because
they are at odds with Islamic orthodoxy and the views of extremist move-
ments, but also because their advocacy of democracy and human rights is
seen as threatening by the mainly authoritarian regimes in the Muslim
world. Some of the thinkers discussed have had to flee their homeland. It is
noteworthy that this line of thinking has expanded greatly in Iran, the
cradle of the Islamic revolution. The quarter-century of experience with
theocracy has led many, including philosophers who previously supported
the Islamic revolution, to the conclusion that combining Islam with politi-
cal power has led not only to great oppression but also to corruption of the
religion itself. While these religious philosophers still try to reason out
democracy and human rights from Islam, there is meanwhile also a cate-
gory of secular intellectuals who base the desirability of these concepts on
purely humanistic grounds (Jahanbegloo 2006).
In most Muslim countries the actual political effect of these views is
unclear because this often occurs underground. But this is not to say that
they have no influence. Abdurrahman Wahid, a prominent representative,
even occupied the presidency of Indonesia for a time. In Iran these ideas
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resonate well among the large group of middle-class youth who are mostly
well-educated and collect and exchange reform ideas, in part thanks to the
Internet (Jahanbegloo 2005; Financial Times 2005). 
What is clear is that the sacred sources of Islam – the Quran and the Sunna
– can be read and interpreted in many ways. With the rise of Islamic
activism the conflict over the correct interpretation – that is, over ‘pure
Islam’ – has intensified significantly. In Muslim countries as well as among
Muslims in the West, the influence of ideas that tolerate no deviation from
a literal interpretation of the texts remains considerable, especially also
because militant means of pressure are brought to bear. But although it is
now not easy to concretely indicate the influence ‘aboveground’ of intellec-
tuals who wish to interpret the sacred texts in context, their ideas do
indeed have great potential relevance. It is true that changes in the religious
views of believers are not exclusively based on intellectual insights, but
also – and perhaps rather – are driven by actual changes in behavior (van
Bruinessen 2004). However, then, too, a need can arise at some point for
interpretations of Islam that are, for example, less rule-bound and more
spiritual in nature. So, too, where the establishment of a state and law are
concerned, changes in structure may precede changes in culture. The
contrasting examples of Turkey and Iran show that many different devel-
opments, for example in the areas of demography, education, and politics,
can bring about a situation where the relationship between Islam and
democracy and human rights quickly becomes relevant. This can also mean
that more and more groups will absorb themselves into alternative theo-
logical ideas and interpretations that see no barrier (any more) between
Islam and democracy and human rights. In short: changes in the context
often lead to a need for different interpretations of the text. These other
interpretations are already available in many countries.
5.3.3 isl amic political movements 
Chapter 3 presented the dynamics of Islamic political movements since
the 1970s. In many Muslim countries, Islam has functioned for a consid-
erable time as a vehicle for the just demands of segments of the popula-
tion. Islamic political movements therefore form a potential political
force with considerable grassroots support. At the same time, we saw that
‘the’ Islamic political movement does not exist. Unlike what many in the
West suppose and also what many authoritarian regimes in the Muslim
world still want us to believe, political movements do not constitute a
homogeneous, immutably fundamentalist and/or violent threat. A threat
does, of course, arise from transnational terrorism that in various estab-
lished and casual groupings concentrates on jihadist actions. In addition,
however, there exist within Muslim countries countless movements and
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coalitions, with as many aspirations, that are influenced by the local polit-
ical context and the local options available. Those movements most
oriented to the political arena have shifted furthest in the direction of
democratic principles and norms. They also usually declare themselves in
favor of versions of Islamic legislation that are more suited to modern
society (icg 2005: 7).
Since the end of the 1990s, many of the leading early revolutionary activists
have opted for a more constructive political position within the constitu-
tional limits of the national state. Instead of striving to replace the often
secular national state, violently if necessary, with an (Ummah-wide)
Islamic state, they now aim at reform through participation in the regular
political system and take part in elections. They have not undergone any
fundamental process of enlightenment or reformation, nor do they gener-
ally have any well-thought-out theological or ideological foundation for a
reconciliation of Islam, with democracy and human rights. Above all, they
draw on a sizeable stock of political pragmatism (Nasr 2005: 15). To acquire
functional political influence and to operate effectively, they have to be
undogmatic, adapt themselves to the political rules, form coalitions and
also formulate political programs. By doing so, they distance themselves
from absolute truths and undefined forms of ‘opposition Islam’ that appeal
mainly to radicals and extremists. Moreover, they become acquainted with
the positive effects of democratic principles and human rights in the fight
against state oppression, arbitrariness, lawlessness, and marginalization.
Precisely because they are so close to the ordinary people, they employ a
religious, often conservative, discourse. But that also gives them a legiti-
mate basis to be able to hammer away at justice, economic development,
fighting corruption, protecting ordinary people, and social emancipation
within the political arena. 
In this rapprochement with concepts of democracy and human rights lie
favorable reference points for practical application. Thus Turkey, for exam-
ple, thanks in part to the ambitions of the Islamic-inspired akp, has started
down the path of further democratization, strengthening the constitu-
tional state, and eu-membership (see box 5.1). 
Box 5.1 The Turkish akp
In 2001 the Turkish akp was founded by a newer guard of Islamic activists who, for prag-
matic and ideological reasons, had resigned from a previous religious party that had been
banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Unlike their predecessors, they presented
themselves from an electoral standpoint as leaders of a broad conservative party that
combined respect for Islamic norms and values with an agenda promoting further demo-
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cratization and the advancement of human rights. But few at that time would have suspec-
ted that precisely an akp-government would so energetically act to strengthen Turkish
democracy and human rights and, partly thanks to the leverage of eu conditionality,
would be in a position to gradually weaken the dominant role of the military in politics.
The Turkish example also shows that despite many external pressure, incentives, and
rewards, it was ultimately the endogenous political and social forces behind democratiza-
tion that were decisive. However, it also reveals that the eu, thanks to its constructive
engagement, can sometimes in a pragmatic and flexible way, take advantage of develop-
ment opportunities that arise in this internal field of influence (wrr 2004).
Other countries exhibit similar endogenous reform processes. Successive
rounds of elections in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh have prompted
religious political parties to adopt less exclusive and more pragmatic posi-
tions. Similar developments can be observed in Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait,
and Yemen, where Islamic parties can take part in politics under certain
conditions. Consequently, non-religious parties in turn have taken more
heed of the voters’ wishes to see political programs reflect religious values.
The result of these shifts is increasing competition for the large group of
voters in the middle of the political spectrum, which leads to further
moderation and readiness to compromise. The political agenda and politi-
cal behavior of Islamic parties in these countries also serve as examples 
for movements in neighboring countries and other regions of the Muslim
world. Even in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where religious political
parties and movements have no access to the political arena, the example 
of the Turkish akp also serves as a source of inspiration for pragmatism,
moderation, and the gradual appropriation of democratic and constitu-
tional concepts (see Chapter 3).
5.3.4 isl amic l aw
In Chapter 4 it emerged first and foremost that the concept of Sharia has
different meanings. It can be an indication of the abstract Plan of God for
the community of believers; it can refer to the elaboration of this plan by
the early religious scholars in a corpus of rules of behavior (classical Sharia),
or it can concern current interpretations of Sharia by states, institutions,
and groups. Also when we look at current formal law based on Sharia, it
appears that we cannot speak of a fixed body of rules that are valid for all
Muslims. There are great differences between countries regarding both
Sharia-based legal rules in themselves and in their practical application.
Moreover, in most Muslim countries the Islamization of law since the
1970s has had a limited scope. In many of these, Sharia plays little or no
role in the majority of legal areas, and there is thus a de facto separation of
religion and state. In addition, the first wave of Islamization has not (yet)
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been followed by a second; rather, the last fifteen years have witnessed a
decline in the influence of, at least, classical Sharia on national law.
Extreme Islamization, that is, the introduction of this classical Sharia,
including Islamic criminal law, has taken place in only a limited number of
countries such as Iran, Afghanistan under the Taliban, for a time in
Pakistan and Sudan, and in a number of Nigerian states. Classical Sharia
has always been the law of Saudi Arabia. Even in some of these countries,
the more severe aspects of Sharia seem to have gradually made way for
more pragmatic applications. 
In most other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nigeria, and Mali, the Islamization of law has a more moderate
character (see Chapter 4). In these countries Sharia has received constitu-
tional recognition as ‘source of legislation’ and/or serves as codified law in
a few specific legal areas. Where Sharia has acquired a place in the constitu-
tion, there is often a situation of constitutional dualism or mixed legal
systems in which secular law is also valid as a source of law. Otherwise, the
countries in this category also show among themselves great variation in
their degree of orientation towards classical Sharia. In present-day Pakistan
and Afghanistan, the orientation is much stronger than in countries like
Egypt, Morocco, and Malaysia, where the constitutional role of Sharia is
more abstract and symbolic, not to mention in the secular republic of Mali.
Finally, in Turkey, Sharia long ago been completely removed from the legal
system. Also where Sharia functions constitutionally as a source of legisla-
tion or is applied in concrete areas of law, it appears that this does not block
modern interpretations as such. This applies, for example, in the area of
family law. Although this concerns a key area of Islamic law, in most coun-
tries there is nonetheless a gradual improvement of the legal position of
women. For most of the countries researched here, it holds that, over the
long term, a progressive incorporation into the state and a professionaliza-
tion of national law have occurred, even in those areas of law which are
based on Sharia. The process of incorporation into the state can work in
two ways, though. It can serve as a counterweight against extreme Sharia-
ization, as in Egypt, for example, thanks to the complementary legislation
and buffers in the legal system. However, it can also mean that Sharia is
hijacked by the ruling powers for their own say, nationalistic, purposes, as
was the case in Sudan and also in Pakistan for a time. Even if the state sets
itself up as guardian of Islam ‘to prevent worse’, this often implies prefer-
ential treatment for orthodox views and forces. State Islam then forms a
buffer not only against extreme Sharia but also against modernizing, pro-
democratic ideas. 
Chapter 4 also showed that a process of reconciliation is taking place
between the concept of universal human rights and that of Islamic human
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rights. After an initially theologically motivated rejection of the concept
of human rights as such, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (oic)
developed the concept of Islamic human rights. The idea of human rights
to be respected by governments has thus been accepted and is usually
constitutionally entrenched. But this Islamic conception of human rights is
certainly not identical to the universal version. On the level of several indi-
vidual human rights there sometimes exist significant differences, on
paper as well as in actual practice. There are important hindrances to
further reconciliation, such as discrimination against women and non-
Muslims, absence of freedom of religion, and inhumane punishments.
Many Muslim countries are signatories to the un human rights treaties and
have sometimes stipulated reservations to these treaties on the grounds of
Sharia. In the treaty bodies, the areas of conflict are regularly reviewed crit-
ically with regard to each country. It is striking that since the 1990s Muslim
countries are increasingly abandoning their objections of principle towards
the human rights standards of these treaties. Unmistakably, then, there is a
gradual movement toward legal recognition and implementation, even if
this happens by way of appropriation, namely through placing the relevant
laws or their interpretation in an Islamic framework (Halliday 2003). It
seems, in fact, as if the acceptance of human rights is promoted precisely
when they are placed under the banner of Sharia (Roy 2005). 
In short, rapprochement is taking place, but it is a ‘contingent’ process. In
addition, its course is sensitive to external and internal events and develop-
ments in power relations, as the recent elections in Iran again demonstrate.
Whether in the long run rapprochement will result in convergence is
therefore difficult to predict; nor can it be excluded that over some issues
differences based on principle will continue to exist. However, when and
where concrete windows of opportunity arise, the Netherlands and Europe
should have a strategic policy at their disposal that could capitalize on
them. That requires a pro-active approach that not only looks at the status
quo and short-term problems and risks, but also searches for long-term
opportunities.
5.4 constructive engagement with the muslim
world
5.4.1 the need for new initiatives
The tensions between the West and the Muslim world should not distract
us from hopeful developments. In several countries of the Middle East, 
like Lebanon and Egypt, the people themselves have taken public actions
aimed at democratization. Many even observe a new democratizing
momentum that also puts pressure on heavily authoritarian regimes
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(Emerson et al. 2005: 2; Rabasa et al. 2005; Roy 2005c). Terrorist attacks 
in the name of Islam also lead to increasingly stronger condemnation by
Muslims themselves; to the extent that the objective of such attacks has
been to mobilize Muslims en masse, they have been anything but a great
success (Kepel 2004). Attacks by or in the spirit of Al-Qaeda can only
flourish in the longer run if they can count on the sympathy of a substantial
segment of the Muslim population. However, according to a study by the
Pew Research Center, support for Al-Qaeda is declining among Muslims,
especially in countries where attacks have been carried out (Pew Research
Center 2005). Leading Muslims in the West are publicly distancing them-
selves from Al-Qaeda in increasingly unambiguous terms. To the extent
that the means – attacks on the innocent – are more emphatically rejected
by the major part of the Muslim population, terrorism becomes more
isolated and thus ultimately could dry up. Mirrorwise, something similar
applies. Among the population in the West, recognition has grown that
democracy and human rights cannot be exported to the rest of the world by
military means. Certainly many citizens in Western Europe opposed the
invasion of Iraq, and – just as in the us – they were ashamed of the
disgraceful treatment of prisoners in Iraq and other places. This suggests
there may emerge a climate of receptivity for initiatives that in the longer
run can break the spiral of violence. 
For the time being, there are no political windows of opportunity for
resolving current large-scale conflicts. But certainly the member states of
the eu, with Muslim states in their immediate vicinity and many Muslims
among their own populations, cannot permit a continuation or intensifica-
tion of the violence and persist in standing aloof. Relations with and within
the Muslim world have become a crucial factor for international stability
and the rule of law as well as for the internal stability and rule of law within
eu member states (Otto 2006). The open nature of European societies
makes them vulnerable to new terrorist activities, which will further
heighten the already tense relations between population groups. Thus,
maintaining the status quo with regard to relations with the Muslim world
is not an option. The stage for this has passed, not only because this situa-
tion itself has already created too much tension, but also because the inter-
nal dynamics will further increase domestic tensions within Muslim coun-
tries. In almost all of these countries at least 40 per cent of the population
is under the age of 25; by 2025, the size of their populations will have
increased by about 30 per cent. For these reasons alone, there will be more
pressure in the coming years on the existing economic, social, and educa-
tional services, which are already partly supplied by Islamic organizations
(Rabasa et al. 2005: 63).
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It would be equally ill-adviced, therefore, to bring relations with these
countries to a lower level of involvement. A Union turned in on itself that
abandons external ambitions creates only an illusion of security (‘Fortress
Europe’) that does not remove its existing vulnerability. The web of mutu-
ally dependent relationships can no longer be denied or averted. Moreover,
remaining aloof means that the eu leaves opportunities unused that do
actually exist for supporting promising developments in the Muslim world.
In short, the wrr advocates an active and, above all, constructive stance 
by the Netherlands and the eu member states towards the reduction of
tensions with and within the Muslim world concerning issues of Islamic
activism, and towards improving the relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims within Europe.
5.4.2 principles for constructive engagement 
The wrr believes that the diversity and dynamism of Islamic political
thinking, Islamic political movements, and Islamic law discussed above
provide important reference points for a European and Dutch policy of
constructive engagement. That policy should be based on a set of coherent
general principles that will be discussed below: 
• taking into account the diversity of Islamic activism; 
• recognizing Islamic activism as a potentially constructive political and
legal factor in the development of Muslim countries; 
• engaging with endogenous development processes and trajectories that
promote democracy and human rights;
• investing in an informed public opinion in Europe on Islamic activism
and on the main European and Dutch policies in this area.
Taking into account the diversity of  Islamic activism
One of the observations of this report is that generalizations about Islamic
activism have very limited value. Both within and between Muslim coun-
tries, there are great differences in views on what a state and society based
on Islamic principles should look like, just as there are also many different
interpretations of how Islam relates to politics, democracy, and human
rights. The Islamization of recent decades in itself does not present any
definitive obstacle to democratization and respect for human rights. More-
over, in a number of countries it is precisely under the banner of Islam that
space has been created for rapprochement with these principles. What is at
issue, is the nature and the direction of Islamization. To the familiar ques-
tion of whether Islam and democracy are compatible or not, one cannot
simply answer that Islam in and of itself is either for or against democracy
or that Islamic legislation in and of itself is at odds with human rights. The
answer is: according to some ideas and/or practices of Islam or Sharia, it is
not, and according to others, it is. Furthermore, there is not only a great
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variation according to interpretation and place but also according to time.
Today’s Islamic activism has different characteristics than that of the 1970s
and 1980s; in many countries Islamic movements that initially took a posi-
tion against democracy and human rights now have many fewer objec-
tions. Perceptions about ‘Islam’ as a monolithic and static concept thus
deny the great variety and dynamism of opinions and practices; they
directly contribute to a socially distorted image of ‘the’ Muslim. Therefore
it is essential in relations with Muslim countries to exercise subtlety and
distinction with respect to Islamic activism.
Recognizing Islamic activism as a potentially constructive political
and legal  factor in the development of Muslim countries
Paradoxically, this need for subtlety also means that we should be aware
that a purely religious perspective can also distort our view of Muslim
countries and Muslims in general. Too often reprehensible phenomena
involving Muslim countries or Muslims are automatically attributed to reli-
gion. The casual use of the adjective ‘Islamic’ also invites inaccurate gener-
alizations in terms of characteristics inherent to Islam. The diversity and
dynamism within the Muslim world mean that ‘Islam’ cannot be qualified
or disqualified in general terms. Thanks to this recognition, space can
emerge for the development of constructive relations directed at the
promotion of democracy and human rights. Conceptually as well as in
practice, rapprochement with democratic principles and norms and with
international human rights standards is occurring in many places. That in
many Muslim countries Islam serves as the vehicle for such reforms is not
remarkable in itself, it had been (and in some countries remains) excluded
from political and public life. In autocratically ruled Muslim countries, it is
precisely Islamic political movements that represent important opposi-
tional forces that expose abuses and advocate reform.
Democracy and law need to emerge primarily from within and cannot
permanently be imposed from outside. If constructive Islamic forces pres-
ent themselves in Muslim countries, taking democracy seriously demands
that these forces be permitted political articulation. In the past, the eu’s
advocacy of democratization in Muslim countries had mostly secular
movements and parties in mind. There was considerable fear that the
admission of Islamic forces into the political system would open the door
for parties that, once elected, would subsequently destroy the existing
democratic system (the scenario of one man, one vote, one time). Given the
absolutist claims of many Islamic movements in the early period of Islamic
activism, there was every reason for this caution. The eu’s fear was also fed
by authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries that saw Islamic activism as a
direct threat to their own positions of power. However, the wrr believes
that the ensuing developments described in this report both illustrate the
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possibility and the desirability to employ an inclusive understanding of
democracy that no longer automatically excludes Islamic movements from
the political system. These developments also showed that calls for imple-
menting Sharia are by no means always at odds with human rights, and are
not seldom a reaction against extreme arbitrariness, corruption, etc.
Engaging with endogenous development processes and trajectories
that promote democracy and human rights
The previous position of the eu on Islamic movements illustrates the
tendency in the West to assume the ‘power of definition’ when it comes to
democracy and human rights. However, the desire to model Muslim coun-
tries to fit a Western template is counterproductive. First, it ignores the
many contextually determined differences among Western countries
themselves in the manner in which they have implemented democracy and
human rights, and thus also the importance of context and dynamics in the
Muslim countries concerned. Second, it shows insufficient sensitivity for
the enormous aversion that these countries have built up against external
interference by the West. If one takes the right of self-determination of
Muslim countries seriously, therefore, one has to influence without
preaching or domination. Yet this does not require Western countries to 
to belittle their own values. It means that endogenous steps towards
democracy and human rights should be encouraged, whereas steps away
from these aims should be discouraged. The eu will have to accept in prin-
ciple that within an Islamic frame of reference democracy and human
rights will sometimes or temporarily come in different shapes and forms
than are customary in Western countries. This implies a constant naviga-
tion between influencing and interfering and between endogenous frames
of references and those considered to be universal or Western. What
consequences this has for relationships with the eu (or its member states)
is still uncertain. It definitely cannot be excluded that subtle advocacy for a
process of inclusive democratization that extends to Islamic parties will
meet with great resistance on the part of the governments concerned and
will initially also harm European prestige. However, the reverse is also
possible. In the case of Turkey, European pressure in favor of democratiza-
tion and respect for religious freedom ultimately in the longer term surely
contributed to a pro-accession sentiment among Islamic movements and
parties (wrr 2004).
The topic of human rights is the prime example of a subject full of pitfalls
and traps; human rights are, after all, in a un connection defined as univer-
sal rights and freedoms. But even though they are established in interna-
tional treaties, they must primarily be brought into application in national
law and by national judges. Despite all the incentives and control mecha-
nisms, they can only go beyond the level of rights on paper when they can
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boast internal legitimacy, in other words, when they are viewed as ‘one’s
own law.’ As was shown in Chapter 4, in a number of countries, however,
this ‘own law’ is based on Sharia, and it is precisely because of its highly
symbolic value that it is not realistic to expect religiously based human
rights soon to be replaced by secular human rights. Therefore the eu
cannot avoid taking a stand on Islamic human rights.
The dilemmas involved are well illustrated by a 2002 conversation
between the German philosopher of law Heiner Bielefeldt and the Iranian
scholar of Islam Mohammed Saeed Bahmanpour. Bielefeldt asked what
precisely was meant by ‘Islamic’ human rights and all the reservations
placed on international human rights treaties on the basis of Sharia. Does it
involve a construct to undermine un standards, or is it actually an attempt
to come to a reconciliation with universal human rights from an Islamic
perspective? In short: does it involve an undermining or a confirmation of
the universality of human rights? Bahmanpour endorsed the latter in prin-
ciple but did not exclude endogenous interpretations. In his view, the
Western world must abandon the presumption of being able to control the
pace of change in the Muslim world. Muslim countries must be allowed to
resolve these issues themselves and be given time to do so. If changes are
imposed from outside, there is a great chance of window dressing or a
strengthening of dogmatic positions. After all, today, many Muslims
simply want to live according to Islamic values; this reality cannot be
denied, according to Bahmanpour (Bielefeldt and Bahmanpour 2002).
Bahmanpour emphasizes an aspect that is also crucial for the position of eu
member states confronting Muslim countries on the issue of human rights,
namely to pay attention to the endogenous dynamics within these coun-
tries. Muslim countries in many respects fail to satisfy the current interna-
tional standards with regard to human rights. In this respect they are not all
that different from many (other) developing countries. But then it becomes
all the more important whether they want to try to improve these stan-
dards. Serious reforms in the direction of international standards thus
deserve support, even if they occur under the banner of Sharia and in the
terms of an Islamic discourse. Concepts such as ‘inclusive universality’ and
‘universalizing universal human rights’ express this effort (Brems 2003;
Otto 2006; Baderin 2003). They convey that human rights are not the privi-
lege of a limited number of countries but affect the dignity and welfare 
of everyone. These rights must therefore also be realized for everyone. 
Precisely because international law primarily acquires its force through
national law, the eu must recognize that the legitimizing power of Sharia 
in Muslim countries can be used to realize international human rights. 
A universalism that denies that Islamic principles represent a normative
value in the debate on human rights, would be dubious (Baderin 2003). 
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In most Muslim countries, progressive realization of human rights, for
example in the areas of the position of women, freedom of religion, and
criminal law, is simply easier to accept if these laws can be seen as parts of 
or related to their own traditions and cultures. From the perspective of a
constructive engagement, it is therefore all the more important that the 
eu recognize and support a positive, development-directed application 
of Sharia (Otto 2006). 
The engagement advocated here must thus take into account the local 
context and the fact that permanent improvements cannot be imposed and
sometimes take a long time. This should not, however, result in downplay-
ing one’s own values or in the rejecting every critical judgment of other val-
ues. It does imply that instead of always judging Muslim countries on their
‘shortcomings,’ more attention needs to be paid to the direction of the
changes in these countries. If this direction becomes the subject of judgment,
then the discussion is about something other than the actual, suboptimal sit-
uation at a particular moment. What then stands to be judged is the demon-
strated seriousness of a country’s dedication, the degree to which it invests in
the advancement of human rights and informs its population on this issue,
the durability of its efforts over time, etc. In this respect, the eu member
states must be prepared to address the shortcomings in these countries, such
as in the case of changes that amount to nothing more than window dressing.
Thus, such an approach does not relieve member states from the obligation
to expose serious human rights violations committed in the name of Sharia.
Otto uses the term ‘destructive Sharia politics’ for politics that uses the sym-
bols and values of Sharia primarily directed to exercise of power and repres-
sion rather than to promote development and tolerance (Otto 2006). Many
rulers would all too happily be inclined to legitimize their repression by call-
ing upon Islam or Sharia. There is, however, no reason for the eu not to judge
human rights violations justified on the grounds of religion any less harshly
than other violations. 
Does the goal of ‘universalizing universal human rights’ mean that even-
tually Islamic human rights will completely correspond with universal
human rights? It is difficult to assess the practical possibilities for conver-
gence; time will tell. In the current situation, an answer is of little practical
importance because the area of common ground is sufficiently large to
formulate common tasks for improvement. Some even argue that there
exists overwhelming agreement with respect to human rights norms as
such (aiv 1998). This is also underscored by the fact that most of the
Muslim countries are party to the various human rights treaties. 
Whereas human rights norms are thus broadly shared, their concrete
implementation is a different case. Here the local context becomes a factor
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which has also provided a reason for granting states a certain policy free-
dom. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has
developed a so-called doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ as a frame for
judicial review. This allows the Court to do justice to the different ideas
among state-parties on the definitions, for example, of a concept like ‘good
moral standards’. This doctrine may also have significance for the global
political arena, given that some human rights do not allow for any policy
freedom and that, where they do so, the final judgment does not belong to
the state concerned but to an international forum (aiv 1998). In the case 
of human rights, the authorized un committees fulfill this function. It is
partly through their influence that reservations to the implementation of
human rights laws that are made on the grounds of Sharia, have become
less important. 
Nevertheless, important areas of conflict between Islamic and universal
human rights remain; these issues provoke much discussion in Muslim
countries as well. In Chapter 4 we mentioned Baderin’s research on
jurisprudence in those areas of law in which at present the greatest differ-
ences exist between universal and Islamic human rights. It appeared that
Islamic jurisprudence displays great differences among schools of law, but
also that – even when it concerns precepts from the Quran – rulings are
possible that, not in their reasoning but in their outcome, are close to the
intention or implementation in the framework of the international treaties
(Baderin 2003). This also offers the possibility that in Muslim countries
where Sharia operates to any extent, Islamic jurisprudence in highly
controversial areas can shift towards international standards. The eu
obviously has no authority to judge interpretations of Sharia; this is 
pre-eminently a matter for the Muslim world itself. As Baderin suggests,
the moral and religious principles in Muslim countries where Sharia serves
as state law, will remain recognizable. 
Given these diverse interpretations, the question arises whether it is possi-
ble to promote a mutual endogenous dynamic towards legal implementa-
tions that will be closer to international standards. Legal development is
not only the result of internal pressure within Muslim countries and exter-
nal pressure from multilateral institutions like the un, but also of mutual
discussions and comparison among Muslim countries themselves. It is
particularly over such charged issues as gender relations, freedom of reli-
gion, and cruel punishments that mutual learning processes can often be
more effective than external pressure that can be interpreted as paternalis-
tic, uninformed, or even inimical to ‘Islam’. 
The implication of a policy that takes into account the diversity,  dynamism, 
and local context of Islamic activism is that one cannot provide an unam-
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biguous sequence or general policy prescription for such a transformati0n 
process, as for example, Fareed Zakaria does. Zakaria opposes the tendency
to give priority to democratization. In his view, analogous to the path of
development in Europe, economic liberalism supported by the rule of law
should come as a necessary first. In the long run, this may result in a
democratization process supported by the middle class (Zakaria 2003). The
analyses in this report, however, point rather in the direction of a combina-
tion of democratic, constitutional, and economic reforms that is sensitive
to contexts and fits in with the endogenous development opportunities of
individual countries. In countries under autocratic rule it is conceivable
that the restoration of human rights and constitutionalism deserve prior-
ity, but also that first a gradual expansion of political participation is
sought. Often, completely postponing political reforms for the sake of
economic growth is no longer a realistic option. Thanks to the media,
migration, and higher education, more and more groups have become
acquainted with democratic ideals. They are demanding a voice in politics
and government now, even if the economic conditions for lasting democ-
racy are far from favorable (Carothers 2003). In the Arab context, for exam-
ple, the anger over earlier failed economic experiments and the Middle 
East conflict are already too great to legitimize further postponement of
political change (undp 2005: 162). In this region, authoritarian rule not
only accompanies human rights violations but also economic failures by 
an entrenched, corrupt elite. It is thus no accident that of all the regions
researched in the world, it is precisely the populations of the Arab coun-
tries that give the most support to the proposition that ‘democracy is better
than any other form of government’ (undp 2005: 68). This explains why
the authors of the Arab Human Development Report 2004 reject attempts
to maintain the political status quo and regard the postponement of
democratization as a ‘disaster scenario’ (undp 2005: 164). It means that
general prescriptions, while normally attractive for policy-makers, do not
suffice. Instead, there is a need for a more complex policy that differenti-
ates according to place and time. 
Investing in an informed public opinion in Europe on Islamic
activism and on the main European and Dutch policies in this area
In line with the theme of this report, the discussion below explores poli-
cies towards Muslim countries. Such external policies, however, are also
connected to Europe’s internal affairs. If Europe tries to take account of
constructive forces within Islamic activism in its external relations, then
this should also be made visible within Europe itself, on the level of
member states. Recent experiences with the Constitutional Treaty have
shown that foreign policy cannot neglect domestic opinion with impunity.
Moreover, a better insight among the public into developments and exter-
nal policies concerning Islamic activism can also lessen the tensions
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between Muslims and non-Muslims within eu member states. Therefore it
is important that member states also invest in making their own societies
aware of the diversity and dynamism of Islamic activism and of the main
policy principles underlying this. Given that this is primarily a national and
local task, the wrr returns to this theme in section 5.6, which focuses on
Islamic activism in the Netherlands.
The general policy perspective formulated here will certainly not remove
all the causes for the existing resentments that Muslims feel towards the
West. As it was explained in Chapter 1, these resentments have many
dimensions, including the colonial past, the recent armed conflicts, and the
stagnating economic and political development in many Muslim states.
These facts obviously cannot be reversed. Now the effort must be to start a
process of constructive mutual engagement by which hostile images will
gradually lose force and positive developments will be promoted. If the eu
in its relations with Muslim countries follows the reference points outlined
here, it will also meet with resistance. The exclusion of Islamic movements
has already caused considerable tensions in these countries themselves.
The changes advocated here require, by their nature, much time and
patience and, of course, must be brought about by the countries concerned
(Haass 2005). They are, however, certainly not unresponsive to the posi-
tion that the eu adopts in this regard.
5.5 european and bilateral policy options for
constructive engagement
5.5.1 introduction
The Netherlands has at its disposal various European and bilateral channels
through which it can shape a policy of constructive engagement. This
section explores the most important of these. On a European level these
concern proposals dealing, firstly, with Europe’s direct relations with
Muslim countries in its immediate neighborhood, i.e. through its Mediter-
ranean partner countries of the Euro-Mediterranean policy (emp), Turkey,
the Gulf States, and Iran. Second, it involves proposals in which the eu
plays an active role in the framework of the un and the oic. Third, it
concerns the discussion on the development of a European Islam. With
this theme we examine the recent debate on the possibility and desirability
of a specific European variant of Islam. According to many, this could exert
a moderating influence on those Muslim countries where the supposed
opposition between ‘Islam’ and democracy is at stake. 
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5.5.2 the euro -mediterr anean polic y and the european 
neighborhood polic y
By far the most important eu policy instrument to shape relations with
Muslim countries concerns the emp, also known in bureaucratic jargon as
the Barcelona process (see appendix 4). Therefore we will go into this in
some detail. This policy, which began about ten years ago, is, however,
very technocratic in nature. It meets with little interest on the higher 
political levels and is thus little-known among the populations of the
member states. What possibilities do the emp and the connected, more
recent, European Neighborhood Policy (enp) offer for greater constructive
engagement? Before we answer this question, it is worthwhile to first 
look at the principal assumptions that form the basis for the original emp.
These still continue to work in dealings with Islamic activism and the
discourse on Islamic democracy and human rights.
The emp was created in a burst of optimism in the wake of the 1993 Oslo
accords on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The intention of the emp’s charter
on political and security cooperation was to settle the peace relations
among the Arab world, Israel, and the eu. But there was also worry about
Islamic activism. With the rise of the fis and the civil war in Algeria still
fresh in memory, the framers of the Barcelona declaration (1995) associated
Islamic activism chiefly with fundamentalist, violent movements that
would seriously undermine stability in the region (Euromesco 2005a). 
The scenario of one man, one vote, one time dominated the risk analyses 
of the policy-makers concerned. By the time the Barcelona declaration was
finally ratified, the political landscape had radically changed once again.2
The desire to use the emp in part to contain Islamic activism, however,
remained (Aliboni 2004a).
In its original form the emp rested on the assumption that mutually
improved market access in combination with foreign direct investment and
eu contributions to good government could set in motion a process of
economic growth that ultimately would also lead to a stronger rule of law,
political liberalization, democratization, and improved human rights. This
would involve processes that must get their impulse from the bottom up
via technical support, education and, last but not least, via contact with
civil society organizations (Youngs 2004c). The idea behind the support for
these organizations is that, in the course of time, they are going to form an
important democratic force against the state and spur democratic reforms
(nimd 2005: 18; Roy 2005; Ottoway and Carothers 2005).
In practice, however, these starting points were reduced to an extremely
cautious agenda. Southern members of the eu, such as Spain, Portugal,
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Italy, and Greece, and recently also the Netherlands, are seeking to control
immigration and to strengthen the security and stability of Europe’s
southern border. Others, especially West European and northern member
states, emphasize that economic concessions from the Union must ulti-
mately result in concrete improvements of human rights, while the partner
countries themselves seem almost exclusively interested in Barcelona’s
economic agenda. They consider more intensive economic ties with the eu
a useful buffer against the pressures of international competition. More-
over, they hope that economic reforms will ultimately take the wind out of
the sails of Islamic activists. In the meantime, mutual irritations have
arisen. The partner countries reproach the eu member states for an overly
passive and sympathetic attitude toward Israel. External pressure from the
eu aimed at improving democracy and human rights meets with resistance
and drives the domestic political opposition again into the arms of the
governing elites (Aliboni 2004a). On the other hand, the eu suspects that
the regimes in these countries take advantage of the Middle East conflict
and the widespread fear of religious terrorism to legitimize their own
authoritarian behavior (Biscop 2005: 11).
Evaluations of the first ten years of the emp endorse the view that the
policy has contributed too little to economic reforms, democratization,
and human rights in the region (Euromesco 2005a; Youngs 2004c; Joffé
2005; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2004 and 2005a).3 Mutual under-
standing and contacts have increased, and the notion of a ‘dialogue among
cultures’ is eagerly embraced, but the policy to date lacks effectiveness and
credibility. Where openings for political or economic reforms already
existed, as in Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia, the contribution of
the Barcelona process was limited. Furthermore, in the aftermath of 9/11,
the intervention in Iraq, and the recent bombings, the eu has placed
increasing attention on combating terrorism. As a result, conducting a
balanced policy which fights against terrorism and promotes human rights
is becoming ever more difficult (Youngs 2005: 8-9; Joffé 2005: 17).4 The
conservatism and survival instinct of political elites in the partner coun-
tries and the understandable European preference for gradual, endoge-
nously induced reforms and for positive incentives instead of sanctions,
have led to support for the political status quo in the region.5 Contacts with
partner countries, apart from those with the governing elites, take place
chiefly with secular opposition groups, Western-oriented ngos, and so-
called civil society organizations that are officially approved and financed
by the state. But these are precisely the groups that usually turn out to play
a marginal role in political and social relations (Perthes 2004: 27; Hamzawy
2005; Menendez Gonzalez 2005). By a clever combination of repression,
patronage, and co-optation the political opposition is sidelined or ‘bought
off’ (see Chapter 3). Many ‘official’ ngos, such as community service
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organizations, unions, and chambers of commerce have close economic
and personal ties with policy-makers, which they do not wish to jeopard-
ize. Arab regimes, especially, have become masters in ‘playing’ with civil
society organizations. They themselves finance ngos that regularly organ-
ize large, much-discussed, international and national conferences with
intellectuals from civil society, with themes like women’s rights and
democratization. But the invited people do not speak in the name of any
grassroots support worth mentioning (Ottaway and Carothers 2005: 257;
nhc 2005: 35-36). Islamic inspired political movements, parties, and
organizations, which do mobilize the great mass of ordinary citizens
(including also women), have thus far not been involved in the Barcelona
process (Menendez Gonzalez 2005: 10; Emerson, Aydin et al. 2005: 21).
By now, there exists within the European Commission and among the
member states support for a renewed emp that introduces a link to the bilat-
eral policy of the enp. This means that the partnership (in an analogy with
the national adjustment programs in the former eu candidate member
states from Central and Eastern Europe) will also include specific national
obligations. Most of the partner countries are not negative at this prospect 
of a new approach. After all, reform-oriented countries like Morocco and
Lebanon look with some jealousy at the impressive transformation process
that the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe have under-
gone, partly through eu support. Although both the global strategy and the
set of instruments of the action plans still need further adaptation and preci-
sion, the foundations for the new process, formalized in November 2005,
are in any case sound.6 ‘Barcelona new style’ has dissociated itself from the
old assumption that economic reforms supply the key to democratization
(Euromesco 2005b).7 There is recognition that economic reforms do
demand political changes and yet do not necessarily lead to democratiza-
tion. Thus democracy and human rights have acquired higher political 
priority along with economic reforms and education.
At the same time, the enp system of bilateral Action plans offers greater
chance of achieving concrete results. The system offers the opportunity to
introduce a more forceful linking between political reform efforts and
positive incentives, such as improved access to the internal eu market,
financial aid, and loans. In this manner a better balance can be achieved
between multilateral cooperation and individual reform trajectories. The
range, the emphases, and the tempo of reforms no longer need to depend
on the least enthusiastic reformers among the partner countries. Moreover,
annual progress reports based on the specific benchmarks in the Action
plans can offer a better view of actual reforms being carried out. This
process can also stimulate mutual peer pressure and learning effects. Thus
it appeared that, during the parallel bilateral negotiation processes of the
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eu with Tunisia and Morocco in the framework of the national Action
plans, the two countries kept a close watch on each other; there arose a
process of constructive competition in which Tunisia, with better
economic accomplishments, and Morocco, more inclined to political
reform, unintentionally spurred each other on to higher levels of ambition,
including the institution of a national commission for human rights. In
short, new chances for success are now possible through the linking of the
new-style emp with the bilateral approach of enp. 
What is undoubtedly the most remarkable development is that the new
emp has abandoned the premise that the secular forces in the region are the
natural allies in the battle against Islamic activism and that ngos outside
the political arena always provide the most important impulses to democ-
ratization and the improvement of human rights. The European Commis-
sion now appears to be rallying around the advice of independent regional
experts and eu bureaucrats directly involved to be open to ties with all the
relevant democratic actors, including the Islamic political movements and
parties (Euromesco 2005a and 2005b; El-Din Shahin 2005: 4; Jones and
Emerson 2005: 21).8 The Commission has urged the participants in the
Barcelona process ‘to strive towards a common view regarding the chal-
lenges for democratization, including the role of democratic Islamic politi-
cal movements in national politics.’ (European Commission 2005: 4).
Apparently, the understanding has gradually come about that support for
processes that systematically exclude religious political activists from the
political system is at odds with a credible European role in the region. This
change of course forms an important condition for the constructive
engagement advocated in section 5.3.
Up until now it has not been clear, however, how fundamental this change
of course has been. The recent call by the European Commission for defin-
ing a standpoint on democratic Islamic parties had found little resonance
on the ministerial level of the eu member states themselves. Partner coun-
tries such as Egypt and Tunisia also fiercely resist the participation of reli-
gious parties in politics. Earlier official declarations on this subject have
had little impact. There is no unity either to be found among the embassies
of the eu member states in the region.9 Many diplomats and political repre-
sentatives of the member states still believe that allowing Islamic activists
into politics would ultimately bring to power all those fundamentalists and
extremists who want to put an end to political freedoms. In its recent call,
the Commission circumvents this dilemma by referring only to democratic
Islamic political movements and parties. But this, of course, does not
resolve the problem. Despite the growing moderation of mainstream
Islamic movements, there are also groups who eagerly want to compete for
political power, without as yet recognizing elementary democratic princi-
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ples. In addition, there are smaller, radicalized movements that do not
shun violence. Reality demands recognition that these movements can
exercise a disproportional influence and can obstruct the political system
for a long time. There is the additional problem that often the governments
in the partner countries do not look with favor on contacts with religious
or other non-recognized interlocutors. Overtures can lead to an initial
cooling of relations with these regimes. The eu must face up to such
dilemma’s if it wants to design a longer term strategy for the emp region.
Although the recent emp proposals thus place a high priority on democ-
racy and human rights and – however hesitantly – no longer exclude
Islamic parties, on the whole they do not refer to Islamic legislation and
Islamic interpretations of human rights. As discussed in section 5.3, in
many Muslim countries, however, there exists the desire to base (parts of)
the state and society, in some form or other, on Islamic norms and (legal)
foundations. Thus it is not in the least improbable that the political partici-
pation of Islamic parties – whether democratically disposed or not – will in
some Muslim countries be accompanied by the (re)introduction or accen-
tuation of Islamic law. That is a thorny problem for the eu. After all, the 
eu bases its strong emphasis on democracy, constitutionality, and human
rights on the secular law of the European Convention on Human Rights
and universal principles of human rights. In addition, it pays special atten-
tion to the rights of minorities and women, including the equality of men
and women. How should the eu deal with Islamic political groups that
distrust external meddling and are at the very least skeptical about Western
or European ideas of democracy and human rights?10 And what to do if a
democratically elected Islamic government tries to introduce an ‘Islamic’
democracy, an Islamic state, or Sharia? Can the Union still contribute to a
firmer rooting of international human rights treaties in such societies? 
The advocates of a renewed emp/enp need to recognize these dilemmas 
as well. 
In the long run, ignoring the political and legal agenda of religious activism
is no solution and can even be counterproductive. Olivier Roy is correct to
state: “The role of Shari’a is a political issue: to oppose or ignore Shari’a
from a purely technocratic point of view (it does not fit with human rights)
leads automatically to a return of Shari’a by opponents of western
encroachments” (Roy 2005: 1011). Not only does a negative attitude
discourage Islamic groups with large followings among the population
who are ready to work towards gradual change within the existing system.
But such an attitude also contributes to the widespread feeling among ordi-
nary citizens that secularism and (Western) democracy by definition
represent antireligious interests. This will only increase the demand for
Islamization, either because fundamentalists get more support from the
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people for their religious ideas or because political rulers themselves play
the ‘Islamization card’ to maintain political legitimacy (Roy 2005: 1003).
Many authoritarian regimes in the region cast themselves as buffers against
the exploitation of Islam for party interests but do not shrink from manip-
ulating official state Islam to maintain their own political power.11 This is
why sometimes the fundamentalist activists and at other times the conser-
vative religious ulama are rewarded, without these groups ever having to
take political responsibility for their standpoints. As a result, these soci-
eties lack social and political correction mechanisms to moderate these
radical and conservative reflexes.
How should the eu participants of the emp and enp deal with these dilem-
mas? The wrr believes that the first step is to recognize that Islamic politi-
cal and social groups can be potentially legitimate and credible political
interlocutors, who, therefore, should not be excluded in advance from the
emp and enp processes. This recognition must not only penetrate the
bureaucratic and diplomatic circuits of ‘Brussels’; eu governments need to
disseminate this line at the highest political levels and, through (parlia-
mentary) debates and discussions and other means, communicate this to
their own populations. In the current polarized climate they will thus send
an important signal to the Muslim world and to their own (Muslim) popu-
lations in Europe, namely that all political activists, including also reli-
giously inspired democratic groups, will be taken seriously as potential
allies in the pursuit of political participation, democratization, and
improvement of human rights. 
The European Commission’s call to reconsider the role of democratic reli-
gious movements and parties in national politics deserves forceful support
from the Dutch government and other member states. But such a reconsid-
eration needs to go further than only these parties. No matter how under-
standable the fear of the scenario of once-only democratic elections may
be, a reconsidered policy must not translate into the broadening of the
political dialogue to include only those movements and parties who in
advance pronounce themselves democratic. The process of democratization
has little chance as long as the Union and the emp partner countries
demand from political groupings a democratic political disposition as the
primary condition for constructive discussions or entrance into the politi-
cal arena, while the (semi)authoritarian regimes in the partner countries
themselves continue to manipulate in undemocratic ways the rules for
admission into the political arena solely to maintain their own positions of
power. It is a fact that most political movements and parties, Islamic or not,
take on the ‘color’ of the environment in which they find themselves.
Authoritarian, repressive regimes with a political culture of ‘all or nothing’
offer few guarantees that they will produce movements that not only in
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word, but also in deed, are democratic. In such an environment, then, there
is also less chance that movements will propagate their democratic disposi-
tion out of political conviction rather than opportunism (Roy 2005: 1003;
Fuller 2005: 45). 
The debates on how the eu should deal with Hizbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in the Palestinian territories illustrate the dilemmas of political
rapprochement. Both organizations have a political party with a military
wing, and both consider attacks as justified as long as Israel remains in the
occupied territories. Since the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, Hizbol-
lah has applied itself increasingly to politics and has experienced a process
of institutionalization (Alagha 2006). Hamas has also shifted more to the
political arena, though without recognizing the state of Israel or foreswear-
ing violence (icg 2006). Three years ago, in part under American and
Israeli pressure, the eu decided to put this movement on its list of terrorist
organizations. However, it would be neither conducive to the peace
process nor to the future development of the region to consider Hamas
merely as a terrorist movement or, in the wake of the massive election
victory of January 2006, to isolate its democratically chosen leaders for
years to come, and thereby deny them responsibility for taking a construc-
tive role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hamas has attained great legiti-
macy and popularity among the population, in large part due to its social
services and its exposure of corruption. Moreover, in the current situation
its party leaders have to attune their strategies to political reality to main-
tain sufficient influence and support. The eu correctly decided at the
beginning of 2006 to temporarily continue economic aid to the Palestini-
ans and to judge an eventual future Hamas government primarily on its
concrete contributions to the building of a Palestinian state and to the
peace process in the Middle East.
Experience teaches us that movements and actors who, originally out of
purely opportunistic motives, align themselves with or turn away from
democratic procedures can develop over time into driving forces behind
gradual, internal democratization processes. But there are no guarantees.
What is involved is to promote in each country the conditions under which
such development processes get started and then continue, and to reduce
the risks of violent eruptions.12 The political opportunities for reforms in
the region are now somewhat greater than before, but there is also more
instability (Roy 2005: 1010; Jones and Emerson 2005: 6). Moreover, every
country has its own political culture and path of development, including
persistent hindrances that the elites concerned will only want to remove 
if they can preserve enough political stability (Hamzaway 2005: 3; Perthes
ed. 2004). Thus, this calls for cautious policy that takes account of the
many risks, but is also prepared for unexpected opportunities. 
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The development of a strategic vision on the reference points for reform in
the emp countries first demands a thorough exploration by the Union of
developments in the political and legal environment within the partner
countries and in the Middle East region, including the characteristics and
dynamics of Islamic legislation and of (religious) opposition movements
and parties. Now that accession negotiations have begun with Turkey and
there is a real possibility of its accession to the Union in 10 to 15 years, the
urgency increases to strategically explore the longer-term opportunities
and dangers of entering into closer ties also with the Gulf States and Iran,
by then the eu’s close neighbors.13 Given the mutual unfamiliarity and
distorted image-formation on both sides, it is advisable to first intensify
the eu’s cultural relations with these countries, as has occurred in the past
10 years with the emp partners. Developing of a vision and conducting
strategic explorations is first and foremost an eu matter. At the same time,
the Dutch government, of course, also bears some responsibility for raising
this issue, as well as for the political dissemination of the insights derived
from these explorations.
Earlier is this chapter it was already argued that the reform processes in
Muslim countries must develop chiefly along an endogenous path. There is
no paternalistic role reserved for the eu in the emp countries, much less
should it impose democratic norms through stringent conditions. That
would inevitably result in strongly nationalistic and anti-Western reflexes
that drive the reformers within the opposition into the arms of the ruling
elites. Similarly, openly supporting truly independent ngos and political
groupings would compromise these organizations in the eyes of the popu-
lation or brings them into problems with the regime. Moreover, the enp
operates on the basis of bilateral, joint Action plans agreed upon by the eu
and the partner countries. In practice this manifests itself in the cited para-
dox between European efforts to promote democracy and human rights in
the region and the aversion on the part of the partner countries to every
form of uninvited European interference. This field of tensions compels a
continual search for opportunities to exert influence that manage to avoid
(the appearance of) meddling.
Clearly then, the Union does have some room for maneuver to promote
political reforms, but this is mainly the case in the partner countries that,
in principle, are ready and able to agree in their Action plans on a long-term
strategic and realistic course of reforms. The eu should therefore initially
limit itself to an ‘exportable minimum’ of basic democratic principles
(Euromesco 2005a). Overly detailed definitions and elaborations of democ-
racy and human rights, which are often also strongly colored by European
experience, do not satisfactorily take into account the endogenous dynam-
ics. They arouse too much resistance to be productive. Moreover, they
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ignore the great variety in historical democratization experiences and
democratic systems in Europe. The eu should also develop more positive
incentives to stimulate and reward reforms (Jones and Emerson 2005).
Furthermore, it must be ready to (temporarily) suspend the partnership in
the case of serious violations of human rights. In this way, the Union
provides room for different paths to democratization and progressive real-
ization of human rights, while at the same time maintaining its own values
in this area, as advocated in section 5.4.2.
The politically relevant elites in the emp countries are not always, by 
definition, against reform, but they usually demand gradual and, above
all, controllable reform processes that have an eye for the complexity 
of political transformations. Conditionality directed at swift regime
change is not only ineffective but potentially counterproductive. How-
ever, by accepting that the concept of democracy can be reduced to a
number of basic principles, such as transparency, accountability, free and
fair elections, constitutionalism, and the independence of the judiciary,
the eu can provide positive incentives and support. In turn, the political
elites can forge coalitions that are able to support concrete, step-by-step
reforms. Sometimes this takes place primarily in the area of political
participation or party formation, sometimes chiefly in the area of consti-
tutionalism, or on both fronts.1 4
Through setting concrete targets in the annual Action plans, the eu can
entice countries to gradually introduce elementary rules that apply to all
political parties and movements, such as the endorsement of non-violence,
electoral participation on the basis of assessable political starting points,
coalition forming, and democratic alternation of power. Political parties,
whether religious or not, would have to accept these rules in exchange for
formal recognition as regular political parties in elections. They should be
required to contest elections on the basis of political programs that explain
their goals and (religious) aspirations. What kind of (Islamic) society do 
they have in mind? What role do they reserve for Sharia in legislation, the
constitution, and politics? It seems anything but clear where the political
leaders themselves stand on these questions. If they are challenged to put
their claims and slogans into assessable programs, this can create openings
for coalitions and compromises. Programmatic politics reduces the risk of
‘secret’ agendas and increases the chance that the voters will have a real
choice. As in many authoritarian political systems, many political actors in
the emp partner countries lack political experience and skills, including the
skill to write party programs. In addition, their financial resources are
sometimes limited. Financial and substantive support from the eu for
strengthening political parties (whether or not through organizations such
as the United Nations Development Program (unpd), the International
policy perspective
183
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 183
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (idea) or the Nether-
lands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (nimd) should partly help to
solve these problems.
5.5.3 the rel ationship with turkey
Above we outlined in what ways a renewed emp could contribute to
democratization and the improvement of human rights in the partner
countries. There is, however, still another strategy available to the eu: its
special relationship with Turkey. The European Council opened formal
membership negotiations in October 2005. This represents a historic deci-
sion, by which the eu member states declared they envisaged full Turkish
membership as a real perspective. In its 2004 report The European Union,
Turkey, and Islam, the wrr concluded that a process of consistently
pursued negotiations with Turkey would sends positive signals to the
Muslim world and to European Muslims (wrr 2004). It underscored that
there is no inevitable clash of cultures or civilizations, that Muslim popula-
tions can be fully part of the Union, and also that ‘Islam’ and Islam-
inspired politics do not in the least exclude a process of democratization
and the promotion of human rights. Recent and future Turkish experiences
with this process offers not so much a model or an instant solution as a
potential source of inspiration for experiments with democratization in
other Muslim countries. 
Referring to its earlier report, the wrr re-emphasizes the importance that
Turkey represents for the eu in maintaining constructive relations with the
Muslim world. The continuing hesitations on the part of some member
states about possible Turkish membership accentuate the need for trans-
parent decision-making and a timely and informed debate on the opportu-
nities and threats posed by Turkish membership. The wrr fully endorses
the European Commission’s call on the member states to get this debate
going. Governments, parliaments, political parties, and civic organizations
must take the initiative. It is obvious that this should not be a one-time
effort, but should span the entire negotiation period.
The member states have for a long time been aware that Turkey can also
play an active role in eu foreign policy. Turkey was a participant in the
Barcelona process from the beginning, and has in the meantime, thanks to
the pre-accession process for eu candidate member states, attained the
political position of ‘northern’ rather than ‘southern’ partner in the emp. In
addition, a treaty has been signed extending the customs union between
Turkey and the eu to the ten new member states, whereas security cooper-
ation with Turkey was intensified in 2002, with the decision to allow 
nato allies from outside the eu to participate in the European Security
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and Defense Policy (esdp). Since then Turkey has already taken part in 
eu-led missions. There are many geopolitical, logistical, and cultural 
arguments for immediately intensifying foreign policy cooperation with
Turkey rather than to wait until the final moment of accession in 2015 or
even later. Turkey can to an increasing extent play an active role in the 
emp/enp and the oic (see box 5.2) and can thus also contribute to a
constructive eu position towards the Muslim world. This requires from
Turkey a continuation, during the long process of negotiations, of the
course of reforms already set into motion. For their part, the eu member
states must consistently and credibly deal with the accession demands
imposed on Turkey and be ready to convince their electorates of the impor-
tance of a future Turkish membership.
Until relatively recently, Turkey was certainly not an active and enthusias-
tic member of the emp because it was disappointed over the stalled Middle
East peace process and its position as a ‘southern’ partner in the Barcelona
process (Emerson and Tocci 2004: 19). Now that the accession negotiations
have begun, the Turkish attitude has changed, however. As was argued
above, a renewed emp/enp that provides concrete incentives for political
and economic reforms must offer the southern partners more in the area of
trade. Access to the Turkish market and also agreements over the delivery
of water from the Turkish-controlled parts of the Euphrates and Tigris and
the Mediterranean Sea, can be attractive inducements for several partner
countries.
Turkey’s membership of the oic is an additional asset in the eu’s relations
with the Muslim world. As a ‘seasoned’ secular Muslim state, Turkey was
until recently an outsider, and felt rather uncomfortable in the oic (Emer-
son and Tocci 2004: 26). But since it has headed in the direction of a more
relaxed approach to Islam on its own soil and has experienced a process of
deepening of democracy, matters have changed. The election of Ekmeled-
din Ihsanoglu as secretary-general of the oic underscores the rising pres-
tige of Turkey within this organization. In December 2005 he declared that
[we] Muslims “do not have the luxury to blame others for our own prob-
lems. It is high time that we faced our national and regional problems with
courage, candor, and openness” (de Volkskrant, December 8, 2005). The
current Turkish government has also shown itself to be a forceful advocate
within the oic for more self-criticism in the Muslim world and for democ-
ratization and human rights. Turkey’s leaders are familiar with the political
sensitivities in the region, know just the right tone to strike, and are there-
fore in a position to communicate with greater authority and conviction
than most other European countries the necessity for reform. In the
coming years, Turkey will thus find itself in a favorable position to main-
tain constructive relations with the Muslim states in the region and to put
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the efforts of the eu toward political reforms higher on the political
agenda.
5.5.4 initiatives in the oic and the un
In section 5.4.2 it was proposed that dealing with Islamic legislation on the
basis of progressive realization means that the eu can do more justice to
the context and dynamism of the development of law in Muslim countries.
At the same time the relationship model discussed in section 5.5.2 remains
that of an asking party (the eu) and a responding party (the Muslim coun-
try). This raises the question of whether further improvement of the
human rights situation could be served by putting a greater emphasis on
the endogenous dynamics of mutual learning processes among Muslim
countries. It is after all a fact that most Muslim countries – whether with
reservations or not – have already become signatories to the international
human rights treaties. Can one imagine a complementary approach that
promotes mutual learning capabilities and social control over the improve-
ment and observance of human rights? If so, then the current discussions
on human rights can become less charged with arguments about Western
conceptual and actual domination. It would mean that the Muslim world,
in its relationship with the West, could become more of an asking party
regarding the contents and background of international human rights.
Provided that their jurisdiction is recognized, separate international
human rights courts can exert an important stimulating influence on these
endogenous dynamics towards greater authority of universal human rights
principles in like-minded Muslim states. There are in principle two differ-
ent ways to shape this, namely through the institution of regional courts
and the institution of a court of Islamic law for the entire Muslim world.
The first option involves human rights courts with their own separate,
territorially limited jurisdictions, analogous to the European Court of
Human Rights. These territorial courts can formulate their own human
rights conventions that completely endorse universal human rights but at
the same time take into account the specific regional (Islamic) heritages,
cultures, and legal practices. By using the experience of the European
Court, among others, and of the various human rights commissions of the
un, effective collective supervision of the interpretations and compliance
with universal human rights can take place within such regional cultural
and Islamic frames of reference (aiv 1998). And although these courts do
not thus refer to Islamic legal norms, in practice, naturally, they may
indeed when the occasion arises, deal with conflicts between Islamic law
and international treaties, as well as think about solutions.
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The power of this regional option is especially visible in Europe, where the
Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights 
in 1950 and created the European Court in 1959. The original group of ten
member states has greatly expanded since the 1980s, primarily due to the
relaxation of tensions between East and West. The current 46 participating
countries (a total of 800 million inhabitants) all come under the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court. The European human rights regime employs
the principle of margin of appreciation, but represents no deviation from
the standards of the un. Its different organs work explicitly within that
framework and strengthen its effect by limiting the kind of cultural differ-
ences and problems between and within countries which can sometimes
hamper actual legal implementation. The un itself has brought about the
creation of similar institutions in regions where they do not yet exist. In
this spirit the Arab Human Development Report 2004 advocated a regional
strategy for the Arab world. Up until now, the report argues, ‘specifically
Arab’ was too often used as an argument for undermining international
human rights. Precisely to strengthen the effective power of international
human rights conventions, the report proposes that the Arab world formu-
late its own Arab Human Rights Convention. This must completely
conform to the Universal Declaration but at the same time also take into
account Arab-Islamic culture (undp 2005: 71-77). 
If this suggestion for an Arab Human Rights Convention with its own
court will indeed elicite a positive response from Arab governments, the
Netherlands, in its role as center of expertise in international law, should
offer opportunities for its further examination. The Council of Europe 
and the eu can assist these governments with their own learning proces-
ses, including the expansion of knowledge of human rights among Islamic
judges. Just as in the case of the European human rights regime, it is 
obvious that the number of parties to the convention will initially be small. 
In the long run, however, this number will grow if the court obtains
demonstrable successes and increasing prestige.
A second approach has been proposed with the same goal of reconciling
Islamic law and universal human rights (Baderin 2003). This option
involves the institution of a separate, global human rights regime with a
court specialized in Islamic legislation composed of leading judges who are
qualified in Islamic as well as international human rights. This court would
be able to issue binding rulings over the reach and interpretation of Sharia
in relation to complaints about human rights violations in the member
states. It can eventually be made part of the oic, the organization to which
a great portion of the Muslim world is already affiliated and which earlier
took the initiative to formulate the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam (see box 5.2). The advantage of such a global Islamic human rights
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court, according to Baderin, is that it expressly works on constructive ways
to create as much harmonization as possible between Islamic and interna-
tional human rights. It can also refer to diverse Islamic legal theories,
schools, and practices in a large number of different Muslim cultures in
such a way that a broad range of doctrines is available for maximal
rapprochement with the universal norms.
Box 5.2 The Organization of the Islamic Conference (oic)
The task of this organization, which was founded in 1969, is to promote cooperation
among Muslim states in economic, social, cultural, scientific, and other vital areas. The oic
is the only organization that includes almost all the Muslim states; it has 57 member states ,
all of them also members of the un. The Charter of the oic is registered as an international
agreement with the un. Its preamble states that the member states consider themselves
bound to the un Charter and Fundamental Human Rights, and want to preserve Islamic
spiritual, ethical, social, and economic values. The oic even deems the ‘right to human
rights education’ as a human right and has taken a series of initiatives to encourage Muslim
states to an interpretation of Islamic values that contributes to a progressive realization of
international human rights. The drafting of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam is one of these initiatives. There is a formal cooperation agreement between the oic
and the un.
Against these advantages there are, however, many disadvantages. The large
mutual differences and political divisions among the member states would
make an Islamic court of human rights under the oic banner practically
unfeasible. A principled objection is that the institution of an explicitly
Islamic human rights court can be interpreted as reaching out to the conser-
vative forces in the Muslim world, who, by appealing to Islamic interpreta-
tions of human rights, turn against the universal application of human
rights treaties. If these forces succeed in naming their own Islamic judges to
the court, this can result in an institutionalization of existing differences
between Islamic and international interpretations of human rights. Instead
of a progressive realization via constructive dialogue, there would even be
the risk of a gradual undermining of much that the un has accomplished 
in promoting a normative rapprochement with universal human rights in
recent years (aiv 1998). And that much has been accomplished can be
shown, among other things, from the fact that the un committees that
oversee the compliance with human rights standards carry out an almost
permanent and constructive dialogue. Because of this, today it is no longer
acceptable that governments ‘explain’ human rights violations by an 
appeal to religion. Thus, having weighed the advantages and disadvantages,
the wrr believes that the first option, the territorial court, deserves prefer-
ence.
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Although a binding human rights regime in connection with the oic is
thus a bridge too far and would also meet with objections based on princi-
ple, the oic does have concrete ambitions in the area of human rights
education which are worth supporting (see box 5.2). For example, the eu
can, through the oic’s Turkish secretary-general, offer help to set up a ten-
year program for human rights education. Moreover, there can be support
for a permanent training program in human rights, specially directed at the
judiciary in Muslim countries. Even office holders are little acquainted
with (Islamic) human rights; they need to have a knowledge of interna-
tional jurisprudence. Furthermore, the eu can help Muslim countries insti-
tute independent human rights commissions, as is now occurring in the
framework of the enp. These commissions could also play a role in the
education and training programs mentioned above. In addition, the oic can
be encouraged to mobilize the study of those areas of Islamic legislation
that are very controversial from a human rights perspective. A moratorium
on the harshest punishments for hadd crimes, as advocated by Tariq
Ramadan, among others, could be one of the outcomes (Ramadan 2004).
This can start a process of opinion-forming that ultimately results in an
authoritative judgment more in agreement with international standards.
But even if there is no readiness to introduce a moratorium, the very fact of
studying this subject already has the important function of stimulating
awareness and debate. 
5.5.5 a european isl am?
There is regular debate on whether in Europe a particular European Islam or 
Euro-Islam can and should develop, in the sense of an Islam clearly recog-
nizable as European. This debate often suffers from a confusion of concepts
and wishful thinking. Many speculations are insufficiently specific on what
elements such a European Islam would contain (Steinbach 2005). For
example, Bassam Tibi, a professor of international relations in Germany,
emphasizes the need for Muslims to completely accept the dominant Euro-
pean culture (or Leitkultur). In his view, this means that they not only
must embrace democracy, human rights, and pluralism, but also must
accept that religion is a private matter. Only in this way can it be prevented
that Muslims create parallel societies that turn away from the principles of
the democratic constitutional state. Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss philosopher
popular among young European Muslims, also cherishes a hope for a
future European Islam that embraces the democratic constitutional state.
But unlike Tibi he stresses that Islam’s common frame of reference can and
should flourish in the European public space, provided that Muslims do
indeed embrace democracy and constitutional principles (see box 5.3). And
while Tibi primarily calls upon Muslims in Europe (and European govern-
ments) to adopt a strategy of assimilation, Ramadan urges participation
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and integration on the basis of a separate Muslim identity. Despite consid-
erable substantive differences, there are also points of agreement between
these two authors. Both attach great importance to overcoming the ‘we 
and they’ situation and to stimulating full citizenship for Muslims. Their
objective goes well beyond the peaceful co-existence that some consider 
to be the most attainable outcome. They also keep hammering on the
importance of learning how to deal with plurality through dialogue and
discussion, within and between different strains of Islam as well as
between Islam and other religions and philosophies of life. Both correctly
state that plurality, in the sense of respect for those with different beliefs,
must be learned, by Muslims as well as by non-Muslims.
Box 5.3 European Islam according to Tibi and Ramadan
Bassam Tibi sees no place in Europe for jihadism, orthodoxy, and fundamentalism. Of
course, they are present there, and they constitute a major threat to an open society and to
the integration of dissident Muslims. The Euro-Islam he advocates involves a cultural
model that is adapted to the political culture of civil society and the separation of culture
and politics. Cultural relativism and multiculturalism on the part of the receiving society
are dangerous, since these shut Muslims out and promote the ghettoizing of communities
and parallel societies. Tibi also strongly opposes any form of recognition of Sharia; the
concept of citizenship demands that the same laws apply to everyone (Tibi 2001). Without
becoming Eurocentric, Europe must reaffirm its own value(s), whereas Muslims in Europe
must embrace ‘the idea of Europe’ to become citizens ‘of the heart.’ This European idea,
the Leitkultur, concerns a system of norms, values and an associated world view. Liberal
democracy, individual human rights, and the demands of civil society form its core. An
open Islam based on these orientations is characterized by laicité, cultural modernity, and
an understanding of tolerance that goes beyond the Abrahamic religions. Euro-Islam
recognizes religious and cultural pluralism and relinquishes any claim to Islamic domina-
tion. Under these conditions an Islam can develop in Europe that will also have great influ-
ence elsewhere (Tibi 2005).
Like Tibi, Tariq Ramadan sees developments among Muslims in Europe and the us as
being of potentially great importance for the entire Muslim world. He observes that in the
shelter of the overwhelming attention for radical Islam, a ‘silent revolution’ is taking place,
especially among intellectual and younger Muslims. These Muslims shape a European and
American Islam that is rooted in their respective European and American cultures, but at
the same time remains faithful to universal Islamic principles, such as justice and human
dignity. This grassroots movement will gain worldwide influence because it has developed
under the conditions of modernity and globalization that will also increasingly affect
Muslim countries. Ramadan wants to contribute to shaping this European ‘Muslim perso-
nality’ by supplying the theological tools that enable Muslims to participate fully in
society. Many Muslims in Europe have isolated themselves in their own, seemingly secure, 
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parallel communities, because they have a sometimes obsessive fear of losing their religi-
ous identity. They are supported in their reluctant accommodation to their immediate
surroundings by existing Islamic doctrines on how to live as a minority in non-Muslim
countries. Ramadan calls upon Muslims to abandon this self-definition as a minority and
to give up their relative isolation from European society. 
Instead of the dichotomy of dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar al-harb (house of the
enemy), which he considers outdated, Ramadan proposes the new perspective of the dar
al-shahada (house of testimony). The West is not an enemy, but a ‘house’ for Muslims, and
that is what should direct their lives. The existing rule of law, freedoms of religion and of
assembly, the right to knowledge, and other rights and freedoms all allow Muslims to live
their religion fully and to develop it further in freedom. They should no longer attempt to
reproduce Islam from their countries of origin, nor remain dependent for their choices on
the religious authorities in Muslim countries. They should dare to follow their own paths
and act as responsible, free, and loyal citizens who contribute to the society they live in, on
the basis of the universal principles of their religion. Ramadan does not say that Muslims,
acting in this way, must abandon Sharia. Sharia concerns primarily universal principles
and a frame of reference to translate these into behavior, but the rules of conduct derived
from Sharia are bound by time and place. As long as the existing laws of Western society
do not explicitly conflict with the conscience of Muslims – and this will occur only in
exceptional instances – Sharia dictates that these law be respected (Ramadan 2004).
Underlying speculations about a future European Islam is often the
assumption that governments in Europe can and should give direction to
the content of religious beliefs and their evolution. It also seem to be
assumed that such an Islam will be both recognizably European and in the
long run, as an ‘enlightened’ version, will be exportable to Muslim coun-
tries outside Europe that still play up the conflict between ‘Islam,’ and
democracy and human rights. However, both of these assumptions require
comment.
First, governments in Europe are committed to freedom of religion on the
basis of international treaties like the echr and the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. It is precisely in the area of religion that they must exercise
caution and certainly not meddle in the content and direction of religious
development. This also applies to eu institutions: the Union has expressly
reserved legal authority over religious organizations to the member states.
In the separate, legally non-binding Declaration nr. 11 of the Amsterdam
Treaty, it is thus stated: ‘The European Union respects and does not 
prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associa-
tions or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally
respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations’
(European Union 1997). To the extent that mechanisms to influence reli-
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gions are available, therefore, these do not reside on the European but on
the national level, in institutions and behavior that fall under state author-
ity. Second, even were the eu to have such mechanisms available, their
presence would not necessarily result in a recognizably European religious
identity. This would, at the least, demand an approachable institutional
form. Unlike for instance the Roman Catholic Church in Christianity,
these institutional forms are absent in the Sunni variants of Islam. And
even the transnational, strictly hierarchical organization of the Roman
Catholic Church has not produced any typically European Catholicism; 
one can always easily distinguish a Dutch Catholic from, say, a Polish one.
This underscores that it is mainly the national and local contexts that exer-
cise influence on the direction of the faith and the characteristics of the
religious perceptions of Muslims, alongside transnational influences on 
the level of the Ummah (such as Internet, television, etc.), which transcend
the European level.
There is, however, no unambiguous, empirical proof of a religious current
from below at the level of individual Muslims or stimulated by local
governments and institutions that would results in a recognizably Euro-
pean Islam. If anything characterizes Islam in Europe today, it is its enor-
mous variety. Muslims living in Europe reflect the worldwide variety of
Islamic religious tendencies. Although almost every European country of
immigration has an over-representation of certain groups of Muslims and
tendencies, within most European countries there is a greater diversity
than exists or is permitted in the countries of origin (Boutachekourt 2003).
This holds not only for non-radical believers or Islamic free-thinkers who
are persecuted in their countries of origin and who continue their scholarly
work in Europe; it also includes spokesmen and their supporters in Euro-
pean countries who reject the democratic constitutional state and strive for
an Islamic state. Levels of education and socio-economic background of
Muslims differ considerably between and within European countries.
Thanks to the greater diversity and greater freedom of religion and expres-
sion, the religious debate in Europe can thus be broader than in the coun-
tries of origin. Whether this debate is carried out to the full and leads to
(religious) assimilation and modernization depends also, however, on the
intellectual contribution, openness, critical position, and readiness for self-
criticism of all those involved, irrespective of their (religious) conviction or
origin.
At national and local levels, there are complex processes involved. Impor-
tant Islamic movements that previously were strongly oriented towards
their country of origin, are now taking more autonomous positions.
Foreign governments in turn involve themselves less with these move-
ments or, as in the case of imams posted abroad, increasingly recognize the
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importance of knowledge of the local context and language. And mosque
leaders in many European countries are more appreciative of the impor-
tance of connecting to the local situation and needs if they want to
continue to attract youth. Muslim organizations are increasingly joining
national and local institutions to have access to facilities for education and
social and cultural activities. In addition to contacts on the European level,
national and local inter-religious dialogues also take place. In various
member states, such as Austria, Spain, Italy, Germany, Great Britain,
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, formal links have been created to
make consultation possible between national governments and representa-
tives of ‘the’ Muslim world, including in emergency situations. The form
of representation that is created in each country between Muslims and the
state is sometimes modeled on the national relationship between church
and state (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2002). In many municipalities,
consultative bodies with the Muslim communities have recently been
established (Koning Boudewijnstichting 2004). Also in some countries
fatwa-centers have been established to find answers for the problems of
Muslims living in Europe; for questions arising from living in a minority
situation, many fatwas have been developed – also in dialogue with
authoritative religious institutions in Muslim countries (Shadid and Van
Koningsveld 2002). Thus in Europe ‘Islam’ takes on the color of its local
environment. The agenda of Milli Görüs Nederland, for example, was until
recently completely different from that of its original movement in Turkey
or its sister organization in Germany. This adaptation is not only institu-
tional, but also substantive. For example, Dutch Muslims show a lower
acceptance of homosexuality than the average Dutch person, but this level
of acceptance is much higher than usual stereotypes lead one to expect
(Motivaction 2005), while Muslims in France score very high on the indi-
cators for secularism (Müller 2005). All these trends contribute to the fact
that Islam in Europe is developing more autonomously in relation to
Muslim countries, engages in increasingly more institutional links with 
the receiving society, and therefore is acquiring its own national and local
characteristics.
Most important, of course, is the evolution of religion among Muslims
themselves. This is all the more crucial because (especially within the
Sunni variant) Islam, despite the current trend of institutionalization, will
not take on the shape of a church congregation. The emphasis is on the
individual believer and the mosque; it is precisely on this individual level
that similar developments are taking place among Muslims in the member
states. In section 5.2 we referred to Olivier Roy’s observation that a process
of deculturalization is taking place among the second and third genera-
tions. Young people distance themselves from the Islamic traditions of
their parents’country of origin and identify increasingly with Islam as such.
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How this new Islam is given content is now becoming a matter of individ-
ual choices; it is a quest that produces great uncertainty. Along with freeing
themselves from traditional authority structures, young people are at the
same time exposed to new influences both from the Muslim world and the
society in which they live. In comparison with their parents, they are
growing up in a situation with much greater diversity of Islamic religious
views, including radical variants. The Internet and peer groups also play a
very important role in the process of religious ‘shopping’. 
Roy points out that deculturalization can lead to radicalization (Roy 2004).
But the vast majority is moving in a different direction. Dutch research
confirms Roy’s general observation on deculturalization. Islam and
Muslim identity remain important, but are becoming dissociated from reli-
gious practice, especially through increased levels of education and
command of the Dutch language. Moreover, some convergence of
autochtonous and allochtonous values takes place among young people.
This applies particularly to social equality and democratic values in the
public sphere. Especially among the higher educated, there is also conver-
gence in values concerning marriage and the family, even though the ideas
of young Muslims are much more conservative than those of the average
Dutch youth. There is only a marginal following for undemocratic ideas
and actions in the name of Islam (Phalet and Ter Wal 2004; Phalet et al.
2000/1). Research by the German Zentrum für Turkeistudien shows a simi-
lar picture for Germany. This underscores that young people define them-
selves as Muslims, but fewer and fewer follow strict religious practices.
Furthermore, the second and third generations more often than the first
have a modern liberal orientation; what the first generation considers a
religious obligation has become a matter of choice for subsequent genera-
tions. The outcome of this evolution could be an Islam in which the main-
stream has clearly freed itself from a non-pluralistic traditional religion.
This means that there is fertile ground for active stimulation of a pluralistic
Islam, but this would require stronger theological guidance by Muslim
organizations (Zentrum für Turkeistudien 2004). 
This last point touches upon an important question. The first generation
was very poorly educated, lived strongly turned in on itself, and ‘survived’
by preserving its own culture and religious customs as much as possible.
The second and third generations have grown up in more open contact
with the surrounding society. The democratic constitutional states as well
as the advantages of education in Europe in principle provide substantially
favorable conditions for the development of a similar Islam across Euro-
pean countries. But these new conditions also mean that the second and
third generations are confronted with many competing ‘Islams,’ attacks on
Islam itself, and with other religions and philosophies of life. If young
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Muslims distance themselves from the traditional faith but also want to
give meaning to their Muslim identity, they have to reinvent their faith and
maintain it in the full wind of this plurality. That they grow up in the
middle of plurality does not mean that they also experience this as inher-
ently valuable. This is what Jonathan Sacks has in mind with his concept of
‘the dignity of difference’ (Sacks 2002). To find one’s own way in this
confusing and threatening plurality is a difficult process. This is also appar-
ent from the questions and discussions on various Internet sites. Changes
in behavior and religious interpretation often go hand in hand; people look
for religious guidelines to determine behavior, as well as for religious justi-
fication for new behavior. In this process of interaction between practice
and conviction, the availability of differing religious viewpoints is crucial.
Providing this diversity is something that should best happen on the local
and national levels. The wrr will return to this question in the conclusion
of this report, when discussing Islamic activism in the Netherlands.
In conclusion, to the extent that European Islam is on the horizon, this
does not offer the perspective of religious uniformity on a European scale.
Instead of the Euro-Islam or European Islam that Tibi or Ramadan wish
for, Islam in Europe will remain characterized by great diversity. We
should be aware of the tenacity of religious differences that are central for
those involved, even if these are barely observable to outsiders. Plurality
itself is, after all, not the problem. What it is ultimately about is that all the
nationally and locally colored variants of Islam are continuing to develop
amidst acceptance of the principles of the democratic constitutional state.
These same principles expressly exclude governmental steering of the
content of religion or its development; the believers themselves must bring
about any possible modernization, and this process is also well underway.
It is, of course, the task of governments to guard the constitutional frame-
work. In some cases that can mean that limits to acts and utterances are
established or that governments make resources available that facilitate 
the free exercise of religion. The autonomy of religious communities does
not after all mean a total absence of the state with regard to religion; that is
also not the intent of the doctrine of the separation of church and state
(wrr 2004). 
The great diversity of Muslim communities in Europe, their position as a mi-
nority in European countries (with the exception of Albania, Bosnia, Koso-
vo, and Turkey) and the partially similar developments with which Muslims
in Europe are confronted can, however, contribute to a certain uniformity
among European Muslims. This also means that there are correspondences
between Islamic activism with which each of the European countries has to
deal on its own territory, and the social questions and policy issues with
which they wrestle. For the wrr it seems obvious that eu member states
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should use European policy frameworks for the mutual exchange of best
practices regarding Islamic activism. That Islam in Europe can eventually 
exercise influence on the developments within the faith in Muslim countries
is of course quite conceivable, given the current global means of communi-
cation. That it will be a decisive influence, as Tibi and Ramadan foresee, is
less plausible. This idea rests too much on the assumption that Europe and
the us are the seats of modernization. Local contexts differ from country to
country and therefore will lead to individual responses to the relationship
between religion, democracy, and human rights.
5.5.6 bil ater al polic y options
Even if European countries or eu member states fail to develop a common
strategic view on Islamic activism, that does not relieve the Dutch govern-
ment of the obligation to give as much content as possible to constructive
engagement. It has available additional bilateral channels through which it
can influence directly or indirectly relations with parts of the Muslim
world. First, there are the regular foreign policy instruments, including the
extensive network of development-aid links with a number of Muslim
countries and the political ties with countries like Morocco, Turkey,
Indonesia, and Surinam, where many of the Muslims living in the Nether-
lands still have their roots. Second , there are ngos, universities, the busi-
ness world, and the media, which in indirect ways can become involved in
Dutch foreign policy toward the Muslim world.
Taking into account the diversity and endogenous dynamism of Islamic
activism requires a basic knowledge of current and future developments
within the Muslim world, including the numerous different intellectual,
political, cultural, and legal manifestations of Islamic activism. The Dutch
government needs to stay informed about these developments and to
nourish its policy, politics, and public opinion with its insights, based on
the realization that domestic and foreign policy are closely intertwined
(Otto 2006). But the level of knowledge in the Netherlands about Islam
and the Muslim world is distressingly low. Transmission of factual infor-
mation will contribute to the correction of inaccurate images and stereo-
types on both sides and will stimulate critical awareness. This can be 
accomplished, for example, by structurally investing in relevant informa-
tion and cultural centers, ngos, and universities within and outside the
Netherlands. It can be done by contributing to making Western scholarly
and cultural products more accessible in Muslim countries, by facilitating
exchanges of teachers and students, and by promoting a situation in which
leading thinkers, political activists, and legal scholars can inform policy-
makers and public opinion on both sides. Previously, we already
mentioned that the Netherlands should use its worldwide reputation as a
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center for international law to offer help, if requested, in establishing an
Arab court of human rights that conforms to un principles (sec. 5.5.4).
In addition, the Dutch government must further investigate with what
other instruments it can broaden its knowledge about and contacts with
Muslim countries. It should also examine how it can disseminate its own
policy abroad and at home, for example, by making optimal use of the
expertise present in the Netherlands. Both its international and domestic
policies should express that the Netherlands takes the principles of democ-
racy and human rights as its reference points, that it takes account of the
diversity of Islamic activism and Islamic legislation, and that it applies an
explicit distinction between constructive and destructive political forces
(Otto 2006). Positive changes in Islamic legislation in the direction of
international human rights norms deserve forceful support in Dutch
foreign policy, while serious violations of human rights in the name of
Islam must be sharply condemned. 
5.6 islamic activism in the dutch democratic 
constitutional state
5.6.1 introduction
Constructive external relations can only thrive in the long run if there are
constructive internal relations between religious and non-religious citi-
zens, Muslims and non-Muslims, and among believers of different Islamic
denominations. In internal relations, too, it is important to take into
account diversity, to recognize that Islamic activism can potentially be a
constructive political and juridical factor, to associate with endogenous
developments, and to invest in an informed public opinion. Political and
public debate in the Netherlands certainly attests to the fact that there is
insufficient knowledge of the many tendencies within Islamic political
thought and that little attention is given to the diversity of Islamic political
movements. The last few years have indeed witnessed “a new intellectual
Islamophobia which is not being countered on the intellectual level”
(Slomp 2003). The stigmatizing of Islam and Muslims is offensive to the
vast majority of Muslims who accept Dutch democracy and human rights
as self-evident. Only a more balanced and open position in the debate can
produce a climate in which the parties concerned are not only self-aware,
but also open to self-criticism. Such a climate would also allow for more
uninhibited discussion about possible new arrangements for the relation-
ship between the public domain and religion, a theme that will be
addressed in a separate study by the wrr. It is partially also the govern-
ment’s task to facilitate this debate.
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There are two sides to taking into account the diversity and potentially
constructive character of Islamic activism within Dutch society. On one
hand, more attention should be paid to concrete, existing Islamic religious
beliefs and the behavior of Muslims who relate positively to the democratic
constitutional state. On the other hand, behavior which appeals to ‘Islam’
but runs counter to prevailing constitutional principles is not acceptable.
The principles of the constitutional state offer freedom but at the same
time set limitations; these also apply to behavior based on religious beliefs.
As long as behavior is primarily concerned with mutual relations among
citizens, the role of the government is naturally limited to the safeguarding
of general constitutional principles, particularly those of equality (art. 1 of
the constitution), freedom of religion, and the separation of church and
state.
At the moment, the emphasis is on closer monitoring of the boundaries of
the rights and freedoms currently in force. While appeals to hate and
violence in the name of Islam were previously tolerated or ignored, they
are now punishable by law. Balancing these various rights and freedoms 
is a difficult task. The constitutional state shows its greatest powers of
persuasion by maintaining its principles even under threat and by not
employing double standards (Buijs 2002). However much repressive
action is taken against terrorism or abuses of freedom of religion and
expression, there must be no illusion that the convictions that result in
hate and violence will also disappear under repression. Rather, they will
‘go underground’ and further withdraw from public contestation. In the
longer term it is crucial that Muslims conform to the existing constitu-
tional norms on the basis of their own choice and not because pure force
restrains them from violating these norms. The overwhelming majority 
of Muslims, of course, fully comply to the rules of the democratic consti-
tutional state. These rules offer both protection for existing views, oppor-
tunities for debate and ultimately – in the case of persisting differences 
of opinion – also workable compromises (wrr 2003: 153). Radical views
that do not conform to these rules also deserve other than merely legal
(criminal justice) responses. They call for a public debate that explores
concrete alternatives and clarifies opinions, complaints, and mutual
demands. In the current climate, sweeping but vague words like ‘Islamic
norms and values,’ ‘Muslim identity,’ ‘Dutch identity,’ and Leitkultur
often dominate. Dialogue and debate can bring greater precision to the
diagnoses and remedies. 
As stated earlier, the policy means examined here mainly concern the
national and local levels. They will be further discussed below, where we
explore general principles for dealing with the three dimensions of Islamic
activism outlined in this report, i.e. Islamic political thought, Islamic polit-
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ical activism, and Islamic law. It emphasizes the role of the government as
supplier of general, structural provisions for dealing with plurality via
encounter, knowledge acquisition and debate, education and participation
in politics and society of all segments of the population, irrespective of
religion or origin. 
5.6.2 isl amic political thought
In Chapter 2 we saw that the common denominator of Islamic activism is
opposition to traditionalism. The quest for reform can take on many forms,
from the literal following of texts considered sacred, to the multitude of
interpretive approaches based on scholarly research. The much-advocated
reform of Islam, via ‘a new Luther’ as it were, thus gradually takes shape,
and its roots go far back. Usually, however, the literal approach is not recog-
nized in the West as reform, while the second gets insufficient attention. 
It is precisely those thinkers of the second category who do away with the
dogmatic religious obstacles to the appreciation of democracy and human
rights. The Islam that they advocate is more spiritual in nature than
directed at following prescribed prohibitions and commandments. It is also
based on theological and scholarly research of various sorts, such as the
theory of interpretation (hermeneutics), anthropology, linguistics, philol-
ogy, and history. 
Widening and deepening of knowledge;  meeting and debate
This latter category of reformist thought is far removed from the dogmatic
truths offered by ‘cyber-imams’ or poorly educated imams, or those
depicted in the various fundamentalist, often violent video clips of ‘web-
Islam’ (Safi 2003). These truths are more readily found among the ‘seeking’
youth of the second and third generations than the well-thought-out
academic theology books that also exist. Other (mass)media besides the
Internet reinforce the image among young people that there is only one,
dogmatic interpretation possible of Islam, one that is primarily fundamen-
talist and violent. Ramadan (2004) points out, for example, that the
‘pamphlet-Islam’ of Muslim fundamentalists and the information from the
bookstores in Muslim neighborhoods are alarmingly one-sided. Thus, the
views of authors who construct a positive relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights (also, for example, those of the prominent
authors from Chapter 2) are little known. There is theological guidance, but
it is often one-sided and sometimes steers in the wrong direction. It is
therefore important to make the views of the many differing thinkers
available in places where young people are looking for answers, and to
foster deepening of knowledge, encounter and debate among Muslims and
non-Muslims. 
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The government, of course, does not itself have the task of filling existing
theological information gaps. It does, however, have an obligation to put
into effect the freedom of religion and of philosophy of life (Tweede Kamer
2004: 8). This obligation, which has after all for ages been the justification
for the Dutch government’s interference with the broadcasting system and
the arts, implies that it has the means to encourage that a broad range of
sources of information – including also through translation – is opened for
the (Muslim) public, so that views are made available that allow for more
carefully considered personal choices.15
The Dutch Cabinet has presented plans for monitoring radicalization and
strengthening preparedness and social cohesion. Among the goals are
expanding and deepening knowledge about Islam itself, the role of women
in Islam, modern forms of Islamic religious experience, Islam and moder-
nity, etc. (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2005). At the
same time, the Cabinet has conceived a plan to create a Center for Cultural
Dialogue (Nicolaï 2005). There is also an initiative in Amsterdam to estab-
lish a center for Islamic culture and religion and in many cities and towns
religious communities are also organizing inter-religious dialogues. It is
important that the various local and national authorities facilitate active
and structural initiatives that address the information needs of Muslims
and non-Muslims, that contribute to broadening the supply of information
about Islam and thus also promote identity formation among (Muslim)
youth. Structural contributions directed at a mobilizing policy for the
longer term can offer a counterweight to one-sided information and influ-
ence-mechanisms. 
The effort to broaden the basis of knowledge, and therefore also to seek out
the places where the youth most susceptible to radicalizing influences are
to be found, deserves high priority and active (financial) support. Combat-
ing discrimination and countering exclusion, both important points of
special interest in Cabinet policy, deserve the same priority. This wrr
report is not directed at these last two issues; the Council will later return
to them in a separate report on identity issues. But their importance for the
subject of this report is evident. The exclusion of and discrimination
against Muslims are leading contributors to a breeding-ground for radical-
religious rancor against which the spread of knowledge ultimately is no
match.
Educational institutions
The young need to obtain insight not only into their own world views or
religious convictions but also into those of others in our society. Parents
are, of course, the first to rely on to convey such knowledge to their chil-
dren. But it is also a legal obligation of both public and private schools, in
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addition to imparting the basic skills, such as language, mathematics, and
writing. Government funding of private, general, formative education has
been at the heart of the political discussion of recent years: the discussion
on article 23, section 7 of the Dutch constitution. Many people wondered
whether (Islamic) private education and integration into Dutch society are,
in fact, compatible. That subject lies beyond the scope of this report. This
report emphasizes that in the Netherlands every citizen, whether religious
or not, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or Hindu, should be confronted with
dissidents. It is pre-eminently public education, which historically is char-
acterized as neutral with respect to religion or philosophy of life, which is
formally charged with the duty of paying attention to the diversity of
philosophical values. Research has shown that pupils and parents as well as
teachers find this task important, but that it is often overlooked because of
all the other educational goals and responsibilities (Veugelers and De Kat
2005).
It is, however, important that every pupil, regardless of what kind of school
he or she attends, learns about the various spiritual movements and their
backgrounds. This knowledge serves not only to put their own faith or
philosophy of life into perspective, but also fulfills a necessary condition
for the development of mutual tolerance and respect. From several recent
policy papers it appears that the Dutch government and parliament
endorse the importance of this aspect of education, as evidenced by the
intention to adopt (in the framework of values and norms and citizenship-
formation for primary education) the following compulsory core goal:
“Pupils learn essentials about spiritual movements that play an important
role in the Dutch multicultural society” (Tweede Kamer 2005a). This
requirement takes effect in the 2006-2007 school year. While under the
earlier ‘Decree Core Goals Primary Education 1998’ this learning goal
concentrated on ways of life and holidays and memorial days, this general
formulation offers an opportunity for a more penetrating approach to the
subject. And because the learning goal is separate from religious education
and philosophy of life, it does not create any strains with the constitution-
ally guaranteed freedom of religion. As it represents a very recent initiative,
the translation of this new core goal into specific learning objectives and
rules (as is customary with other core goals like Dutch language and math-
ematics) will still take some time. The wrr believes that energy is required
here. Specific learning goals, teaching methods adapted to the experiences
of young children, and adequate support from the teacher training colleges
mean that the core goal will take a valued place in education, and that
teachers themselves do not have to reinvent the wheel. In addition, specific
goals enable the education inspectorate to test whether schools and teach-
ers indeed fulfill their roles as conveyers of knowledge of the leading
philosophies within society.
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Although knowledge of life-philosophies is not a separate core goal within
the required curriculum of secondary education (for pupils 12 years old and
older), knowledge of the different philosophies and reflection on values
and norms and citizenship-formation do deserve attention throughout the
entire course of schooling. The memorandum Basic rights in a plural soci-
ety points this out and proposes that, for example, school subjects like
‘people and society’ and, later, the compulsory subject social studies offer
room for this teaching. The responsibility for the way in which this
happens rests, however, with the school (Tweede Kamer 2004). The wrr
believes that in secondary and (general and intermediate) higher education
attention to this aspect of education must become more intense. It is
precisely during this period that young people increasingly distance them-
selves from the views that they received at home, their own views have not
yet crystallized, they come into contact with people of different views, and
they experiment with behavior and may seek new religious footing. It is
important that in this phase they have more information resources avail-
able than the one-sided supply of religious radicalism from the sources
they heavily consult, such as the Internet.
Broadening the supply of alternative views must contain more than offer-
ing abstract material on ‘the other religions,’ including also the tendencies
within Islam. Alternative information should relate to the existing preju-
dices, questions, and grapplings that young people in secondary education
experience, precisely those subjects that they seek advice about from
‘expert’ peers and the Internet. Educational institutions should therefore
not avoid conflict-ridden and taboo subjects but focus on them, using
unorthodox methods specially addressed to the young. On the basis of
discussions with, for example, well-educated imams, it can be made clear
at school that Islam offers more answers than only those of cyber-imams.
The individual responsibility of the educational institutions allows for
experiments with this approach, for example, by throwing open seminars
to interested outsiders, by inviting imams to class, etc. It goes without
saying that these should not be one-time activities but structural tasks. The
government should create the financial space for institutions to fulfill this
role as required. 
With regard to higher education much attention is given to the education
of imams. Quite a few politicians have high hopes that a new kind of train-
ing, with Dutch as the language of instruction, will contribute to better
integration of newcomers from Muslim countries in the future. But one
should not count on it too much. A large portion of the Muslims in the
Netherlands have no direct connection with a mosque (Shadid and Van
Koningsveld 2004). The government is also not authorized to interfere
in any way with the content of this spiritual education. It rightly places
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the responsibility with the Muslim communities themselves. The only
demand government can make is that the religious authorities be more
informed about Dutch language and culture, so that they can better under-
stand and guide the Muslims living here. Also, it is up to the governors of
the mosque themselves to select imams. Finally, for many, the designation
‘approved by the Dutch government’ would actually be a counter-indica-
tion of proven suitability. 
The government is authorized to create the general preconditions for a
high level of scientific education and research, including in the field of reli-
gion. There are professorial chairs in Dutch universities that deal with
aspects of Islam, such as languages and cultures of the Middle East, social
processes in modern Islam, Islam in Western Europe, and Islamic law. The
only institute in the Netherlands that studies Islam in an interdisciplinary
way is the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern
World (isim), which was established in Leiden in 1998. This institute is a
collaborative effort of the universities of Leiden, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and
Nijmegen. It employs a socio-scientific approach to expand the knowledge
of and insight into the manifestations of contemporary Islam. That is an
important contribution, but not identical with the general religious-scien-
tific deepening of understanding that the wrr is advocating here. It is
therefore advisable to create complementary possibilities at a general
university for a fully-fledged study devoted to the scientific treatment of
Islam. In the longer term this can bear fruit for religious development,
including in Muslim countries. Through various kinds of exchanges, schol-
arship in Europe can benefit from the knowledge that exists in Muslim
countries, while Muslim countries benefit from the fruits of the free and
open research at European universities. Although the effect on society of
such a program occurs outside the mosque, it can be considerable: through
publications, appearances in the media, and scholarly discussions. It is even
conceivable that the training of imams will in the long run take place in
cooperation with academic education on Islam, allowing students to follow
part of their training at universities. In this way, imams would also obtain a
higher level of scholarly education. 
5.6.3 isl amic political movements
Islamic movements have been active in the Netherlands and also in other
member states of the eu for a considerable time. However, the formation of
parties on an Islamic basis or according to the Muslim region of origin has
taken place only on a limited scale and only very recently. Belgium is ahead
of the Netherlands in this respect, with the Noor party, the Parti de la
Citoyenneté et de la Prospérité, the Arab European League (ael), and the
Resist party, which was originally connected to the ael and which conse-
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quently led to the Muslim Democratic Party (Koning Boudewijnstichting
2004). Some of the parties in Belgium have already participated in elec-
tions, however without winning any seats in representative bodies. The
Dutch ael tried to follow the Belgian example by setting up a Muslim
Democratic Party; the intention was that this party take part in local elec-
tions in a number of large municipalities in 2006 (Douwes et al. 2005). This
intention has since been abandoned. The aim of the ael is now to find
interest within the existing parties for its longer term goals, such as the
recognition of a Muslim identity and cultural and economic integration
(nrc Handelsblad, November 18, 2005). 
It is important that existing parties pay more attention to issues that
concern Muslims. But in addition, the formation of parties in whole or in
part on the basis of Islam or Muslim identity should be considered as a
potentially constructive contribution to politics. Analogous to our argu-
ment above regarding political activism in Muslim countries, our approach
to such parties should proceed from an inclusive conception of democracy.
Such parties can also give a voice to those who do not feel themselves
represented in Muslim representative bodies. It appears from recent
research that Muslims in the Netherlands also find it important that parties
based on Islam or Muslim identity be formed, separate from the question
of whether they themselves would vote for these parties (tns nipo 2005).
The Dutch election system creates few obstacles to party formation: there
is a relatively high degree of accessibility, with the only substantive
demand being that the designation of the party not be in conflict with
public order (art. G 1 Electoral Law). Participation in the democratic process
implies that the grievances and aspirations of Muslims are articulated via
existing rules and can be included in the political debate and decision-
making. For even if a party is small, that does not mean its influence has to
be. If a Muslim party should expose existing impediments to full participa-
tion in society (such as discrimination in the labor market), this can wake
up the larger parties. Participating in parliament and in local councils
increases the chance that the supporters will feel they are taken seriously,
thus preventing frustrations from building up in the informal sphere.
In the Netherlands there has not yet been discussion of setting up a politi-
cal party based on Islam that advocates the introduction of some form of
Sharia. According to the Dutch intelligence service aivd, this was one of
the ambitions of the ael, but the party itself expressly denied this in a
newsletter in 2005 (aivd 2004b: 40). As was shown in Chapter 4, this
ambition in itself does not indicate very much. The party programs of
many (religious) parties employ language and symbols which can seem
abstract, vague, or even radical to non-party members. What this means
for the position of the party in daily politics cannot be derived just like
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that. This is also true of parties that use the term ‘Sharia.’ Often it is only
from political behavior itself that one can determine what the party
members concretely intend and aspire to with reference to Sharia. Should it
appear that the intention is to introduce an Islamic state by democratic
means in the Netherlands, then that would require serious procedures that
are connected to amending the constitution.16 The political chance of real-
izing such an ambition is very small. But Sharia as a source of inspiration,
for example, for striving for justice and an ‘ethical politics’ on the part of
such a party could translate into planks of a social-conservative platform,
which could find broader support beyond Muslims. 
It is equally evident that an Islamic or Muslim party, no matter how small
and whether or not referring to Sharia, would introduce points of views
into the Dutch political debate that could deviate from the normal political
discourse or even be taboo. This could for instance be the case of subjects
like the Dutch attitude to the Middle East conflict, the participation in
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the support for autocratic regimes.
As appeared with the establishment of the ael in the Netherlands, some of
these program points will provoke reactions of shock. However, it is time
to recognize that through the immigration of the past decades, other ways
of looking at the world have been simultaneously introduced into Dutch
society. It is obvious that sooner or later these views will be translated into
politics. There is no reason to avoid debate on these (sensitive) subjects.
Whether this discourse and the concrete aspirations that arise from it are
incompatible with current democratic and constitutional norms, can then
become clear in the political arena.
In conclusion: on the basis of the points discussed above, the forming of
political parties with an Islamic foundation or Muslim identity is consid-
ered as a constructive contribution to Dutch politics, which demonstrates
the striving towards participation in existing institutions and democratic
rules.
5.6.4 isl amic l aw
Because of the large number of Muslims, the question of recognition of
(elements of) Islamic legislation can at some moment become relevant in
by means other than the formation of political parties. It is evident that
some of the Muslims living in the Netherlands want to live according 
to what they understand to be Sharia. That does not have to be problematic
if the norms of behavior concerned are not in conflict with the existing
legal order. But given the many definitions of Sharia, problems could occur.
How considerable such problems could be, was again shown by the
lawsuits against Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of the Dutch film-
policy perspective
205
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 205
maker and playwright Theo van Gogh. Bouyeri repeatedly testified: ‘Your
constitutional state is not mine.’ If Sharia is called upon to legitimize
behavior that conflicts with existing legislation, the investigation and pros-
ecution of such behavior are obviously required. However, alongside this,
there exists a sliding scale of behavior that is not illegal but is at odds with
prevailing social and moral norms (such as individual autonomy) and that
is supported through group pressure. National and local governments 
must be alert to these phenomena and to the tensions they create. The
government has a special responsibility to guarantee a social climate in
which groups can peacefully live together. The wrr previously examined
this subject in its publication Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag
(wrr 2003: 169-196). 
In this report the Council is looking at a different issue, namely the formal
recognition of (elements of) Islamic legislation in the prevailing legal
system. This is a different subject from the regulation of the status of
foreigners living in the eu member states or of persons with dual national-
ity where international private law or bilateral agreements with third
countries are applicable. There is a real possibility that in the Netherlands
an appeal will be made to freedom of religion to seek recognition the appli-
cation in particular areas, like civil law, of law derived from religion. 
It would involve the formal right of using religious laws exclusively for
one’s own group. This can relate to a formal possibility for persons from
this group to voluntarily opt for the application of either the laws that are
generally in force or the laws in force for the group. In Muslim countries it
is not uncommon that in areas where religious law is applicable, followers
of other (large) religions can choose their own law and courts. There have
been efforts to introduce such a system in Canada and Great Britain (see
box 5.4). 
Box 5.4 Sharia Jurisprudence in Canada and Great Britain
In Canada, an intense debate took place on the recognition of arbitration commissions,
which issue binding judgements on conflicts in the area of family law on the basis of
Sharia, with the possibility of appeal to a regular court. The possibility for this formal
recognition was based on the Arbitration Law that is in force in the province of Ontario
and is intended, through the new model of mediation and arbitration, to unburden the
public legal system and to reduce its costs. After the Jewish community seized this
opening, the Muslim community followed, in this case from a desire to apply Islamic legis-
lation to family law, the core area of Sharia. However, the proposals for this group law led
to a sharp rejection by, among other bodies, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. It
argued that it would be unclear which of the many interpretations of Sharia the relevant
commissions would follow, thus creating great legal uncertainty as well as a convenient 
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opportunity to apply orthodox interpretations. The Council feared, moreover, that the
formal freedom of choice does not exist in practice and that arbitration would turn out to
be to the disadvantage of women, because the social control in their own community
would force them to follow the path of ‘good’ Muslims. The Council also thought that this
opening would create a precedent that certainly Muslims in Europe would be encouraged
to use to achieve similar provisions in their countries. But the Canadian Council also used
an argument of principle for rejecting the proposal. According to its definition of Sharia,
the Council saw no opposition between this Sharia and human rights as defined in the
Universal Declaration. The Council saw the norms laid down there, along with the
conventions based on them, as completely consistent with the ideals of Islam and the
Quran. Because Canadian legislation and its legal system are based on these human rights,
there is no reason to apply any other law. Recognition of Sharia would just mean a conve-
nient opportunity to damage the position of women (Canadian Council of Women 2005).
Because of the resulting commotion, the Prime Minister of Ontario in the meantime deci-
ded to forbid all religious arbitration. For the time being, it is not clear whether this deci-
sion will be upheld.
The desire to institute group law is in play not only in Canada but also in Great Britain.
Since the 1970s there have been efforts to introduce a parallel system of family law, under
which Islamic law would automatically apply to Muslims. Unlike in Canada, this would
not involve recognition of a possibility offered by existing legislation, but new legislation.
The Islamic Shari’a Council (uk), which informally settles conflicts related to family law,
seeks formal recognition within the British legal system. Although a certain degree of
cultural pluralism is permitted in Great Britain, a renewed request in 1996 for legislation to
formally recognize Islamic family law was again rejected. The most important argument of
the British government was that there was no certainty that the non-secular legal system
would apply universally accepted human rights, particularly where equal rights for women
were concerned. As the Canadian Council also argued, there is also the problem of the
many differing interpretations of Islamic family law. Even apart from the practical
problems of how to do these justice, this would certainly lead to great dissension within
the Muslim world and to formal legal inequality among Muslims (Fournier 2004). 
On the basis of the efforts towards the ‘universalizing’ of universal human
rights that are advocated in this report (see sec. 5.4.2), the wrr considers it
inadvisable to pursue the path of pluralizing national law or to abandon
secular law that rests on the separation of church and state. The ambition
expressed by the concept of the universalizing of human rights is precisely
to lead to extending rather than limiting the reach of universal human
rights. The law in force in the Netherlands is in part based on the echr;
formal recognition of Islamic legal norms that do not comply with this
standard would mean a setback. Such recognition would also be in conflict
with the principles of equality established in the echr and the constitu-
tion.
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In section 5.4 it was argued that in Muslim countries rapprochement
with universal human rights can go through Islamic law. For the Nether-
lands, the reverse path is appropriate. Immigrants from Muslim coun-
tries other than Turkey are often socialized in legal systems that are in
part based on a version of Sharia. The knowledge that Muslims have
regarding the existing laws in the eu member states – including human
rights – is sometimes very limited, which leads to a natural preference for
the Sharia with which they are familiar. According to some, there is
indeed a misunderstanding in principle among many Muslims regarding
the existing relationship between religion and the state in Europe (Biele-
feldt and Bahmanpour 2002). The frequent designation of the state as
secular causes considerable misunderstanding. That secular character is
now often understood by a number of Muslims to mean that the state is
anti-religious or ‘post-religious,’ or that European countries are ‘finished
with religion.’ This perception also explains in part their mistrust of the
Western state. They do not understand that the non-religious state and
secular law precisely serve as guarantors of the right of each person to
equal respect for his or her religion. As the earlier resistance of Christian
churches leads us to suppose, it will clearly take some time before believ-
ers realize that the state is not by definition secular in the sense of being
anti-religious, but by being secular can actually safeguard religious free-
dom (Bielefeldt and Bahmanpour 2002). This perception has also gradu-
ally emerged among Islamic political movements in Turkey, and has even
led to a reversal in attitudes there towards eu membership (wrr 2004).
As shown in section 5.4.5, both Tariq Ramadan and the Canadian Coun-
cil of Muslim Women find that universal human rights and legislation
derived from them in the eu member states are not in conflict with
Sharia. As a consequence, Muslims in almost all cases can be loyal to the
law that exists in the member states (Ramadan 2004). Islamic thinkers
discussed in Chapter 2, like An Na’im and Soroush, hold the same 
opinions. This shows how important it is for the member states of the
Union and for Muslim countries to make it their task to expand the
understanding and knowledge among Muslims living in Europe about
the principles of the prevailing law, human rights and their relationship
with Islamic law. Once Muslims have a better knowledge of the princi-
ples of the prevailing law and their concrete rights, and once they recog-
nize that they do not have to reject that law on Islamic grounds, this 
can also contribute to the development of Islam in Europe and the
Netherlands. 
In conclusion, the Council believes that the presence of Muslims cannot
be the occasion for the formal incorporation of Islamic legislation into
existing law, which is after all in part based on the echr. But it is of great
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importance that Muslims in the member states be made more familiar with
the principles of law applied in eu member states.
5.7 conclusion
With the policy perspective presented in this final chapter the Council
aims to contribute to stopping the downward spiral of action and reaction
that has come to characterize the relations among Muslim states as well as
those between Western states and Islamic activism in recent years. The
consequences of this spiral affect not only relations between countries but
also between segments of the population within countries. Fear of Muslims
and Islam has also emerged within the Netherlands, and in turn Muslims,
because of their religion, feel increasingly like unwelcome strangers. 
A climate of confrontation is hardly conducive to the creation of lasting
conditions for security, democratization, and increasing respect for human
rights. Therefore, there is no desirable alternative to trying to find a way to
associate with the reference points for democracy and human rights pres-
ent in Islamic activism itself. The analyses presented in this report unmis-
takably show that these in fact exist. Islamic activism cannot be identified
across the board with an antidemocratic disposition and a denial of the
value of human rights. Rather, there is great diversity in Islamic activism’s
relationship with democracy and human rights and a gradual rapproche-
ment with these concepts.
These empirical insights form an important correction to the image that
has established itself in Western countries, and certainly also in the
Netherlands, regarding Islamic activism. In the current atmosphere of
confrontation little attention is given to what is actually happening on the
other side; stereotypical thinking dominates. A policy of constructive
engagement with the Muslim world needs to take into account the diver-
sity and dynamism of Islamic activism. Then can it also be recognized that
Islam in its political and legal aspects really can play an important role in
the development of Muslim countries. Supporting endogenous develop-
ments to promote democracy and human rights can lead to more lasting
results in the longer term than trying to impose these from outside. This
approach requires, however, a cultural shift, in the sense that it needs to be
acknowledged that Islam can be an important vehicle for the realization of
democracy and human rights. The cultural shift also involves acceptance of
the possibility that universal values can, in Muslim countries (for the time
being) assume different expression than is common in Western societies.
The West does not have a monopoly on the interpretation of universal
human rights nor on the behavior that is in agreement with them. Along
with the self-criticism to which Western countries regularly call the
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Muslim world, it would not be amiss that they also search their own hearts.
By admitting that the demand for universal human rights is also a perma-
nent task for Western countries, the West gains credibility.
The policy options indicated here show that stimulating positive internal
dynamics in Muslim countries is not easy. It means that one must simulta-
neously exercise influence and avoid meddling, and use windows of oppor-
tunity as they appear. In every case this demands a very substantial knowl-
edge of the situation in different Muslim countries where the venture is
undertaken. The cultural shift that this report also has in mind does not
mean that the Netherlands and the eu must support developments that
conflict with their own values. It does mean that Islamic-inspired forces are
not to be excluded in advance from external contacts and that policy efforts
should be directed toward the long term. Only when constructive forms of
Islamic activism are accepted gradually into the existing democratic order
do they have a chance to develop into an Islamic democratic movement.
Western political history itself reveals examples of an analogous passage
from diverse forms of broadly supported activism to democratic move-
ments. There is no reason why an analogous development cannot occur
with respect to Islamic activism. The empirical findings above illustrate
that a similar process of normalization is actually in progress in several
Muslim countries. 
The Council realizes that the strategic perspective of rapprochement
presented here requires sustained effort. Furthermore, it is a vulnerable
perspective. Actual rapprochement can easily be frustrated by a flare-up of
violence in running conflicts or by actions of individuals. The interdepen-
dencies in today’s world are such that events elsewhere have consequences
at home, and promising improvements in relations can be nipped in the
bud. This means that the current accent on security will (have to) be main-
tained for yet a long time. But for longer term security it is of utmost
importance to make the alternative proposed here the guideline for all
levels on which the Netherlands can exercise influence.
dy na mism in isl a mic activism
210
Dynamism in Islamic  24-08-2006  10:14  Pagina 210
notes
1 In comparison: in the other seven countries the percentage varies from 22
per cent (us) to 37 per cent (Spain).
2 The peace process became deadlocked after the assassination of Yitzhak
Rabin and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. During a subse-
quent discussion of a new charter, which lasted four years, it appeared that
the Arab countries did not want to become involved in military coopera-
tion with Israel before that country signed a peace treaty with Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinians. 
3 In the area of economics, it is not only the vested interests in the partner
countries who are resisting; to date the eu itself has not been in the fore-
front of external liberalization; the free entry of agricultural products and
textiles and the free movement of labor are especially sensitive points. Real
free entry is applicable only to oil, gas, and industrial products. Since 2005
progress has been made in the negotiations over a free trade zone. 
4 The Commission warns that the fight against terrorism causes tensions
between internal security considerations, on the one hand, and the human
rights and democratization agenda, on the other, that ultimately can be at
the cost of human rights (Biscop 2005: 13).
5 Euromesco, the research group of the foreign policy institutes and think-
tanks within the emp, comes to the somber conclusion that ‘the banaliza-
tion and routine nature’ of violence against citizens and political leaders of
the opposition form the major impediment to peace, democracy, the rule
of law, and human rights (Euromesco 2005a). 150,000 inhabitants of the
southern flank of the region have already died as a result of political
violence since 1995. But the eu in the ten years that the emp has been in
existence has not even once used the possibility of suspending the asso-
ciation treaties in response to serious human rights violations. Worse 
yet, the eu member states are reproached for applying double standards;
when prominent secular human rights activists or political leaders are
rounded up, European protests follow. When something similar happens
to Islamic activists, they mostly remain silent (Joffé 2005: 17; Panebianco
2004: 154). 
6 See among others Jones and Emerson (2005) for an extensive treatment of
the reform process on the basis of the Action plans.
7 In development policy, this assumption has also recently come under fire.
See among others undp 2002; Van Ardenne 2005.
8 As the nimd also notes, in recent years the eu has invested in supporting
elections, government reforms, civil society, and strengthening of the
constitutional state, but it has largely ignored political life. The nimd
considers political parties as an important missing link in eu aid policy
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directed to the promotion of democracy and human rights (nimd 2005:
26).
9 As Youngs notes: “Despite the commitments made by countless ministe-
rial statements and policy documents, in practice little new engagement
with Islam has been forthcoming. Donors have proceeded no further than
including general discussion on ‘Islam and democracy’ in some civil soci-
ety forums. A plethora of initiatives aim at ‘cultural understanding’
between Islam and the West, but concrete political support is lacking for
moderate Islamists concerned to widen political participation in their soci-
eties. (…) The eu’s new guidelines on democracy and human rights
promotion in the Middle East fail even to mention the Islamist issue. The
eu largely avoids working with Islamists even on fairly apolitical issues: for
example, declining to work through professional syndicates captured by
Islamists. In short, Islamists continue to be the apparent untouchables of
the democracy assistance world” (Youngs 2004b: 12).
10 This special attention to the rights of women is emphasized by the Euro-
pean Parliament. See, for example, the motion of the European Parliament
regarding the revised emp of the end of September 2005 (European Parlia-
ment 2005).
11 The Egyptian ndp, the government party that has monopolized power for
decades, is a textbook illustration of this intertwining of supervision of
religion with political party control over Islam in Egypt. Before the May 25,
2005 referendum on the changing of constitutional article 76, the official
ulama and the Minister of Religious Affairs called on all Egyptians to vote
in favor of these changes, regarding it as their religious obligation to do so.
All the major opposition parties were opposed to this proposition (icg
2005c: 21-22).
12 The experience of organizations such as the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (idea) underscores that assistance for
democratization that takes into account the dynamics of political develop-
ments and power relations of a country is more effective than assistance on
the basis of static, normative standards that start from a ‘deficit’ with
respect to established (Western) democracies. Precisely by taking the driv-
ing forces behind political and social changes as the starting points, can a
better understanding arise of the chances and limits of democratization
initiatives (Tommasoli 2005). Today, Islamic political movements and the
truly independent civil society organizations constitute the pre-eminent
driving forces.
13 In June 2004 the eu member states adopted the initiative for a ‘Strategic
Partnership with the Mediterranean Region and the Middle East.’ In addi-
tion to the emp Partners, the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar), Iraq, Iran, and
Yemen are also intended partners (European Commission 2003: 7). See
also: nhc 2005 and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005. 
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14 The examples of Egypt, Bahrain, and Jordan reveal that the courses indeed
differ, while there is also great variety in the tempo of reform. In Egypt the
reforms proceed extremely cautiously and in the main via the party elite of
the ndp. The party congress of October 2004 implemented a number of
reforms; it has, among other powers, control over the admission of
formerly banned political parties to the political arena. Jordan’s course has
been one of gradual expansion of political participation under control of a
special Ministry for Political Development that is also responsible for the
modernization of the political landscape and the political parties. In 1991
that led to the lifting of the ban on leftist and Islamic political parties, after
which they won seats in the parliament. In Bahrain the course of changes
can be characterized as ‘gradual constitutionalism’ (Perthes 2004b). The
introduction of a new constitution in 2002 means that this country is now
formally a constitutional monarchy. This step has given more room for
political debate and new forms of political participation. In addition, a
number of steps have been taken towards the expansion of individual and
political freedoms, women have for the first time obtained the active and
passive right to vote, and the parliament has been reinstated after a suspen-
sion of 27 years. 
15 The government itself does not have to allocate the available funds; that
can be done by independent agencies.
16 Changes to the Dutch constitution require first that a law be adopted that
rules that the constitutional change is considered. This consideration law
must receive in both the First and Second Chambers half plus one of the
votes cast. Then, during a second reading in both Chambers, a second
majority is needed. Only after a new election for the Second Chamber has
taken place, can discussion begin on the proposal to change the constitu-
tion. 
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appendix 1
Comparison of the scores of Muslim countries with regard to political rights and civil liberties,
early 1970s and 2003/2004
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Freedom House score (1972) Polity IV        Freedom House score (2004) Polity IV
score, 1971 score, 2003
and regime
type(1)
Political Civil Status – Political Civil Status:
rights liberties rights liberties NF=not
free; PF=
partly free;
F= free
Middle East and 
North Africa
Algeria 6 6 NF -9 6 5 NF -3
Bahrain 6 5 NF -10 5 5 PF -7
Chad 6 7 NF -9 6 5 NF -2
Egypt 6 6 NF -7 6 5 NF -6
Eritrea - - - - 7 6 NF -7
Iran 5 6 NF -10 6 6 NF 3
Iraq 7 7 NF -7 7 5 NF Itp.
Jordan 6 6 NF -9 5 4 PF -2
Kuwait 4 4 PF -8 4 5 PF -7
Lebanon 2 2 F 5 6 5 NF Itp.
Libya 7 6 NF -7 7 7 NF -7
Mauritania 6 6 NF -7 6 5 NF -6
Morocco 5 4 PF -9 5 4 PF -6
Oman 7 6 NF -10 6 5 NF -8
Qatar 6 5 NF -10 6 5 NF -10
Saudi Arabia 6 6 NF -10 7 7 NF -10
Sudan 6 6 NF -7 7 7 NF -6
Syria 7 7 NF -9 7 7 NF -7
Tunisia 6 5 NF -9 6 5 NF -4
UAE 7 5 NF -8 6 6 NF -8
West Bank, 
Gaza - - - - - - - -
Yemen - - - - 5 5 PF -2
Yemen, North 4 4 PF -6 - - - -
Yemen, South 7 7 NV -3 - - - -
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Burkina Faso 3 3 PF -4 5 4 PF Itp.
Comoros - - - 5 (1975) 4 4 PF 4
Djibouti - - - -8 (1977) 5 5 PF 2
Gambia 2 2 F 8 4 4 PF -5
Guinea 7 7 NF -9 6 5 NF -1
Mali 7 6 NF -7 2 2 F 6
Niger 6 6 NF -7 3 3 PF 4
Nigeria 6 4 PF -7 4 4 PF 4
Senegal 6 6 NF -7 2 3 F 8
Sierra Leone 4 5 PF -6 4 3 PF 5
Somalia 7 6 NF -7 6 7 NF Itg.
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Comparison of the scores of Muslim countries with regard to political rights and civil liberties,
early 1970s and 2003/2004
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Freedom House score (1972) Polity IV        Freedom House score (2004) Polity IV
score, 1971 score, 2003
and regime
type(1)
Political Civil Status – Political Civil Status:
rights liberties rights liberties NF=not
free; PF=
partly free;
F= free
Asia
Afghanistan 4 5 PF -8 5 6 NF Itp.
Azerbaijan - - - - 6 5 NF -7
Bangladesh 2 4 PF 8 (1972) 4 4 PF 6
Brunei 6 5 NF - 6 5 NF -
Indonesia 5 5 PF -7 3 4 PF 7
Kazakhstan - - - - 6 5 NF -6
Kyrgyzstan - - - - 6 5 NF -3
Malaysia 2 3 F 4 4 4 PF 3
Maldives 3 2 F - 6 5 NF -
Pakistan 3 5 PF Fall of regime 6 5 NF -5
Tajikistan - - - - 6 5 NF -3
Turkmenistan - - - - 7 7 NF -9
Uzbekistan - - - - 7 6 NF -9
Europe
Albania - - - -9 3 3 PF 7
Turkey 3 4 PF -1 3 3 PF 7
(1) Itp.= Interruption of the regime. Itg. = interregnum.
Notes  Since 1972 the Freedom House indicators have measured (on a scale from 1 to 7) the degree of
political rights and civil liberties in a country. A score of 1 is the most free, a score of 7, the least free.
The index of civil liberties is compiled on the basis of indicators for: 1. the freedom of expression and 
religion; 2. the freedom of association and organization; 3. the rule of law and human rights; 4. personal
autonomy and economic rights. From this is derived a general score to determine whether a country 
is Free (F, average score 1.0-2.5), Partly Free (PF, average score 3.0-5.0) or Not Free (NF, average score
5.5-7.0). The Freedom House indicators are, of course, not without controversy. There are doubts regar-
ding their objectivity and cultural neutrality.
The Polity IV score measures the democratic quality of political systems on a scale from -10 (high auto-
cracy) to 10 (high democracy). This score is based on the assumption that a democratic system must
include three mutually connected elements: 1. the presence of institutions and processes through which
citizens can express their will regarding which alternative policy and which alternative political leaders
they prefer; 2. the presence of institutionalized limitations on the exercise of executive power; and 3.
civil liberties in daily life and during moments of participation in the political process. All the other
elements of democracy, such as the presence of a constitutional state, checks and balances, and press
freedom are in this approach considered as deriving from or being expressions of these three basic
elements. A completely ‘mature’ democracy, according to this classification, is a political system in which
political participation by citizens leads to considerable opportunities for choice and competition, the
executive power meets considerable countervailing forces and is chosen by elections.
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Classification of Muslim countries by regime type - 2002
Source: Polity IV index
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Regime type
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Bahrain Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Chad Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Egypt Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Eritrea Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Iran Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Iraq Politically closed, authoritarian
Jordan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Kuwait Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Lebanon Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Libya Politically closed, authoritarian
Mauritania Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Morocco Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Oman Politically closed, authoritarian
Qatar Politically closed, authoritarian
Saudi Arabia Politically closed, authoritarian
Sudan Politically closed, authoritarian
Syria Politically closed, authoritarian
Tunisia Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
UAE Politically closed, authoritarian
West Bank, Gaza -
Yemen Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burkino Faso Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Comoros Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Djibouti Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Gambia Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Guinea Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Mali Electoral democracy
Niger Electoral democracy
Nigeria Ambiguous regime
Senegal Electoral democracy
Sierra Leone Ambiguous regime
Somalia Politically closed, authoritarian
Asia
Afghanistan Politically closed, authoritarian
Azerbaijan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Bangladesh Electoral democracy
Brunei Politically closed, authoritarian
Indonesia Ambiguous regime
Kazakhstan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Kyrgyzstan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Malaysia Electoral, competitive, authoritarian
Maldives Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Pakistan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Tajikistan Electoral, non-competitive, authoritarian
Turkmenistan Politically closed, authoritarian
Uzbekistan Politically closed, authoritarian
Europe
Albania Electoral democracy
Turkey Electoral democracy
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Status of Islam and Sharia as a legal source in the constitutions of Muslim countries
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Islam Sharia
Islamic  Islam The source, An A source Not a 
state as state of the main important source1
religion source source
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria Yes Yes Yes
Bahrain Yes Yes Yes
Chad No No Yes
Egypt No Yes Yes
Eritrea
Iran Yes Yes Yes
Iraq Yes
Jordan No Yes Yes
Kuwait No Yes Yes
Lebanon No No Yes
Libya No Yes Yes
Mauritania Yes Yes Yes
Morocco Yes Yes Yes
Oman Yes Yes Yes
Qatar No Yes Yes
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes Yes2
Sudan No No Yes
Syria No No Yes
Tunisia No Yes Yes
UAE No Yes Yes
West Bank, Gaza3 No Yes Yes
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burkina Faso No No Yes
Comoros No No Yes
Djibouti No No Yes
Gambia No No Yes
Guinea No No Yes
Mali No No Yes
Niger No No Yes
Nigeria No No Yes
Senegal No No Yes
Sierra Leone No No Yes
Somalia4 No No Yes
Asia
Afghanistan Yes Yes Yes
Azerbaijan No No Yes
Bangladesh No Yes Yes
Brunei5
Indonesia No No Yes
Kazakhstan No No Yes
Kyrgyzstan No No Yes
Malaysia No Yes Yes
Maldives Yes Yes Yes6
Pakistan No7 Yes Yes
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appendix 3 (continued)
Status of Islam and Sharia as a legal source in the constitutions of Muslim countries
Source: International Constitutional Law (undated) Constitutional Documents,
www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html
1 ‘Not a source’ indicates that these sources are not explicitly named as sources.
2 The Koran and the Sunna are not ‘only’ the sources on which the Constitution is based, but are the
constitution. Art. 1 reads as follows: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State
with Islam as its religion; God’s Book and the Sunna of His Prophet, God’s prayers and peace be upon
him, are its constitution (…).”
3 This refers to a draft constitution.
4 At this time Somalia has no constitution.
5 This constitution is not available.
6 Islam and Sharia are not explicitly mentioned as sources, but there are indications that these are an
important testing framework. In connection with this see, for example, art. 1: ‘the Maldives shall be a
(…)democratic republic based on the principles of Islam.” Art. 16 sec. 2: “every person who is charged
with an offense (…) shall have the right to defend himself in accordance with Sharia’ah.” Art. 23:
“No person shall be deprived of his property except as provided by law or Sharia’ah.” Art. 38: “The
President shall be the supreme authority to propagate the tenets of Islam.”…Art. 43: “The powers 
of the President shall be exercised subject to Sharia’ah and the Constitution. Nothing shall be done 
in violation of Sharia’ah or the Constitution.”
7 The preamble of Pakistan’s constitution states that Pakistan is a democratic state, based on Islamic
principles of social justice.
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Islam Sharia
Islamic  Islam The source, An A source Not a 
state as state of the main important source1
religion source source
Asia - continued
Tajikistan No No Yes
Turkmenistan No No Yes
Uzbekistan No No Yes
Europe
Albanië No No Yes
Turkije No No Yes
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appendix 4:  the barcelona process,
emp and enp
Barcelona process and emp
In the framework of the emp the eu has signed agreements with the
following partner countries: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Gaza/West
Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey. (In the
meantime Malta and Cyprus have become eu member states and Turkey is
a candidate-member state.) Libya was recently granted observer status. The
emp operates formally on the bilateral level, via the Association Agree-
ments, as well as on the multilateral level, chiefly through a yet-to-be-
formed regional free trade zone and financial aid. The emp is marked by its
ambitious security-political, democratic, and economic objectives. Analo-
gous to the Helsinki Process of the osce, measures and special oversight
mechanisms have been developed within three separate ‘baskets’. The
promotion of democracy and human rights is at the heart of the first basket
for the ‘strengthened political and security dialogue’. The second,
economic, basket aims to achieve ‘a zone of shared prosperity’ through the
gradual creation of a regional free trade zone in 2010, while the third basket
deals with measures to strengthen the mutual cultural and social relations
between the Union and the partner countries along the Mediterranean Sea
(Joffé 2004: 2).
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 includes the following statement about
democracy, human rights, and economic development:
“The major objective of the creation within the Euro-Mediterranean region
of ‘an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace,
stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect
for Human Rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social develop-
ment, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understand-
ing between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership’.
The participants undertake to:
1 act in accordance with the un Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;
2 develop the rule of law and democracy within their political systems;
3 respect Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom
of expression, association, thought, conscience and religion;
4 give favorable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to
exchanges of information on matters relating to Human Rights, funda-
mental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;
5 respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies
and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia;
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6 The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter
of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms.
Under the social, cultural and human “chapter”, participants:
7 attach particular importance to fundamental social rights, including the
right to development;
8 recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the
process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership;
9 will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the
strengthening of the rule of law and civil society [...];
10 undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under
existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective terri-
tories;
11 underline the importance of waging a determined campaign agains
racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to co-operate to that end.”
These objectives and basic principles were again confirmed at the eu
summit held at the end of November 2005 as part of the celebration of the
tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process (see below).
emp and enp
In December 2003 the Council of the eu adopted its first common Euro-
pean security strategy under the title ‘A secure Europe in a better world’.
They decided on a multidimensional policy that linked political, socio-
economic, cultural, military, and ecological dimensions. In October 2003
the Council decided to adopt the proposals of the European Commission
for concretizing this security policy via the European Neighborhood
Policy, enp. The area concerned stretches geographically from the Balkans,
Ukraine, Moldavia, Belarus, and the southern Caucasus to the emp coun-
tries. The connection with the enp means that also on a bilateral level, in
technical subgroups, national Action Plans could be established that could
introduce a stronger tie between financial incentives and actual progress.
Following the example of the so-called screening procedures for candidate-
member states, the European Commission prepares individual country
reports. Assessments over the situation in the areas of democracy, rule of
law, and human rights are also included in these reports. On the basis of
these assessments, negotiations are held with the partner countries on
concrete Action plans covering a number of key areas, including political
dialogue and reform and trade and gradual access to the internal market.
The annual progress reports must keep track of the advances in these areas
(European Commission 2003: 14-20; 2005: 5).
At the European summit of 27-28 November 2005 in Barcelona the emp
countries succeeded in unanimously adopting a five-year work plan and a
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code of conduct against terrorism. Together with the Association Agree-
ments and the bilateral action plans in connection with enp, the work plan
forms the basis for future cooperation in areas such as politics, security,
trade, the environment, education, and migration. On the other hand, the
member states remained divided among themselves on democratic reforms
and the Middle East peace process (Ministerie van Buitenlanse Zaken
2005b; Vasconcelos 2005).
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glossary     
Ahmadiyya Muslim movement in Pakistan
Ayatollah Religious title (Iran)
Baha’is Followers of the Persian Baha’i faith
Caliph Successor of the Prophet, deputy of God, leader of the
Muslim community (Ummah)
Caliphate The rulership of the entire Muslim community
(Ummah)
Da’wa Islamic proselytizing
Fatwa Judgement based on Sharia regarding individual ques-
tions (legal advice)
Fiqh Both the Islamic knowledge by which God’s divine plan
with society can be derived and the body of rules itself 
Hadd (pl. Hudud) Five crimes set down in the Quran (literally: limit)
Hadith Traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad
Hakimiyya Sovereignty of God
Hezbollah/Hizbullah Party of God
Hizb al-shaytaan Party of Satan
Hudud See: Hadd
Ijtihad Free interpretation, method of legal interpretation
Imam Religious leader
Jahiliyya Heathenism
Jama’a al-Islamiyya/
Jamaat-i-Islami Literally: organization for Islamic rebirth
Jihad Struggle; the inner, spiritual struggle of the believer or
the struggle to defend the religious community
Jinayat Rules for the application of the pre-Islamic retaliation
principle of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, or
compensation with blood money in cases of murder,
manslaughter, or assault
Khilafa See: Caliph
Khul Divorce by mutual agreement, entails a payment
Loya Jirga Consultative assembly (Afghanistan)
Madrasa Religious school
Muddawana Moroccan code of family law
Mullah Religious teacher or leader
Pancasila Five pillars of the state’s constitution (Indonesian)
Pesantrens System of Islamic boarding schools (Indonesia)
Shah (Persian) King
Sharia Islamic law; literally: ‘path’
Shiites A minority denomination within Islam (followers of Ali,
the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet)
glossary
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Shura Obligation of the ruler to consult with the ruled
Siyasa Authority for rule-giving, granted by Sharia, to the
government, which must not conflict with Sharia 
Sufi Mystical order in Islam
Sunna Acts of the Prophet (source of Sharia)
Sunnis Followers of the denomination which represents the
majority of all Muslims (literally: followers of the tradi-
tion)
Tachtsche The place where the Quran is stored: the highest place in
the house (Persian)
Tawhid The unity of God, monotheism
Ulama (singular Alim) Those educated in Islamic law
Ummah The community of Muslim believers
Vilayat-i-faqih Spiritual leader (Iran)
Wahhabism Conservative interpretation of Islam that is the official
religious doctrine in Saudia Arabia and that dates back to
the ideas of Muhammad ’Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792)
Zakat Compulsory contribution of a percentage of one’s wealth
to the poor (alms)
Zina Extramarital sex (a hadd crime) 
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